My War Memoirs/References

(1) Published in English as The Making of a State. (George Allen & Unwin. 218.)

(2) At that time aviation had hardly started and the plans of the pan-Germans seemed to me nothing more than childish phantasies.

(3) At these meetings it was decided that Dr. Lev Sychrava should go abroad. He left Prague in the second half of September and was the first of the Czechs who proceeded abroad with expressly revolutionary aims.

(4) This refers to the battle at which the Czechs were defeated in 1620.

(5) After a long search I found these documents unharmed in 1922.

(6) The Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Vienna had sent it to the Ministry of the Interior, whence Machar had obtained it through Kovanda.

(7) My information about the police was obtained from Jan Hájek, with whom I had been in touch ever since my stay in Paris. He was employed at the headquarters of the gendarmerie, and supplied very valuable and copious information, for which he ran many risks.

(8) One of our double postcards was seized by the authorities and after being deciphered it served as a piece of incriminating evidence in the proceedings which ensued. The fact that this was the only postcard which was seized in this way shows that on the whole our arrangements worked well.

(9) Dr. Rašín was arrested a few days later.

(10) Masaryk pointed out that circumstances might make it necessary to take active measures at home; for example, to organize manifestos of dissatisfaction, demonstrations, a secret printing press like that used in Belgium against the Germans, the dissemination of illicit newspapers, reports, etc., but it must be done cautiously and at the right time, and there must be no unnecessary rushing into provocative acts which would lead to persecution. Masaryk always emphasized these points.

(11) Dr. Kramář expressed this view to me in very emphatic terms.

(12) At that time, during the investment of Cracow, the enthusiasm for the Russians was at its height among all sections of our population.

(13) Captain Voska’s activities in America, with the assistance of the American and British authorities, belongs largely to another aspect of our revolutionary movement. It was described in detail by President Masaryk in his memoirs.

(14) With reference to all these reports I should like to make the following observations:

1. They were sometimes intentionally written in an optimistic tone, in order to prevent our people at home from losing courage at a period of Allied military defeats. On other occasions they were given a somewhat pessimistic colouring when we wanted them to produce a definite reaction in Prague, i.e. more activity against Austria or other measures which we demanded.

This will explain some of the strong terms which I used from time to time.

2. They contain a number of inexact details either about military successes or diplomatic negotiations on both sides. I reproduced the items of information as I received them, and I did not always have the advantage of first-hand sources.

​3. Mistakes occur in a few details of facts, but I always defined accurately the policy of ourselves, the Allies and Central Powers as a whole. In the same way I gave an accurate estimate of various individual events. Moreover, I received prompt and accurate information about all the main events.

4. There are some details which are repeated in nearly all the reports. This applies particularly to the wish that we abroad should not be repudiated by our politicians at home, that they should not relax their revolutionary activity—since not even the Allies would give us something for nothing—and that at all costs a continuous communication should be maintained between Prague and us.

(15) I set off for Holland on the very next day and spent Christmas Eve suffering from seasickness on the steamer. On the day after I met Dr. B. Štěpánek at Amsterdam. On this trip I spent two weeks in Rotterdam, where I lived under the name of M. Leblanc. The English authorities took me for an Austrian spy and would not let me return to London. When, finally, with great difficulty I did manage to land in England I was arrested, taken to London and imprisoned. Masaryk’s intervention led to my release, and on January 11, 1916, I returned to Paris. I may mention that this was not the last occasion upon which I was imprisoned by the Allied authorities. The English locked me up three times—in each case only for a short period until matters were cleared up—and the French twice.

(16) In my third report to Prague, which was based upon the notes I took at that time, I wrote as follows on the subject of Masaryk’s discussions with Briand:

“Professor Masaryk then came to Paris and discussed matters with a number of influential politicians. He was received by Briand who said to him verbatim: We French have always entertained keen sympathies for the Czech nation, and these sympathies have been strengthened by the war. I assure you that France will not forget your aspirations, which we share, and we shall do everything in order that the Czechs may obtain their independence. We will not speak about the details now, but as far as the chief point of your claim is concerned we are in agreement. Deschanel, who to-day is powerful and influential, expressed himself similarly. We have France entirely on our side.”

(17) Quoted from the notes which I took at the time. Protopopov was then on his well-known journey in Western Europe.

(18) In his pamphlet entitled In the Czech Service (Prague 1921), Dürich, speaking of Crkal (p. 29), says that I recommended him for the journey to Russia. I never recommended Crkal to anybody. From the first moment when I saw his work and attitude in the colony at Paris I was consistently opposed to him. All of us in the secretariat of the National Council, with the exception of Dürich, shared this point of view.

(19) From my daily notes during 1916 and 1917.

(20) Our purpose in arranging this sham arrest was to avert the suspicion of the Austrian authorities from people who were apparently being interfered with by the Allied authorities. In this way we succeeded in sending home a number of important messages.

(21) This was my second meeting with Milyukov. I had met him for the first time at Paris on May 29, 1916, when, as a member of the Russian Parliamentary Delegation, he was making a tour of the Allied countries of Western Europe with a number of his colleagues. This delegation on which Protopopov, then Minister of the Interior, was also serving caused considerable agitation in London and Paris on account of its political views and demands. On that ​occasion I had visited Milyukov and Shingaryev, the two cadet leaders. They had made statements to me on war aims and their views of the Czechoslovak question which had then been a great encouragement to us. Milyukov’s declaration, in particular, produced a strong and decisive effect, because we were in the early stages of organizing our political movement.

(22) At the time of Mackensen’s offensive against Serbia the number of Austro-Hungarian prisoners there was said to have been about 35,000, of whom about 25,000 were Czechoslovaks. These figures are only approximate, and some of our officers give other estimates. Those which I quote here I regard as being approximately correct. The number of 4,000 of our prisoners in France was ascertained by the National Council, but it is certain that there were Czechoslovak prisoners in France of whom the secretariat of the National Council had no record.

(23) The difficulties which we encountered in our work even at this time, in spite of the fact that we were in regular touch with the authorities, and enjoyed a certain esteem and confidence, as representing an important political factor, is shown by the obstacles which I was perpetually encountering on my journeys from Paris to Masaryk in London. As General Secretary of the National Council I was being invited by the French authorities to headquarters and to the ministries. Negotiations were carried on with me regarding military and political affairs, I was supplied with reports and telegrams from Russia on the subject of our prisoners and troops, and also with reference to Štefánik’s mission there. After events of any importance, or when I had received any urgent news, I generally proceeded to Masaryk in London to discuss with him what our next step was to be. On all these journeys the same difficulties with passport, visas, and control were always recurring. Having a Serbian passport and being obliged to state that I was travelling to the Allied countries for the purpose of discussing Czechoslovak questions, I everywhere aroused the suspicion of the authorities, by whom I was usually regarded as a spy. I have already mentioned that on a number of occasions I was arrested and imprisoned. A typical instance of this occurred in connection with the reports on our military movement which were sent to me from Russia by Štefánik in October 1916. On October 19, 1916, after visiting the headquarters at Chantilly, I left with my military documents for London. At Southampton I was stopped, subjected to an extremely unpleasant examination, and then imprisoned. The documents, which in the eyes of the English authorities formed a striking proof that I was a spy, were confiscated. It was only after long and difficult proceedings, which were followed by an apology on the part of the English authorities, that I was released. Once I was arrested at Havre and on another occasion in Paris. These difficulties continued until the proclamation of a provisional government. Even in the spring of 1918, when I had left London after my negotiations with Mr. Balfour on the subject of our recognition, Mr. Wickham Steed had to intervene at Southampton on my behalf. He pointed out to the police official that although they were now treating me as a suspicious person they would before long be placing visas upon passports signed by me. To-day it is pleasant to recall all this, but during the war it was very far from amusing. It wasted time, energy, health, and nerves.

(24) In this connection there is an interesting telegram which was sent on November 5, 1916, by Karl from the Austrian headquarters at Teschen to Burian. In this telegram, which explains more than could be told on many pages of description, Karl expresses himself as follows:

“The Emperor informed me to-day that Hindenburg proposes to make a démarche only after the Ploesci-Bucharest line has been taken. On raising objections I received the answer that the suitable moment must be chosen ​by the Field-Marshal. My impression is that the Foreign Office has been completely thrust aside and that there is a complete military dictatorship holding sway. The Kaiser is entirely uninformed about the lamentable economic situation of Germany and the war-weariness of his nation, which no amount of subterfuge could disguise. To-morrow I shall make another attempt to win over Hindenburg and Ludendorff in favour of accelerating the démarche which, I think, displeases them. Hohenlohe is doing all that is possible.”

(25) During the discussions in the National Council with Dr. Sychrava and Osuský, the latter expressed the fear that the Allied Note to President Wilson might mention only the Czechs and not the Slovaks. In the course of my negotiations with the Ministry I convinced myself that our point of view in this matter was, on the whole, well understood. Nevertheless, throughout the proceedings I more and more insisted on the necessity for a formula which would comprise the Slovaks, for I was afraid that if this were not done it would cause difficulties within our movement.

(26) When the note was published in London Masaryk sent me the following telegram on January 12, 1917: “The success is unexpectedly great. Inform me whether we owe it to Briand. It will now be possible to state the fact in the papers. Your share in the success will also be appreciated.” In Vienna they knew that Russia had no initiative or share in the whole of the movement against Austria-Hungary. This pleased them, and they supposed that the whole matter was due to the initiative of the English Government.

(27) The Poles, in certain respects, received preferential treatment, mainly because they started their volunteer movement a considerable time before the United States entered the war.

(28) In Russia, up to the time of the Bolshevik revolution, our army was not an independent fighting force, but was a constituent part of the Russian Army and took an oath of allegiance to Russia.

(29) From my notes taken during 1916 and 1917.

(30) On this occasion, just as previously, I was assisted by Barrère’s whole entourage. Thus, throughout my stay in Rome, I was in constant touch with Charles Loiseau and his family, and it was again through Loiseau that I was able to communicate with the Vatican.

(31) In this sense I at once informed Masaryk, to whom, through Sir Samuel Hoare, I sent the following telegram: “I am returning to Paris but in three weeks I shall be back in Rome. I have completed all political negotiations here and we are beginning the organization of the troops. The result of our work is this: Complete recognition of the National Council, liberation of all interned civilians, establishment of Czechoslovak Labour Corps on second line of defence. Fear of reprisals on the part of Austria compels Italy to maintain certain reservations. The rights of our troops here will therefore be somewhat restricted. But on the whole the success is complete and in a short time will be supplemented.

(32) The former category included the Austro-Hungarian Ministers at The Hague (Szechényi) and Berne (Musulin) respectively, and Count Revertera. On the English side there was Sir Horace Rumbold, the English Minister at Berne, together with General Smuts and Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary. The French representatives included Count Armand and Professor Haguenin, head of the Press Bureau in Berne. Of the neutrals should be mentioned the Swedish Foreign Minister at that time and, in particular, M. Loudon, who was then the Dutch Foreign Minister and who is now the Dutch Minister in Paris.

Among the second category may be mentioned Prince Djemal Tussun, and on behalf of the Austrians, Dr. Rostoworowski and Dr. Bader, together ​with Consul-General Montlong and Baron de Vaux. Of the staff of the French Legation at Berne may be mentioned Count de Châteauneuf, who, by all accounts, acted entirely on his own initiative and was not taken seriously. Such persons as Casella (the correspondent of the Matin) and Svatkovsky also were concerned in these matters on various occasions. An active part was taken in this respect by Parodi, who was then the confidant of Sir Horace Rumbold and who is now in the Secretariat of the League of Nations. Then there was a group of international pacifists, such as Professor Herron, Lammasch, and others.

(33) Mrs. Barton, a prominent Englishwoman resident in Switzerland, and a relative of Earl Balfour and Lord Robert Cecil. During the war she was in continual touch with Allied official circles.

(34) In fairness it should here be pointed out that in his consistorial pronouncement of January 22, 1915, Benedict did express his disapproval of the injustice perpetrated in the war. He then caused a confidential statement to be conveyed to the Belgian Government, indicating that though he had formulated his point of view in general terms, he had in mind the invasion of Belgium.

(35) “Aux Chefs des peuples belligérants.”

(36) These three points in the Pope’s note had already been emphasized in various forms in all Wilson’s notes on the subject of peace aims, and both sides therefore regarded them as proposals acceptable to all, especially as they were expressed in such general and vague terms. On all the other points there was a fundamental divergency.

(37) The decree was published in the Press on the day after the first meeting between General Smuts and Count Mensdorff-Pouilly.

(38) For the same reasons, as we shall see later, it was my particular care that when our movement was recognized by Great Britain in August 1918, this uniformity of all our military forces should be expressly emphasized.

(39) At that time Wilson had no official knowledge of the London Pact.

(40) In his speech on October 24, 1917, just before the serious reverse at Caporetta, Sonnino was still unable to say anything final and decisive on this subject. He continued to express himself vaguely on fundamental questions, saying, for example, that Italy was not concerned with dividing up the Habsburg Empire.

(41) When the first reports on the establishment of our army in France reached Rome, Deputy F. Arca made a speech in the Italian Parliament on our revolutionary movement and demanded that it should be supported as resolutely in Italy as in France. Qualtiarotti, the vice-president of the Chamber, associated himself with Arca’s speech and sent me also a congratulatory telegram to Paris.

(42) By the terms of the statutes which had been signed, neither the French Government nor the High Command had the right to settle the matter without our consent.

(43) The text of this official report runs as follows: “La commission des affaires extérieures, après avoir examiné les documents et recueilli les témoignages relatifs aux conversations de paix engagées et poursuivies par l’Autriche-Hongrie en 1917 et 1918, constate que ces conversations n’ont offert, à aucun moment, l’occasion d’une paix acceptable pour la France et pour ses Alliés.”

(44) The question of a joint declaration by the Allies in favour of the oppressed peoples had at this moment made such progress in Paris, where ​they were much more decisively opposed to Vienna, that Pichon, realizing the danger of disagreements (Wilson’s declaration on the claims of Italy and the London Pact), proposed that a joint Allied programme on this subject should be drawn up. There was so much uncertainty and disunity on this point, and also so great a fear that it might lead to disagreement between the Allies, that a decision was made for each of the Allies in the meanwhile to proceed independently in this respect.

(45) After my conversations with Clemenceau I then believed that all our troops would be transferred to France in three months.

(46) This Article runs as follows: “The Emperor is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; he declares war and makes peace.”

(47) This declaration, which was made on December 23, 1917, runs as follows: “The question of the State allegiance of national groups having no State independence, cannot, in the view of the Quadruple Entente Powers, be adjusted on inter-State lines. This question should be settled as the case arises by each separate State with its nationalities independently by a constitutional process.”

(48) In May and August 1918 Dr. Štěpánek sent to Paris two reports in which he gave us a detailed account of his scheme for getting away from the Dalmatian islands to Italy with important political and military news by means of a submarine. The scheme would have demanded proceedings on the part of the Allies which we could not have asked for at that time, more particularly from Italy, which was very mistrustful in these matters. I replied to this effect in my report to Prague on June 14, 1918. Dr. Štěpánek, nevertheless, with remarkable courage, managed to cross the Adriatic in an ordinary boat with his friend Giunio, towards the end of October 1918, at a moment when the Empire was on the point of collapsing. He was first stopped in Italy, but then reached Paris where he took part particularly in the negotiations arising from the differences among the Jugoslavs. In November he returned from Paris to Prague as one of the first envoys with news about preparations for the Peace Conference.

(49) This report probably referred to the first conflicts of our transport divisions at Penza and Samara with the local Soviets.

(50) As far as I have been able to ascertain, the idea of concentrating or transporting our army by way of Archangelsk and Murmansk first made its appearance in an official document of the British War Office on April 1, 1918. From that date onwards the French military authorities also took it into account. It is first quoted in the French official documents on April 20th. A similar plan emerged in Russia also about the same time, whether under the influence of the telegrams from Paris and London, or independently, I do not know.

(51) The divergency of views between England and France as to the employment of our Russian army was settled two weeks later at the Franco-British Conference in London, where an official resolution on this subject was passed in accordance with our ideas.

(52) Clemenceau’s remarks on this occasion included the following: “I want to have all your troops in France. I consider them first-rate soldiers. We will give you a declaration and will acknowledge your independence. You must be independent because you deserve it. You can rely on me not to leave you in the lurch.”

(53) As soon as Masaryk, who was in Washington at the time, received the text of this document he sent Pichon a telegram of thanks.

​(54) At that time I had no exact information as to the total number of our troops in Siberia. But having news in Paris that as our army proceeded eastward it was continually increasing in numbers by the arrival of fresh prisoners, we estimated its size as being far beyond what it actually was. That is why I erroneously mentioned so high a figure. At that time the maximum number of our troops was somewhere about 80,000.