My War Memoirs/Chapter 18

Amid the feverish activity entailed by the organization of the newly recognized State after October 15, 1918, some of the daily papers in Paris published the unexpected news on October 23rd that the Viennese Government had granted permission to the leading Czech politicians to proceed abroad, and even to get into touch with the members of the provisional Czechoslovak Government. At first we could not believe this. We knew, of course, that Austria was in a bad way, and we ourselves had asked for this very step to be taken in Prague, but we had not expected they would allow such a course so soon, and we were therefore not certain what might be behind this decision on the part of the Viennese Government. Later, we ascertained that Vienna, still believing that the Allies were anxious to preserve Austria, hoped that the Entente would bring its influence to bear on the politicians from Prague and on the interim Government at Paris so that the Czechs might be satisfied with autonomy or federalism as a solution of their question. At the end of October the Viennese Government was making efforts through Count Skrzynski in Berne to reach an agreement with Paris in this sense, but these efforts were unsuccessful. By that time the orientation of the Allies was on entirely different lines.

When the report was confirmed to me by Dr. Osuský from Geneva I informed the French Government, and added that the representatives of the interim Czechoslovak Government had decided to proceed to Geneva to negotiate with our politicians there. The first section of the Prague delegates, comprising Dr. Kramář, Dr. Preis, Dr. Šámal, and others, reached Geneva ​on the evening of Saturday, October 26th. They had been accompanied on their way through Switzerland by Dr. Osuský, who had given them the earliest news about the general political situation. I myself arrived at Geneva on the following Monday morning, October 28th.

This meeting at Geneva had, I think, considerable historical importance. The conference began on the same afternoon, and the questions which were discussed can be classified into three groups:

(a) My colleagues and myself supplied the delegates from Prague with a detailed account of the international situation in general. The Prague delegation on their part explained to us the situation at home, the military and political state of Austria, the economic conditions there, and the anxiety of our people as to what might happen in the immediate future should Austria-Hungary collapse.

(b) The second part of the discussion was concerned with the arrangements for establishing our independent State, the form of which was discussed in detail. We also considered how, at the moment of the capitulation of Austria-Hungary, the transition to a Czechoslovak regime was to be carried out.

(c) The concluding part of the conference was devoted to the conditions of an armistice for Austria-Hungary and the wishes of our people at home, which after my return to Paris I was to place before the Allies.

It seemed to me that on a number of questions the Prague delegates were a little uncertain, and that on the whole they had no very clear idea of our affairs abroad during the war. They were all convinced of the forthcoming collapse of Austria-Hungary. They referred to the desperate economic conditions, the exhaustion of the population, the demoralization of the army, the grim humour prevailing among the Czechs and especially in Prague, the perplexity of Vienna, and the attempts of the Government there to win over the Czech politicians. M. Klofáč told me about his last interview with Karl, from which he discovered that the Emperor’s only wish was for everything “to be liquidated peaceably.” They all, without exception, however, were alarmed about what might happen at the last moment. M. Habrman expressed this vigorously by saying that, “when the brute was at its last gasp it would lash out and avenge itself on us with terrible butchery.” The rest feared that “when breaking-point had been reached,” German ​troops would occupy the Czech territories, and that this would be a source of the greatest danger to us. A third serious danger to all consisted of the anarchy of Bolshevism, which was feared not so much among the Czechs, as in Vienna and Budapest. The only remedy lay in rapidly improving the food supplies.

On the whole I saw that the certainty of our final victory was tempered by fears of a German occupation and of hunger riots, especially in Vienna, as well as by the consciousness that Austria was still in existence, and that the delegates would have to return there. They had no definite plan as to further international action, which they left entirely to us abroad. For the eventuality of Austria’s collapse, however, they had, as we shall see later, a fairly detailed scheme providing for the practical transition from the old monarchy to an independent State. In reply to the report of the Prague delegates I gave them a full account of what we had been doing abroad during the war. I should add that the discussions were not carried on with the usual formalities of meetings, but were rather in the nature of amicable conversations. Resolutions were passed with the proviso that they were to be submitted for the approval of the political parties and the National Committee at home. My own statement was couched in optimistic terms, and the gist of it was that our cause had been won, that we were already existing as an independent State and nation, that I had no further misgivings as to the result of the war, and that we should obtain far more than we had ventured to hope in 1914. The delegates, who hitherto had not been aware of our achievements in detail, and who were not acquainted with the wording of the documents granting us recognition, were both surprised and gratified to learn about these matters.

After we had exchanged information, I approached the delegates with a number of questions and requests. First of all, I explained that it was necessary for the Allies to see that there was complete agreement between ourselves and the politicians at home, and that our movement abroad was backed by the whole nation. Recalling the reports as to the Austrian efforts to obtain a declaration in favour of the Empire from our politicians, I urged the delegates that nothing was to be done at home which might be used against us. For this reason I asked whether the delegation was entitled and willing there and ​then to make definite binding decisions on behalf of the nation, in accordance with which we could continue negotiations with the Allies. What I asked for, in concrete terms, consisted of the following:

(a) A solemn testimony that the Czech nation was giving its full assent to the whole of our policy, that it was opposed to the Habsburgs now and for all time, and that it no longer recognized the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

(b) A declaration that our politicians at home, and therefore also those whom they represented, approved all the steps which we had taken in our activity abroad, and that they would accept all the commitments which we had made towards the Allies on behalf of the National Council and the interim Government. The Prague delegation pointed out that although they were not expressly authorized to take such a step, they were entitled to do so in view of the situation at home, and accordingly they at once replied in the affirmative to both the above-mentioned points. It was therefore decided that a statement to this effect should be drawn up in writing, and Šámal, Kalina, and Habrman undertook the task of wording it. On the following day the text of it was duly approved, and on the day before my departure for Paris it was signed. We also arranged that I was to hand one copy of the declaration officially to the Allies, but that, out of consideration for the delegates who were returning to Prague, it was not to be published until the conditions in Austria made such a course desirable.

The Prague delegation was so impressed by the documentary and other evidence of what had been achieved by our movement abroad, that on their own initiative they decided to place on record their special recognition of the work done by Masaryk, our troops, and the others who were concerned in our movement. Accordingly, without the knowledge of the Paris delegation, they drew up a statement expressing the sentiments of the nation in this respect. Before my departure to Paris they handed me a signed copy of this manifesto with the request that its contents should be conveyed in a similar form and at the appropriate moment to all those for whom it was intended.

Thus, after having been recognized by the Great Powers, the interim Government at Paris received its final and most important token of recognition from Prague. The unity of our struggle for liberation at home and abroad was in this way solemnly confirmed.

Another important item for discussion involved the form of the Czechoslovak State and the establishment of a definitive Government at home. The majority of the delegates held the view that the Czechoslovak National Council and interim Government had probably incurred obligations with some of the Allies which involved a monarchist form of State. I therefore explained that we had never undertaken any commitments in this sense. In particular, all statements as to Masaryk’s negotiations on the subject of Prince Arthur of Connaught were without foundation. At one time General Štefánik had shown some inclination for an Italian dynasty, but not even here had there been any definite undertakings, and the question of a Russian dynasty had ceased to have any meaning as far as we were concerned since the outbreak of the Russian revolution. I myself was offered the opportunity of discussion on this subject on two occasions. As early as 1917, indirect overtures were made to me to discover whether it would not be possible to save the Czech crown for some Habsburg Archduke. I made it clear I did not take such discussions at all seriously.

Thus we were entirely free, and the nation and political circles possessed full liberty to please themselves as to the form of the State. I also pointed out that the Washington declaration definitely announced that our State would be a republic.

This being the case, the discussion on this point was not protracted. Habrman, speaking for the Social Democratic Party, expressed its desire for a democratic republic, a single chamber, and election of the President by the people. If the independence of the State rendered a monarchy imperative, his party would accept it, but very reluctantly. He was, therefore, particularly gratified to hear that we were in no way committed on this score. Dr. Kramář declared that he personally was in favour of a monarchy, but, he added (and I made a note of the exact words he used), “If it is to be a kingdom, it would have to be extremely democratic, as in England.” From a private conversation about Russia, which I had with him on the same day, I gathered that he had in mind a monarchy governed by one of the Russian Grand Dukes, his assumption being that the conditions in ​Russia would soon change and that after the rapid fall of the Bolsheviks the Romanoffs would return to the throne.

The establishment of a definitive Government in Prague, as soon as the regime in Austria came to an end, also formed the subject of detailed discussions. As regards this, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the two ministers of the interim Government were the chief items of the debate. All the members of the delegation considered it as a matter of course that Masaryk should be President of the new State. In the same way it was a foregone conclusion that the Prime Minister of the definitive Government was to be Dr. Kramář. The only point about which there was any uncertainty among some of the delegates was the choice of the future Minister of the Interior.

The Prague delegates also laid emphasis on the question of the Germans in Bohemia. It was recognized that in this respect we must proceed cautiously so as not to create any prejudice for ourselves when vindicating the historical frontiers of the Czech territories. We therefore unanimously passed a resolution that the definitive Government should include one German as a regional minister without portfolio.

It was further agreed that the two ministers of the interim Government should continue to exercise their functions as Minister of War and Minister of Foreign Affairs respectively in the definitive Government. I should here add that these negotiations were a friendly exchange of views, and were not regarded in any way as final decisions. The subjects dealt with were to be fully discussed in Prague, both by the National Committee and the political parties who were then to express their final opinion in accordance with the situation at home.

No less interesting was the debate on the manner in which the transition from the Austro-Hungarian regime to the new Czechoslovak State was to be carried out. From what the delegates said on this subject it was clear that our people at home had given the matter close consideration and were adequately prepared for the eventuality. The information thus gained was extremely valuable to me in my further activities in Paris.

​In our discussions the change of regime was envisaged as involving, first and foremost, definite general revolutionary measures. All constitutional laws hitherto existing would cease to exist, and they would be replaced by emergency regulations which the National Committee would issue as decrees. A legislative commission would, however, be immediately set up to prepare and arrange detailed enactments, and to carry out the functions of a Parliamentary body until the constituent assembly had been convened.

Similar proceedings would be taken in economic matters. All the economic enactments would remain in force, and a number of the war-time arrangements would provisionally be retained (the distributing centres for sugar, clothing, cotton, potatoes, coal, etc.). On the day when independence was declared, all unrestricted export and import would be suspended and would then be sanctioned only by the Government. At the same time an import organization would be set up which, with the assistance of the banks, would deal with the import of raw materials, would restrict the import of luxury goods, and would attend to the supply of food, clothing, and employment. There would be a department to prevent profiteering, which would be punished by the confiscation of the offender’s property. The prices of commodities would be adjusted by the State.

It would be necessary to make immediate preparations for establishing a National Bank and a new currency. We contemplated adopting the franc and forming an agreement with the States comprised in the Latin Currency Union. The Austro-Hungarian Bank would be liquidated and its branches in the Czech territories taken over by the State. The Austrian banknotes would, for the time being, remain in circulation, but they would have to be quickly superseded by Czechoslovak banknotes, which would then be the only legal tender. Joint-stock companies with their works on our territory would have to transfer their headquarters to us and become amenable to our control. Their board of directors would have to contain a definite percentage of our citizens. The rules and regulations concerning taxation would continue to hold good.

Mines and spas would at once pass over into State administration. The appropriate ministry, acting in co-operation with the Ministry of Social Welfare, was to make the necessary arrangements for safeguarding the interests of owners and workmen.

Land reform was discussed in some detail and in a very radical ​spirit. All privileges connected with large landed estates, entail, freehold, and ecclesiastical property were to be abolished; further, it was proposed to set up a National Land Bank which was to be entrusted with dividing up the landed estates into allotments, the subsequent sales to be carried out under close State supervision.

All munition factories would be handed over to State administration. Social policy was also discussed in detail, together with various questions affecting Allied property which had been confiscated by Austria-Hungary. For carrying out all these plans it would, of course, be necessary for us to secure the assistance of the Allies, both directly and indirectly, the essential point being that the Armistice conditions should be favourable to our plan. Our delegates were particularly concerned with the problem of a rapid military occupation of Austro-Hungarian territory if and when the final catastrophe ensued. One of the conditions which they were anxious to secure as being advantageous to a successful course of events was that Allied troops, and our own as well, should be promptly sent to the Czech territories; that a number of railway routes should be occupied; and that, in general, communications with the Allies should be secured in good time.

Much concern was caused to our delegates by the prison camps, especially those containing Russians and forming Bolshevik centres. They were also anxious to obtain Allied protection against a possible invasion by Mackensen’s German army on the Rumanian frontiers.

These questions were all connected with the important problem of the food supplies. The delegates urged the necessity for relieving our own population from the hardships they were suffering, and also for preventing the possibility of hunger riots, especially in Vienna where, in the opinion of them all, the danger was most acute. They impressed upon me the need for drawing the attention of the Allies to these matters and for taking them into account when an armistice was under consideration.

Finally, we discussed the economic and financial affairs of Austria-Hungary and their bearing upon the interests of our State. This had particular reference to the pre-war and war debts of the monarchy, and the possibility of our obtaining financial assistance in the form of a loan from the Allies or by means of economic co-operation with them.

While we were discussing the questions concerning the establishment of our State, events were developing with such rapidity that the climax, which we had not expected for weeks or even months, surprised us in the middle of our conference.

As I have already pointed out, Karl’s manifesto proposing the federalization of the Empire had satisfied nobody, either in Austria-Hungary or elsewhere. Abroad it was regarded as a plain sign that the beginning of the end was at hand, at home it merely caused fresh indignation and protest, while among the troops it resulted, first of all in uncertainty, then in confusion, and finally in a complete collapse.

At Prague the National Committee met on October 19th, and from that date onwards continued in permanent session. It repudiated the Emperor’s manifesto very decidedly, and proclaimed that “For the Czech nation there could be no discussion with Vienna on the subject of its future.” The statement of the National Committee contained also the following: “The Czech question has become an international one . . . and cannot be settled without the sanction of that internationally recognized part of the nation which is beyond the Czech frontiers. It is the duty of the National Committee, on behalf of the whole of the Czech people, to declare that there can be no other settlement of the Czech question than absolute State independence. The National Committee therefore publicly protests against the efforts being made in Magyar quarters to persuade the world that our Slovak brethren do not desire to form a single national State unity with the nation of which they are an inseparable branch. The Slovaks, ill-treated and reduced to silence by unexampled Magyar coercion, cannot freely make known their desires. . . .”

During the same period, on October 17th, 18th, and 19th, the Jugoslav National Committee met at Zagreb and issued a manifesto signed by the representatives of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in Austria-Hungary. Like the manifesto of the National Committee at Prague, it unanimously repudiated Karl’s proposals, and demanded the unification of all Jugoslavs in a single free State. Although both these manifestos were confiscated, their contents became known in Switzerland just ​after October 24th, and they provided the world with a further indication that the end of the Habsburg Empire was at hand.

Wilson’s note of October 18th was published at Vienna on the evening of Sunday, October 20th. It was received with consternation in some quarters and resignation in others, while among the representatives of the subject peoples it caused enormous satisfaction. It provided the Magyars with an incentive for hastening their separation from Vienna, which was carried out two days later.

On the afternoon of October 21st the Austrian National Assembly met and passed resolutions which make it clear that the Austrian Germans themselves were gradually preparing for any eventuality. The Assembly, comprising the German deputies from the Austrian Alpine regions, demanded the creation of a German-Austrian State which was to incorporate the Sudetic Germans. This, of course, presupposed some kind of agreement with the other national States established on the territory of the former Empire.

These details were reported in the Allied countries on the following day, and were interpreted there merely as a proof of the advancing process of collapse. The events in Hungary in the eyes of Allied public opinion also constituted a severe blow to the existence of the Empire. When after the publication of Karl’s manifesto the Hungarians at once drew their own inferences from it, these developments were taken to mean that all bonds between the nations were gradually falling, and that the dynasty was being hurled to and fro by revolution without being able to brace itself together for any deliberate action. These signs of dissolution now became more and more frequent. Thus, on October 26th, we learned in Paris that four days earlier Dr. Stránský, referring to the results of Wilson’s note during the debate on Burian’s motion for establishing a permanent Parliamentary committee of twenty-six members to be in permanent touch with the Government, made the following statement: “We Czechs will not participate in the elections to the Committee . . . because the Entente has recognized our National Council in Paris as a Czechoslovak Government, and the Czechoslovak Army as the army of the Czechoslovak State. All this has been done with a view to the peace negotiations. We deputies cannot therefore anticipate the action of the Entente, and we are not entitled to act of our own accord.” Then there came the news that on October 23rd a commission ​of delegates for foreign affairs had met at Vienna to examine Wilson’s note, and that on this occasion the Czechs and Jugoslavs had announced that for reasons of principle they would not take part in the discussions. About the same time we learnt that Burian had resigned, a course which was followed also by Hussarek and Weckerle. Then came the news that Professor Lammasch had undertaken the task of negotiating with individual politicians for the purpose of forming a Cabinet “of order and liquidation.” In the Allied Press this confused record of events left only one impression: the approach of the end, the downfall of the Empire, chaos, revolution, a struggle of all against all.

Concurrent with these decisive political events, the whole situation on the battle-fronts was moving rapidly towards the inevitable end. From the Balkans the Allied troops were advancing at such a rate towards the frontiers of the Habsburg Empire that the Magyars were beginning to clamour for the return of their regiments from the Italian front. In the concluding days of October the Turks were sustaining such severe defeats that they too appealed for an armistice, which was signed at Mudros on October 30th, and in the meanwhile the retreat of the German Army on the Western front was continuing. By the beginning of November the German line was approaching the Moselle, and was thus near its own frontiers. The collapse behind the front and the political upheavals were merely the direct result of the military defeat.

As regards the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the operations which had a decisive effect upon events were those on the Italian front, where the offensive which ensued on October 24th was bound to complete the overthrow of the Empire. It would be unjust to Italy to underestimate the significance of that last offensive, which was carried out by fifty-one Italian divisions, three English, two French, one Czechoslovak, and one American regiment. The opposing forces consisted of fifty-one Austro-Hungarian divisions.

Even before the offensive was begun there were signs of revolt in the regiments composed of Croats, who refused to go into the front line. On October 24th two Magyar regiments, the 22nd and the 25th, also refused to enter the fighting zone, and demanded that they should be sent to Hungary to defend their ​own country. This request was granted by the Emperor, and then other regiments, especially after the Piave defeat, imitated the example of the Magyars, so that the collapse of the army was precipitated like an avalanche. The Austro-Hungarian army began to disperse in confusion. One part was captured, while another part threw away its arms and seized upon whatever means of transport it could find. These troops, crowded together in cars, railway trains, and lorries, swarmed along, congesting all the railway lines, stations, and roads, and here and there destroying whatever stood in their way. And while this complete military collapse was in progress, news arrived from Pola that the Austro-Hungarian fleet had revolted. On October 30th it was handed over to the Jugoslavs.

The events at Prague between October 28th and 30th formed a connecting link in the great chain of circumstances constituting the downfall of the Habsburg Empire. Each of those who took part in this huge drama played his part as the instrument of a destiny which some interpret as the irresistible development of historical forces, others as the divine purpose of Providence. And as regards the events in Prague their relation to our national cause is that of a logical conclusion to the vast struggle which demanded so much exertion and sacrifice, self-denial, and firmness of will. This last phase had been so well prepared by the preceding events that, at the moment when the time came to act, there could be no doubt of immediate success, provided that sufficient skill and determination were brought to bear upon the task. The results show that this was indeed the case.

On October 25th a meeting was held at the Hôtel Continental in Vienna between our Geneva delegates and the Poles and Jugoslavs. On the same day the delegation proceeded to Geneva and Dr. Rašín returned to Prague. This was the time when news had reached our politicians and, in fact, all persons of authority in the Empire, that an Austro-Hungarian military collapse was imminent. On October 26th Rašín refused the appeal for help which General Boroević had made to the Prague National ​Committee, his answer being that Austria-Hungary must first capitulate. On the same day the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of War was negotiating with the National Committee on the subject of joint action concerning the food supply, and the National Committee decided to co-operate with the Corn Exchange. On the evening of October 27th Tusar telephoned to Dr. Rašín about the disastrous situation on the Italian front, whereupon Rašín immediately settled with Scheiner that arrangements should now be made because on the next day “things were going to happen.” The Germans in Bohemia, being also aware of the critical situation of the Empire, held a meeting at Dresden on the same day to discuss the question of help for German Bohemia in case there should be a catastrophe and a revolution in Bohemia.

Early on the morning of October 28, 1918, the chief members of the National Committee learnt the contents of Andrássy’s note (Tusar had telephoned about it to Rašín during the night and the newspaper Bohemia had brought out a special early morning edition containing full details) as well as the capitulation of Vienna. This news at once became the starting-point for decisive action on the part of the National Committee. Švehla, together with Dr. F. Soukup, on behalf of the National Committee, took charge of the Corn Exchange, which formed the headquarters of the food supply for the whole country. Immediately afterwards the Vaclav Square, where the inhabitants of Prague learnt the joyful news in front of the offices of the Národní Politika, was filled with cheering crowds and the houses were decorated with flags. In this atmosphere of excitement the National Committee met at 11.30 a.m., and at noon Švehla, Rašín, Soukup, and Stříbrný proceeded to the Governor’s residence and to the central administrative offices, where they demanded that the administrative authority should be surrendered to the National Committee.

The news of these events reached Vienna shortly after midday at the moment when Lammasch, the new Prime Minister, was taking his vow of loyalty to the Emperor at the Hofburg. The Emperor at once began to discuss the situation with Lammasch and Andrássy, and these discussions were continued at the first meeting of the Lammasch Cabinet which was held on the same day at five o’clock in the afternoon. Coudenhove, the Governor of Bohemia, was present, and from the Council Chamber telephoned to his deputy, Vice-President Kosina, ​instructing him to refuse to hand over the administration to the National Committee.

Meanwhile, in Prague, during the afternoon, the military authorities endeavoured to moderate the excitement of the crowds, who had already begun to pull down the Austrian emblems. The Magyar troops who were garrisoned in Prague were sent to patrol the streets. The military commander, however, who had been instructed by the Ministry of War to co-operate with the national committees for the maintenance of peace, acceded to the request of the National Committee in Prague and recalled the troops. The National Committee thereupon undertook the task of maintaining order in the city, largely with the help of the Sokols. The enthusiasm of the people was thus allowed free play, and October 28th was duly celebrated as the first day of national liberty. In accordance with the prevailing mood the National Committee, at seven o’clock in the evening, issued the first law of the Czechoslovak State. It runs as follows:

At the same time the National Committee issued a proclamation to the people, calling upon them to maintain order and to show themselves worthy of the freedom which had crowned their efforts.

On the evening of October 28th the first attempts were made by the National Committee, with the help of the Sokol organizations, to form its own military units. Dr. Scheiner, Dr. Soukup, and Dr. V. Pospíšil negotiated with General Kestřánek, at the military headquarters, to obtain for the National Committee full authority over the Czech troops. The negotiations concluded after midnight in an agreement, the chief terms of which were announced by the military commander in his orders on the following day.

The Czech troops, wearing the distinctive mark of the national colours, were to be under the control of the National Committee which appointed Dr. Scheiner as their commander. The foreign garrison would continue to obey the orders of its military commanders, but it was to be used only after agreement with the National Committee. The circumstance that the military command in Prague at the critical moment showed its willingness to give way to the National Committee had an important bearing upon the ease with which the coup d’état was carried out.

On the morning of October 29th Coudenhove arrived in Prague. He was taken into custody and then was escorted by the Sokols to his former headquarters, which he was not allowed to leave, although enjoying freedom of movement in other respects. At midday a deputation comprising four members of the National Committee came to renew negotiations with him. It was then arranged that he would recognize the National Committee as “the executive organ of the nation’s sovereignty,” and that he would acknowledge its “joint management of the public administration.” The staff and administration of the ​State services were to continue unchanged, although Coudenhove himself decided to resign his post, as he was unwilling to co-operate with the National Committee.

On the same day, in the afternoon, the Ministerial Council met at Vienna, and sanctioned the arrangement which had been arrived at in the morning between the National Committee and Coudenhove, who was given provisional leave. Lammasch and several members of the Cabinet, however, severely criticized the action of the military authorities for having given the various military commands authority to co-operate with the national committees on the previous day, without having obtained beforehand the sanction of the civil administration. In fact, the Cabinet declared that the military authorities were entirely to blame for what had happened at Prague.

At five o’clock on the afternoon of October 29th the Ministry of War issued its long overdue reply to the proposals of the military command at Prague. For the greater part it approved the agreement between the military command and the National Committee, but on the most important point it disavowed the attitude of the military authorities in Prague. It declined to permit the formation of a special Czechoslovak Army from officers and men offering themselves voluntarily for service, and gave instructions that all were to be retained at the duties undertaken under the terms of their military oath until they could be properly demobilized and allotted to the new national States. The Ministry further announced that they were sending General Bardolff to Prague to superintend the military arrangements there, and that until he arrived the command were not to enter into any further arrangements with the National Committee unless the Ministry had previously given its sanction.

The military command at Prague thereupon endeavoured to withdraw that part of the agreement with the National Committee to which the Ministry objected, and it therefore prepared a proclamation of martial law against civilians who incited soldiers to infringe their military oath. It also freed officers from their vow to the National Committee, and refused to permit Dr. Scheiner to continue his official activity at the military headquarters.

This denoted an opposition, at least for the time being, against the formation of a special military force taking its orders from ​the National Committee. The fundamental point at issue was whether the liquidation of the old order in the Monarchy would be carried out in accordance with the contents of the Emperor’s manifesto, or at any rate with the possibility of preserving the dynasty within the new States, or whether it would be accomplished according to the desire of the nationalities for complete independence and separation from Vienna and Budapest.

In the evening General Kestřánek paid a visit to Coudenhove, and about the same time the National Committee received news that the military command at Litoměřice was preparing to take measures against the coup d’éat at Prague, and that the Prague military headquarters also contemplated upsetting the agreement with the National Committee. Telephonic communication between Vienna and Prague was therefore cut off to prevent any further arrangements from being made. On the morning of October 30th Dr. Scheiner, Dr. Soukup, and Stříbrný went to the military headquarters, and by their decisive action, with the assistance of the first armed Czech troops, they succeeded in frustrating any further attempts to stem the course of affairs at Prague. At half-past nine Vienna was informed that the military authorities in Prague had failed to recover their mastery of the situation, and that the National Committee now had the military command also in its power. Vienna could do nothing but accept the news with resignation, since equally grave reports were arriving from the other parts of the Empire, while from Budapest the news was graver still.

On the preceding day what was known as “Deutschböhmen” and “Sudetenland” had been constituted, and when the Austrian National Assembly met on October 30th it sanctioned this step and designated Sudetenland as a constituent part of a new German Austria. Meanwhile, at a meeting in Ústí nad Labem (Aussig), it was announced that the German Government had promised help, and if need be, a military occupation for Deutschböhmen. On the following day the Government of Lammasch handed over the political administration of this new State to the State Council of German Austria, and thus began the struggle between the Government at Prague and the Germans in Bohemia on the subject of Deutschböhmen and Sudetenland.

The critical moments of the National Committee, October 29th and 30th, had now been overcome, and October 31st was the day upon which constructive work and the development of ​the new administration may be said to have started. From the very outset Dr. V. Šrobár had associated himself with this work on behalf of the Slovaks. By the declaration made at Turčiansky Svatý Martin on October 30th, the whole of Slovakia officially associated itself with the Czechoslovak national and State unity. The National Committee rapidly organized the food supply, the railways, the postal services, the national defence, and the Press. In this respect the early days of November passed off fairly quietly. The chief concern was occasioned by the maintenance of order, and the prevention of hunger riots or Bolshevism.

Of all these events we in Geneva, during the course of our negotiations, knew only those matters which had appeared in the newspapers. We read Andrassy’s note on the evening of October 28th in the Journal de Genéve, and on the following evening we read the first news from Prague which had reached Switzerland by way of Vienna, and which gave a fairly accurate account of what had taken place. We also heard of the violent revolutionary manifestos and fighting at Budapest, where the events formed a striking contrast to the comparative calm prevailing at Prague.

It was on October 30th that we received fuller details of what had happened at Prague and, in particular, of the proclamation of independence there. At the same time arrived the first reports that a special province comprising the German Bohemians had been formed, and that a separate Government had been set up for it at Liberec (Reichenberg). News then continued to arrive from Vienna concerning the events at Budapest, Cracow, Zagreb, Ljubljana, and also at Czernowitz, where a Rumanian National Committee had established itself and demanded independence for the Bukovina and Transylvania. On the same day we heard that the Supreme Austrian Command had ordered the evacuation of all the occupied territory, and from Paris it was reported that the Supreme Military Council was meeting to discuss the Armistice conditions for the Central Powers.

On the evening of October 31st we heard of the Armistice with Turkey, Karolyi’s victorious revolution in Budapest, the increasing republican movement in Vienna, the demonstrations of the soldiers in the streets there, and the formation of a new ​national Government for German Austria. From Prague it was reported that all was quiet and that the National Committee had matters in hand as regards the economic situation, as well as communications and Press.

When we read all these reports we realized that our arrangements at Geneva, which, as we had surmised, would not be carried out until some future date, had now suddenly become a matter for immediate action. My greatest fear at that moment was that in Paris, at the negotiations on Austro-Hungarian affairs during our absence, arrangements might be made detrimental to our interests. I therefore hastened back to Paris with the feeling that my authority was now of wider scope than it had been on my departure. I was now the officially accredited representative of a nation and State, whose task it was to act as advocate for our historical heritage from the dismantled Empire.

In the course of the Geneva negotiations, and before my departure for Paris, I was repeatedly asked by the Prague delegates, in view of the extreme tension prevailing at home, to urge upon Masaryk the necessity for returning to Bohemia as soon as possible, as his authority was universally recognized. I was also to ask him to authorize Dr. Kramář to act as his deputy and sign State documents during the period which would elapse before his return. On reaching Paris I at once fulfilled both these requests, and also gave Masaryk a fairly detailed account of the course of the negotiations at Geneva. Masaryk thereupon communicated his approval of all that had been arranged there, and at the same time expressed his opinion on a number of personal questions. He also telegraphically authorized Dr. Kramář to sign State documents on his behalf. As regards an early return to Bohemia, he was rather doubtful. At that particular juncture he was engaged upon a discussion on important financial matters concerning our Siberian army and also our eventual financial co-operation with the Allied States in the near future. He was anxious to settle these matters at any cost before he left America. By the end of November all the important points had been settled, so that at the end of the first week of November Masaryk reached Paris on his return journey home.