Page:A handbook of modern Japan (IA handbookofmodern01clem).pdf/388

régime, was in no position to offer any opposition to three of the greatest World Powers, when they tendered her kindly(?) advice. The only two powers who might have assisted her against this combination were neither sufficiently interested nor far-sighted enough to interfere; and they (Great Britain and the United States) kept silent. Therefore, Japan had nothing to do but to submit and accept a monetary consideration for giving up her claim to the Liaotung Peninsula.

This in itself was not a casus belli, but it was enough to arouse to almost fever-heat the excitement of an intensely patriotic and naturally militant nation. The Government was able to hold in check the indignant people; but nothing could prevent the development of a not unnatural desire for revenge. From that time it was definitely and positively known that a war with Russia was inevitable in the not-distant future; and calmly and carefully the Japanese went to work to prepare themselves for that conflict. It is not necessary to go into the details of that preparation, the thoroughness of which has been surprising the civilized world.

But even then war might have been averted, for the spirit of revenge would have faded away in the multitude of other interests and sentiments that have been pressing upon Japan's attention within the past decade. Indeed, during the Boxer troubles of 1900 and 1901 in China, when the troops of Japan were marching, in company with those of Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain, the United States, et al., to the relief of the beleaguered foreigners in Peking, it almost seemed like a harbinger of continued peace in the Far East. But this harmony was only apparent, not real,—only temporary, not permanent.

In fact, it was that very campaign which enabled Russia to complete her practical possession of Manchuria. She