My War Memoirs/Chapter 16

The month of July 1918 became a period of decisive change in the action of our Siberian troops. While I in Paris throughout April, May, and even June had based my political negotiations on the question of transporting our Siberian troops to France, the development of events in Siberia was such that, at the beginning of July, and especially in August, I had to adopt a slightly different line for the continuance of my political campaign.

The opposition of our troops to the local Soviets on May 25th, 26th, and 27th, and the struggle for the occupation of the Siberian Railway in the first half of June, caused the French authorities in Russia and also in France to consider for a short time some new military scheme in Russia.

The question of intervention in Russia was as old as the Bolshevik revolution itself. I have already mentioned that the British military authorities had something similar in view, i.e. some kind of “small” intervention at the outset, by which they desired, on the one hand, to preserve access to Russia by way of Archangelsk and Murman, on the other hand to check the advance of Bolshevism to Baikal, where they feared its effects upon their policy in the Far East. They carried out this “small” intervention by their own means and methods from the very beginning. Then when they saw the increasing strength of the Czechoslovak Army they at once considered the possibility of using it for these purposes. The objection of our troops, who wished to proceed to France, and the French policy on the subject of our army, which was in agreement with the consistent policy of our National Council, caused the English also to assent to the transport of our troops to Europe. Having sanctioned this ​policy at the Supreme Military Council and at the conference in Abbeville, they kept to it loyally till July 1918, although some of them in the Far East never lost sight of their own aims in this question, and continued to work on behalf of them.

In the period immediately following the Bolshevik revolution, the French also, from time to time, considered the possibility of intervention. The Press discussed the matter frequently, for the general opinion was that the Germans were helping Bolshevism to power, and that they had had a direct hand in creating it for the purpose of destroying Russia and the Eastern front. Official circles were afraid that the Bolsheviks would negotiate directly with the Germans, or that the Germans, owing to the weakness of the Bolsheviks, would gain control of Russia with all its material resources. Others again regarded intervention as being desirable, because after the Bolshevik revolution and the collapse of the Eastern front the Germans would concentrate their whole strength on the West. Intervention in Russia thus denoted mainly an attempt at renewing the Eastern front against the Germans.

It would be wrong to suppose that the idea of intervention in Russia, originating or upheld in Western Europe, was caused, notably in 1918, only by opposition to the Bolshevik revolution or by the effort to bring the bourgeoisie to power in Russia. Originally, more thought was given to the Germans and to the struggle against them by way of Russia. It was not until after Koltchak’s anti-revolutionary activities that the idea of anti-Bolshevik intervention began to gain ground in Western Europe, for it was then that the direct action of the Bolsheviks, their propaganda and their attempts to undermine the morale of the Allied armies, began to produce definite effects.

In our Czechoslovak circles, both political and military, the situation at the beginning was fairly clear. Although immediately after the Bolshevik revolution there were Czechoslovaks who held that it would be possible to defeat the Bolsheviks and who, if they had had their way, would have brought about the destruction of our army with all its inevitable consequences to our aims, Masaryk realized at once the impossibility of all such schemes, and therefore opposed them rigidly from the very start.

From the moment when, in February and in March 1918, the transfer of our troops to France had definitely become the order of the day, no serious-minded person amongst us reckoned with ​the possibility of intervention in Russia. The one endeavour was to reach France as rapidly as possible. It was a straightforward, simple, sincere, and consistent policy without any ulterior motives. This continued until the beginning of July. Even when at the end of May 1918 our troops in Siberia were compelled to fight their way from station to station, even when in June, during their struggle against the Soviets, they occupied various towns on the Trans-Siberian Railway from Samara to Vladivostok, they had no wish to carry out anything which could be described as intervention, their only purpose being to proceed eastwards and reach France that way.

It is true that the Czechoslovak Army contained a number of Russian officers who were predisposed in favour of intervention, and tried to influence our troops accordingly, but this was only at the beginning, and they did not remain for long. It is also true that during their advance eastward our troops showed their sympathies with the local non-Bolshevik elements, especially those with democratic tendencies. But the whole of the army, being fundamentally and emphatically opposed everywhere to the methods and policy of the Bolsheviks and to Bolshevism as a whole, profoundly shared the sentiments of the Russian revolution, disliked the old regime, and would have done nothing which was deterimental to this point of view. For this reason our troops instinctively resolved not to interfere in Russian affairs, thus acting in accordance with Masaryk’s express instructions. Moreover, they had ample opportunities of seeing how incompetent and unprepared the anti-Bolshevik elements among the Russians were.

The French and English Governments at this period also consistently pursued their policy as regards the transfer of our troops to the Western front. Throughout the month of June and at the beginning of July also negotiations in this sense were carried on with me in the National Council. The meeting of the Supreme Military Council at Versailles passed a resolution on June 1st to continue the preparations for the transport of our troops, as already agreed upon at Abbeville and in London, and also decided what vessels were to be sent to Vladivostok.

The instructions sent in the first half of June from Paris to London, Washington, Tokio, and Moscow indicate the realization of this programme. The negotiations of the Allied ​representatives at Moscow in the first half of June were directed towards the same purpose, i.e. to secure for the Czechoslovak troops a peaceable departure from Russia and Siberia.

On the other hand, General Lavergne, the French military attaché, in his telegraphed report from Moscow on June 1, 1918, made the first reference to the possibility of intervention in Russia, in view of the fact that a conflict had arisen with the Czechoslovak Army. It was obvious that he personally desired such a course. This telegram also illustrates Trotsky’s hostile attitude towards our army, as well as the feeling of mistrust entertained by our troops towards the Soviets. It also draws attention to the conciliatory attitude of Chicherin, who was anxious to avoid any conflict with our troops or with the Allies. Altogether the telegram makes it plain that the Soviet Government, the Allies and our army were equally uncertain which policy would have to be decided upon, and what would be the proper course to adopt.

When our troops took possession of Samara and Krasnoyarsk, it seemed as if the Allies were hesitating and considering whether the attitude they had hitherto adopted towards the transfer of the Czechoslovak Army ought not to be changed. They did not decide in favour of intervention, but realizing that for the moment no reliance could be placed upon the transport of our troops by way of Archangelsk, and that it was not possible to begin with the embarkation at Vladivostok, they decided in favour of half-measures. On June 20th Paris sent the first instructions to General Lavergne. In view of the fact that as a result of the recent developments in Russia the Czechoslovak regiments had come to a standstill, the status quo was more or less to be maintained, i.e. the positions occupied were to be held, and although there was to be no intervention, nothing for the meanwhile was to be done which might prove detrimental to the possibility of intervention in the future. General Alby, by whom the instructions were signed, also demanded that the Czechoslovaks should not allow themselves to be disarmed, and that those who had reached Vladivostok disarmed should be supplied again with rifles and ammunition. General Janin and myself gave our consent to these arrangements.

It was about the same time, towards the end of June, that our military command in Vladivostok decided on the need for returning to Irkutsk for the purpose of assisting our second military detachment, which had been blockaded between ​Irkutsk and Vladivostok by gangs of Bolsheviks and prisoners. There was no ulterior motive in this decision, and it did not imply any attempt at intervention. But its direct consequence was to hold up the transport from Vladivostok, which had already been arranged by the Allies; and the Japanese, the English and the French were at once officially notified that, for the time being, the transport of the Czechoslovaks from Vladivostok would be abandoned.

It should be added that the French Government nevertheless regarded this decision as provisional, and continued to negotiate with the British Government for securing vessels to transport our troops. The question of the return of our regiments from Vladivostok to Irkutsk caused the Allies some concern as to what was about to happen in the Far East and in Vladivostok itself if a free field were left for the agitation of the revolutionary Soviet elements, and what would happen if our troops were actually cut off from the Vladivostok base. As a matter of fact, our military command in Siberia, fearing the possibility of such a development, had negotiated with the Allies on that subject. On July 12th the British Government notified Paris that, should this occur, a battalion of soldiers sent from Hong-Kong and about 1,000 troops from the “Suffolk” would be landed at Vladivostok. The French Government associated itself with this manœuvre, and sent a battalion of its troops from Northern China and Indo-China to Vladivostok for the purpose of securing peace, order, and a military base for our army.

In his communications to London M. Pichon also emphasized that the real purpose of these measures was to maintain the Vladivostok base for the security of the Czechoslovak Army, and not for intervention in Siberia. He said that it was all the more necessary to lay stress on this point because at that particular moment negotiations were proceeding between Japan and President Wilson with regard to a definite form of intervention by Japan, which must not be confused with the projected landing of French and English troops.

These matters were progressively notified to us, and in the course of July they formed the subject of negotiation in the National Council. Having no detailed news from Vladivostok and Siberia, and being without any direct connection with them, I was dependent upon the reports of the Allies. I found it difficult to reconcile myself with this state of affairs. Rightly or wrongly I did not think then that the Siberian undertaking ​would be of much use to the Allies from a military point of view. I could have seen some point in a united intervention on a large scale with definite political aims, directed towards the construction of an Eastern front. I knew, however, that for a scheme of this kind there was neither the determination nor the resources, and I feared the effects of any vague and half-hearted action for the Allies and for Russia, to say nothing of ourselves, since our troops would fall a victim to it. I therefore continued to lay stress upon our line of policy: We would not interfere in Russian affairs, and in any case we were anxious to transfer our army to France. For I considered that our best course was to have the greatest part of our army in Europe, where a decision would be reached as to the fate of the Habsburg Empire.

Here I should like to insert a few remarks about the policy of the Soviet Government at that time. All indications show that this Government, as long as it feared a German invasion, which might lead to its destruction, aimed at being on good terms and even co-operating with our troops and the Allies. The guiding idea of the Soviet Government was obviously to pursue a course which involved the least menace to its authority, and at that moment, not having any other interest or purpose than to maintain its position, the Soviet Government was prepared to keep in with all those who made such a course possible, and to proceed against any who endangered it.

That is why at Bakhmatch the Bolshevik troops kept on our side, and that is why, during the struggle for the Ukraine, they advanced against the Germans. In the same way Antonov-Ovseyenko, the military representative of the Soviets at Kursk, made friendly declarations concerning our troops. The Germans soon became aware of this. Their policy, prompted also by other considerations, before long was directed so as to avoid, as far as possible for the time being, any menace to the Soviet regime. The consequence was that the Soviet Government, seeing that for some time there was no immediate danger to be feared from Germany, became aware that the possible sources of danger comprised the Allies and our troops.

Thus, by its mere existence, our army became a serious problem to the Soviet Government. The Government at Moscow was familiar with the tendencies of our troops, who had no great liking for the Bolshevik regime. Moreover, the ​German and Austrian Governments were urging the Soviets to disarm the Czechoslovaks in accordance with the terms of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. It would have best suited the wishes of these Governments if the Czechoslovak Army had been demoralized, disorganized by attacks from gangs of prisoners, or even scattered and possibly added to the ranks of the Communists. They would, in fact, have welcomed anything likely to prevent our troops from reaching France. All this led to ever-increasing conflicts on the railway route along which our army was advancing, and these conflicts were intensified by the anarchy within Russia, and the inability of the Central Government to compel the local Soviets to adopt a uniform course of action against the Czechoslovaks.

It cannot be doubted that at first the Soviet Government was actuated by a sincere endeavour to assist our army in proceeding as quickly as possible from Russia and Siberia to France. But it had no confidence in our troops, continually fearing as it did their intervention in internal affairs. Hence the demand for their disarmament, the main purpose of which was to minimize this manifest danger to the Soviets. Later on Trotsky, and especially our Communists, hoped that it would be easy to disorganize and bolshevize the disarmed troops. It was naturally an attractive undertaking for the Bolshevik doctrinaires to prevent the transport of our troops to France, and thus to make it impossible for them to have any further share in the imperialistic bourgeois war of Western Europe.

From the development of events it is clear that if the Soviet authorities had straightforwardly assisted us in our journey eastward, the instructions and aims of the Allied representatives in Siberia would not have been modified, nor would there have been any partial intervention by Japan. The mutual distrust between the Bolsheviks and ourselves, the misunderstandings to which it gave rise, the later insincere and ambiguous policy of the Soviet authorities, with the resulting misgivings of our troops as to the safety of the whole army—all this inevitably resulted in warfare. If the actions of all the parties concerned are closely scrutinized, it is impossible not to assign the original and main responsibility for the whole conflict to the Soviet Government and its representatives.

Thus it was that, in the second half of July, the idea of a Siberian intervention had come to a head among the Allies. President Wilson, after some hesitation and after making ​certain reservations, arrived at an agreement with the Government at Tokio on the conditions of Japanese intervention. The concluding stage of these proceedings was reached on August 2, 1918. The Japanese Army progressively occupied the eastern part of Siberia, and our army held the remaining part of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Both forces then mutually supported each other as military allies.

Having completed the negotiations concerning Pichon’s note of June 28, 1918, and being continuously occupied with the progress of our military affairs in France, Italy, and Siberia, I was anxious to take advantage of the favourable atmosphere in London, where as a result of the military and political events from May to June there had been an unmistakable stiffening of the anti-Austro-Hungarian line of policy. This, of course, was to our advantage, and I therefore hoped that it would be possible to induce the British Government to give more definite expression to its attitude towards us, in the form of a solemn public declaration analogous to Pichon’s letter, and covering a wider scope than Mr. Balfour’s letter of June 3rd.

There were two former diplomatic documents of the British Government which served me as a formal basis for undertaking this action: Mr. Balfour’s letter of June 3, 1918, and Mr. Balfour’s telegram of July 1, 1918, addressed to the French Government with reference to Pichon’s note giving the sanction of Great Britain to the French decision. I considered that the situation as a whole was now sufficiently advanced for the settlement of something definite and permanent as regards our cause. It seemed to me that the time had now come to embody the results of everything we had hitherto achieved in the form of a decisive diplomatic document which, from the point of view of international law, would denote the establishment of a State and Government of an independent nation.

This aim was prompted also by our continual endeavour to manage our movement so as to achieve the establishment of a provisional Government before the war had ended, so that we should be actually in existence at the time of the Peace Confer​ence, and thus automatically attend the peace negotiations, not as a section of a defeated State forming the subject of deliberations, but as an Allied nation which had helped to bear the brunt of the war. This was a point which I always emphasized, that we were fighting of our own accord, without guarantees or commitments from the Allies; that we were fighting with our own resources for our independence.

When I survey the details of our political and diplomatic activity abroad during the war, it seems to me that our greatest success lay precisely in the fact that long before the end of the war we managed to achieve full recognition as an Allied and belligerent nation. This proved of enormous advantage to our State as soon as the negotiations for an armistice began, and also later at the Peace Conference. How great this advantage was can be gauged if we try to imagine what would have happened at the Peace Conference if, the differences of interest and opinion among the Allies being what they were, and in view of the Allied unfamiliarity with conditions in Central Europe, they had negotiated about us and not with us. This danger was particularly great in our case because the whole of our territory was located within the Habsburg Empire. We were thus less favourably situated than the Jugoslavs of Austria-Hungary or the Rumanians of Transylvania with a State behind them, which, when the war ended, would represent and advocate their interests on an internationally legal basis.

The moment which I chose for my negotiations was very favourable. It was the first time that during four years of warfare the Allies were at a decided advantage in the field. The end of July, when I left for London, marked the beginning of the victorious struggle which formed the last momentous episode of the German offensive of March 1918, and which Marshal Foch regarded as the first step to the military victory of the Allies. In Paris the political circles and all those who had any inside knowledge of the situation breathed a sigh of relief after the second battle of the Marne. The Allied Governments now realized that the last stage of the war was at hand. Any lingering doubts as to victory were disposed of. Such was the impression with which I left Paris on my way to London, and this impression was strengthened in London—in that calm London which had stoically received all bad news from the ​front, and which had produced an overwhelming effect by its composure when everybody else was overwrought.

The Foreign Office was thus able to listen to my request at a moment when there was no more doubt that the tide of war had definitely turned in our favour. But the situation was favourable to us in other respects as well. Our troops in Italy had already been engaged at the front, and our French brigade had just been prepared for transfer from Alsace to Gouraud’s army in Champagne for the purpose of taking part in the operations on the most difficult sectors of the front. The British Government itself was just negotiating with the Government of the United States and with Japan for the occupation of Siberian territory in the Far East in which Great Britain had special interest. Our army, whose operations were the subject of daily reports in the Press, had gained considerable popularity both for itself and for our cause, and now naturally occupied an important position with the Allied armies also.

Such, then, was the situation, such were my reflections and hopes when, in the last week of June 1918, I called on Mr. Balfour at Downing Street for the second time during the war.

While waiting in Mr. Balfour’s drawing-room and preparing to approach him with my petition, it suddenly flashed across my mind—as often during the war at moments which were important or decisive in their bearing upon our national cause—how strange human destinies could be. As a young student I had devoted much time to English history, and I had become attached to the personalities of the great English statesmen. I had traced the growth of British world-power in the last few centuries, and I regarded the leading politicians of the British Empire as incorporations of this power. When in 1906 I paid my first visit to London, England produced an enormous impression upon me. I again studied its history, and again I became aware of the prosperity, influence, and power which the British nation had derived from the judicious, skilful, and purposeful policy of its statesmen.

I often used to think that in Trafalgar Square and on other prominent London sites there ought to be monuments, not of the English admirals and soldiers, but of the English politicians. I also felt, rightly or wrongly, that the strong and sometimes, perhaps, too self-centred statesmanship of Great Britain, ​rather than the strength of armies and military victories, was the source of the British world-empire.

These impressions of mine coincided with the ideas I had formed in my student days, when I used to read the biographies of British statesmen. William Pitt, Castlereagh, Canning, Palmerston, Lord Salisbury, Gladstone—all these great figures appeared to me, a young student and a member of a small nation in Central Europe, who, from his youth upwards, had devoted careful thought to the destiny of his own nation and its struggle for existence, in an impressive and alluring light, by reason of the determined and yet humane manner in which they pursued their aims.

By a strange freak of destiny and under circumstances altogether curious and unexpected, I suddenly found myself now face to face with the successors of those historical figures, successors concerning whom history—whatever judgment it may pass on them—will one day declare that in the greatest war that the world had hitherto experienced they helped to control the destinies of the British world-empire, and they had a share in deciding the fate of half the globe. I could not help recalling my early impressions, which had left such vivid traces on my mind and in the light of which I still regarded British policy.

It was with these sentiments that I carried on negotiations during the war, during the Peace Conference, and also later with Mr. Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Curzon, and others. I regarded them as prominent figures in the Great War. Lord Balfour, whose mild stoical scepticism, rarely showing itself, but nevertheless acting strongly within him, I observed whenever I began to speak to him about political matters, was always thoroughly familiar with the topics forming the subject of his negotiations. Outwardly he produced the impression that, like other Englishmen, he was slow in taking in the points that had been explained, but he grasped the essentials of questions with exceptional rapidity, with equal rapidity he discovered his opponent’s weaknesses, and in the course of debate he managed to direct the argument straight towards them. He had a brilliant capacity for finding his way about when dealing with a problem, and particularly for forming a rapid and final judgment about persons. He will certainly occupy a permanent place among the great English statesmen. I had opportunities, especially later on at the Peace Conference, of seeing with what ​psychological skill he was able to estimate and classify the individual representatives of the nations concerned, and how, in accordance with the opinion he thus formed, he found an appropriate attitude towards each one in his political dealings with him.

To the psychologist it was a sheer joy to observe how Mr. Balfour, in moments of excitement, dispute, or heated argument, by his composure and by uttering a few words contrived to restore matters to their right proportion. He applied, so to speak, cold poultices to the heads of excited politicians, even when he revealed much human understanding of their conflicts and their agitation. I always esteemed his high intelligence and his cultivated mind, and it was gratifying to me that during several years of sincere co-operation he counted me among his friends.

In Lord Robert Cecil I at once recognized an idealist, always engaged on an internal struggle between his fanatical desire to show good will even to his opponents, and the need for considering the immediate interests of British politics, which from time to time imposed upon him the duty of refraining from action and keeping silence precisely on occasions when he was anxious to do just the opposite. This first impression was confirmed later on, notably during the long period of my co-operation with him in the League of Nations. His idealism brought him near to me, and from the very first I became so closely attached to him that the memory of the support he gave to my work and that of my friendship with him during the war, during the Peace Conference, and later, will always be one of the most pleasant features of my political activity.

This man who, by many people in England, was regarded as an unpractical or naïve idealist could, on occasion, by his intelligence and where need was, also by his understanding of exclusively British interests, show himself so excellent a tactician and so practical an advocate of his country’s welfare while maintaining his idealism, that often he seemed to me an excellent indication of how British politicians endeavour to make British statesmanship coincide with gentlemanly conduct.

From the first moment I approached these two statesmen with feelings of respect for the power and influence which they represented, but also with a complete frankness which placed me completely in their hands. I not alone had confidence in their honesty, but I was also a firm believer in their British ​political common-sense and also in the strength of the facts and arguments which I had submitted to their Anglo-Saxon mentality. And I had taken great care not to ask anything of them which would not have been compatible with the interests of Great Britain. I soon felt that they, on their part, had confidence in me, and that however far-reaching my demands often were, they appreciated the direct and detached manner in which I always endeavoured to act where our cause was concerned.

At a critical moment in the history of our national movement I now stood before these two men, anxious to convince them that for a moment they should use their great influence and their extensive power on behalf of our national cause. I proceeded to do this with a feeling of confidence that my request was not only in our own interests, but was of general advantage to the Allied cause. My hopes were not disappointed, either by Mr. Balfour or Lord Robert Cecil.

As during my negotiations in May, I now explained to Mr. Balfour quite frankly what the Czechoslovak National Council was aiming at—a final settlement of its international position in a juridical and political respect. On the strength of the events which had occurred concerning us within the past two months, I placed before him a whole scheme involving the integral recognition of the National Council as a Government, the recognition of Czechoslovak independence, the recognition of the Czechoslovak nation as an Allied nation, and also, from the point of view of international law, as a belligerent nation. Finally, I asked for an explicit statement declaring all our armies in France, Italy, and Russia a single whole, fighting on various fronts.

I supplemented my memorandum by a verbal explanation, in the course of which I could see that Mr. Balfour regarded my demands as excessive. He at once quite frankly mentioned a few serious objections, the most important of which were as follows:

(a) He was not certain whether it would be possible without any reservation to declare the National Council a Government, and thus establish a State, the territory of which was occupied by the enemy, to whom it still thus belonged both in international law and in actual fact. There was no analogy or precedent for such a case in history.

​(b) If Czechoslovakia were to secure recognition, what were the Allies to do afterwards regarding the Poles and Jugoslavs? The Allies were unable, for obvious reasons, to establish a Polish State immediately; the Polish problem was still too complicated, and the form of its final solution uncertain. It was not clear what steps would be taken in this matter by the Central Powers, by Soviet Russia, or by Poland as then already established by the Central Powers. Then, in Mr. Balfour’s opinion, there were difficulties equally great, if not even greater, on the subject of the Jugoslavs. This problem was complicated by the fact that an independent Serbian State was already in existence, that there were serious differences with Italy, and that the question of the Jugoslav Committee differed in character from that of the Czechoslovak National Council. Moreover, what of the Rumanians? And even that did not exhaust all the difficulties of the Austro-Hungarian problem. Hence, to detach the Czechoslovak question from the whole set of Central European problems, and to settle it as an isolated item, as I was asking him to do, was very difficult, if not impossible. That would not lead to a solution of the Austro-Hungarian problem. All these points would have to be carefully considered.

(c) Mr. Balfour acknowledged the work of the National Council, our political efficiency, and the achievements of our troops. But when I explained to him about our opposition to Austria at home and the establishment of the National Committee in Prague, he quite openly expressed to me his doubts as to what extent our National Council really represented the opinion of the Czechoslovak nation, and how far it was legally entitled to act on its behalf or to become its Government. The question was whether we were backed by the nation at home, or were only political émigrés with radical views, as émigrés generally are.

I endeavoured to dispose of all Mr. Balfour’s objections partly by word of mouth, partly by a new memorandum which I submitted to him at a subsequent visit. He seemed to be fully satisfied by a detailed account of the latest phase of our policy at home. I pointed out that the best proof of our ability to speak and act on behalf of the nation lay in the fact that about a hundred thousand of our volunteer troops in the Allied countries already fully recognized us as their supreme authority. ​Further, I mentioned that our movement abroad had met with the approval not only of political circles at home, but also of the masses of the population there. Mr. Balfour who, as an Englishman, appreciated plain facts, was particularly impressed by my reference to the hundred thousand volunteers fighting on the three Allied fronts.

In my accompanying memorandum I dealt chiefly with the objections of an international character. I also approached a number of influential persons in London, including Sir. Eric Drummond, who was then Mr. Balfour’s secretary, and who is now General Secretary of the League of Nations. I also had an important interview with Lord Milner, the Minister of War. It was at that time, too, that I first had dealings with Sir George Clerk, who later became British Minister in Prague. He was interested in the Central European situation, and particularly in Polish affairs.

Our friends, Mr. H. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton Watson, were naturally anxious as to what the Foreign Office would say in reply to my demand. At that time they were both working at Crewe House, and in this capacity they were in a position to influence official circles. Mr. Steed generously and devotedly helped me by direct interventions. He approached people whom he knew in Downing Street and elsewhere, making it possible for me to meet various important officials. He also indicated what should, and what should not be included in the memoranda. He arranged fresh meetings, and when I received unsatisfactory answers he devised new methods of approach and new statements of our case.

Mr. Balfour recognized the validity of the arguments in my second memorandum, and at a new interview he told me that in principle he was in agreement with the idea of issuing a British declaration on our behalf; but, as at the previous discussion in May, he referred me to Lord Robert Cecil for a further and more detailed discussion of the matter.

I submitted to Lord Robert Cecil the above-mentioned memoranda, and also the draft of a declaration which I had sketched out on leaving Paris. In this draft I made the same demand as that contained in M. Pichon’s letter of June 28, 1918, but I couched it in more emphatic terms and in a more juridically explicit form. I referred to the historical State rights, to the resistance of our people and troops to Austria-Hungary during the war, and to the manifestos of our politicians in ​January, April, and May 1918. I demanded the recognition of the three Czechoslovak armies as a single independent army of an independent nation, whose destinies were now guided by the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris as the provisional Government of a new independent Allied nation.

Lord Robert Cecil considered that the draft was too emphatic, lengthy, and theoretical. At our very first interview he told me that the British Government would scarcely go to such lengths. He promised me that I should soon receive the Government’s reply to my proposal, and two days later he placed before me his own draft based on the memorandum which I had given to Mr. Balfour. I was disappointed, however, by its moderation; the scope of its contents was smaller even than that of M. Pichon’s letter. It was much shorter than my original draft and in this, incidentally, it was superior. It left on one side our historical arguments, and emphasized chiefly the facts connected with our movement abroad, the importance of which it acknowledged, but it did not even mention the words “sovereignty,” “State,” or “Czechoslovak Government.” It took over from my memorandum and draft the passages emphasizing our political and military movement, as well as the juridical and political character of our three armies which, as Allied armies, were waging regular warfare against the Central Powers.

In view of this situation I at once took Lord Robert Cecil’s draft as a basis for further discussions, and submitted to him a new and more emphatic counter-proposal which was a revised version of his own draft. I accompanied this by a further commentary in support of our claim. In order to secure Lord Robert Cecil’s consent I not only drew attention to what we had already attained in France, but I also explained in detail the juridical aspect of the agreement which Štefánik had made with Italy in April and June 1918, and I laid particular stress on all the prerogatives which had been granted by Italy to our army and our National Council. I completed this commentary by a proposal which might serve as a compromise, to the effect that it might be possible to make a declaration couched in more moderate terms as regards the National Council as a Government, but that, on the other hand, the British Government might make an agreement with the National Council in which the supremacy of the National Council and the Czechoslovak nation, as well as its relationship to the Allies, could be mentioned more clearly and emphatically than would be possible in ​a public declaration under the circumstances then prevailing. It would be a special convention between the two parties constituting a commentary on the British declaration, the political and juridical implications of which it would express in detail. I prepared an outline of these juridical consequences, and at once handed it to Lord Robert Cecil, with a demand that if the British Government consented, they should be formulated as articles of a convention which would then be signed by both parties as a valid and binding document. The wording was as follows:

Lord Robert Cecil promised that he would again consider the matter, discuss it with Mr. Balfour, as well as the other members of the Government, and would give me a definite answer at the earliest possible moment.

The subsequent negotiations proceeded rapidly. Lord Robert Cecil recognized in principle all my objections. A few days later he summoned me again to the Foreign Office and placed before me a revised draft of the British declaration which had met with Mr. Balfour’s approval. In its essentials our new counter-proposal had been accepted with insignificant changes. ​I therefore expressed my agreement on behalf of the National Council.

As a characteristic change in our proposal, it is worth mentioning that the British Government declined to say unreservedly that it recognized the Czechoslovak National Council as an interim Government; for this it substituted a phrase recognizing it as a trustee of the future Czechoslovak Government. This was a compromise which we reached after a lengthy discussion with the assistance of Mr. Steed, who had proposed it. In no case did I wish to assent to any formula not expressly mentioning, on the one hand, the Czechoslovak State and Government, and, on the other, the National Council as the depository of national sovereignty. Mr. Steed’s formula contained both these points.

The declaration which, with a special letter from Mr. Balfour, was officially handed to me from the Foreign Office on August 9, 1918, ran as follows:

August 9, 1918.

I regard the negotiations which resulted in this declaration as the most important political activity of the National Council during the war. Of all the Allied declarations hitherto, that of Mr. Balfour had the widest scope in its bearings on international law. In this respect it constituted the actual ​recognition of the independence of our nation (including the Slovaks) while the war was still in progress, and its removal from Austro-Hungarian domination.

During my last visit to Lord Robert Cecil we were still concerned with the settlement of the British-Czechoslovak Agreement. In principle, Lord Robert Cecil assented to a formulation of the juridical and political consequences of the new British declaration. He also accepted the demand for a special agreement, acknowledging that it was expedient for ambiguities to be avoided by means of a precise formulation of the political and juridical consequences which proceeded from the British declaration, but which could not be embodied in it.

Just before my departure from London on August 10th, I gave my assent to the wording of the proposed agreement as formulated by Lord Robert Cecil in articles according to my suggestions quoted above. It was decided that the text of the agreement, the actual preparation of which would involve a short delay, was to be signed in about a fortnight, and that the British Embassy in Paris would notify me when I was to proceed to London for the signature. This stage was reached on September 3, 1918.

I do not think it is necessary to analyse in detail the juridical aspect of the British declaration, and especially of this agreement. In addition to what I have already said, I should only like to emphasize that by Article 6 of the British-Czechoslovak Agreement, giving us the right as an Allied nation to attend, during the actual war period, all Allied conferences where our interests were involved, it was my purpose to establish a basis for the entry of Czechoslovakia, first of all to the inter-Allied conferences and thus automatically with the Allies to the Peace Conference. In this my expectations were entirely fulfilled.

By the financial control which I offered it was our purpose to give England a full opportunity of examining our management of affairs, which would be equivalent to a guarantee of our credentials. By arranging for a permanent representative to be accredited to the British Government, and by establishing a consular and passport service, I aimed at taking the first practical step for our independent existence as a State in a palpable manner.

It will be seen that the British-Czechoslovak convention is an important document with regard to the creation of our State. From it can be demonstrated how our State was estab​lished deliberately and step by step, by laborious creative work, which had been planned with due regard to the political and psychological factors involved. This process of our gradual recognition by the Allies and our establishment by successive stages during the war provides much material which can be studied with advantage by all those who are concerned with the theories of sociology, law, and statesmanship.

It was clear that after these conversations the establishment of the Government and the State was only a purely formal matter. I indicated to Lord Robert Cecil that this step would soon be taken, and that we should do so at a moment when the circumstances seemed to make it desirable. Thereupon, even before proceeding to Paris, I instructed V. Nosek, who was in charge of the office of the National Council in London, to make all arrangements for securing legation premises, setting up a passport service, etc. This, of course, was to be done in consultation with the British Government.

Having negotiated the declaration and the British-Czechoslovak convention, I left for Paris with very definite plans as to what my further steps were to be. I had decided to co-operate with Professor Masaryk in rapidly constructing our State, in producing the greatest possible number of faits accomplis, in setting up all the external emblems and institutions of a State which, under the circumstances then prevailing, could be realized. The whole of my activity from the London negotiations to the period immediately preceding the Armistice was directed towards this end. I had in view the situation of Belgium and Serbia, States without territory, with only a small army, with a Government in exile, and burdened with difficulties of all kinds. It was my aim to secure for Czechoslovakia the same juridical position as that of these two States, so that there could be no withdrawal, whatever might happen in the Allied countries or in Central Europe. In this I was prompted not merely by the fact that from July onwards the Allies had crushed the German military front, while the Austrian front in Italy had collapsed in a similar manner, but also by an observation of how matters were developing within the Habsburg Empire. I felt that we must now be prepared every moment for all possibilities.

On leaving London I asked Lord Robert Cecil to notify officially to the other Allies the agreement which we had reached. I was anxious that, by so doing, the British Government should ​emphasize the scope of all these arrangements. Lord Robert Cecil promised me this, and the Foreign Office made the necessary arrangements through diplomatic channels.

The far-reaching importance of the London agreements was realized in all Allied circles, both among the Government authorities and the politicians. It was not long before I myself saw Clear indications of this. I will just mention two of the most typical cases.

As on all similar occasions I informed the French and Italian Ambassadors, as well as the Serbian Minister in London, about the proceedings. I was particularly anxious that Italy, having a direct interest in Austro-Hungarian affairs, should have a precise knowledge of the situation, and should realize that we were undertaking no steps which were not in accordance with her interests. For this reason, as soon as I arrived in London at the end of June, I quite frankly explained to Marquis Imperiali what my purpose was, and I asked him to use his influence for me with the English Government, while notifying to his own Government my proceedings in London. Marquis Imperiali was willing to help me, but at the same time he doubted whether the English Government, which hitherto had shown itself somewhat conservative as regards Austro-Hungarian affairs, would show any readiness to take so decisive a step openly. This view was in accordance with the policy of Rome and particularly with that of Sonnino. At that time there were considerable differences of opinion on this subject in the Roman Cabinet, but they terminated with the well-known Italian communiqué passed on September 9th and published on September 22nd, in which Bissolati’s point of view in favour of Jugoslav unity was adopted with the more emphatic action in Austro-Hungarian affairs which it involved. I am inclined to think that our successes in London made this decision possible and, in fact, helped directly to bring it about. It should be remembered that the British Government at that time, as Mr. Balfour and Lord Robert Cecil pointed out to me, did not agree with Sonnino’s policy in Jugoslav affairs, and on account of Italian opposition were unable to do anything decisive for the settlement of the problems which they presented. The assistance given to us, however, tended, in my opinion, indirectly to further the ​progress of the other questions. In this sense it is possible to interpret Mr. Balfour’s speech at a public meeting held on July 25th at the Mansion House in favour of the war aims of Serbia and the Jugoslavs. His emphatic and non-compromising remarks directed against the Habsburg Empire, and delivered in the presence of several ambassadors, including Marquis Imperiali, were more than significant, and were taken as a clear indication of the policy being pursued by the London Cabinet in Austro-Hungarian matters.

Here I may point out that as soon as I received Mr. Balfour’s declaration on August 10th, I sent a copy of it to Marquis Imperiali who, surprised at this step on the part of the British Government, went to Mr. Balfour to satisfy himself as to the British point of view. According to the report which reached me from a semi-official quarter, he asked Mr. Balfour whether the British Government realized the consequences of the arrangement with the Czechoslovak National Council. Mr. Balfour’s reply is said to have been “Yes, we considered the matter for a very long time. We hesitated before deciding to adopt this course. But there is no other possibility. This means the destruction of Austria-Hungary.”

The British declaration occasioned a certain amount of surprise in French Government circles also. In Paris they fully realized the political and military bearings of these decisions. As far as I could see, however, they did not at first understand the formula about the unity of our three armies. They were afraid that without their knowledge or consent I may have completed some new arrangement about our Siberian army or agreed that England was to make fresh use of it. As this army formed a part of our army in France, and was still mainly dependent upon the French military command, this interest on the part of the French Government can be readily understood. It was because Paris was not acquainted with the details of the London negotiations that the publication of the British declaration, which had been telegraphed to the Havas agency in Paris, was held up until my return there. When I arrived on August 12th I was at once sent for by Clemenceau at the Ministry of War, and then by Pichon and Berthelot at the Quai d’Orsay to give an exact account of what had happened in London. The matter was quickly explained, the declaration was published, and the representatives of the French Foreign Ministry did not conceal their satisfaction at the course which the British ​Government had adopted. They also took the view that Austria-Hungary was settled as far as England was concerned.

While still in London I had informed Professor Masaryk in Washington of what had been done. On behalf of the National Council he sent a telegram of thanks to Mr. Balfour, and the representatives of the Siberian army sent the National Council in Paris an enthusiastic manifesto expressing their gratitude and devotion.

It would appear that the greatest surprise, if not alarm, was caused by the British proclamation in Vienna, where it became known on August 14th. It was at once forwarded to Burian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who at that particular moment happened to be conferring with the German Ministers and the Kaiser at Spa. There, too, they realized the significance of this document, especially as Burian asserted so unequivocably that the Habsburg Empire would not hold out for more than another two or three months. In any case, the Government at Vienna took an unprecedented step as regards our movement abroad. It attempted, in a special communiqué, to weaken the effect of the British declaration upon public opinion in the Czech territories. How far matters had gone is shown by the fact that this Austrian manifesto passed almost unnoticed in the Allied countries.

I had taken advantage of my stay in London in August and again at the beginning of September 1918 for the purpose of attempting to discuss the question of our recognition also with Japan. At that time there was very close contact between the National Council in Paris and the Japanese Government. As early as 1916 Professor Masaryk had been in touch with Japanese official circles in London, and Štefánik, in the course of his journeys, always made a point of establishing contact with them in one form or another.

I myself was in communication with the Japanese in Paris and in London. Most of my dealings were with Mr. Ito, an Embassy official, first in London and then in Paris, as well as with Count Matsui and Viscount Chinda, the Ambassadors in Paris and London respectively. In accordance with my custom, ​from the year 1917 onwards I kept them systematically informed of the progress being made by our movement, and of our negotiations with the Allies.

Until the end of 1917 the direct interest which the Japanese had in our movement was not very extensive. But from the time of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia this direct interest increased considerably; and when our army in Russia became a factor of importance, and the Allies decided to transfer our troops by way of Vladivostok to France, the Japanese became our immediate military collaborators and were, in fact, more directly interested in our proceedings than some of the great Allied Powers.

Professor Masaryk’s visit to Tokio in April 1918 had a decisive influence in this respect. His personal intervention, his negotiations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other authorities, the appointment of our representative at Tokio and the activity of our first military contingent in the Far East, so consolidated the relations which had already been established in Japan that our political and military importance was soon recognized at Tokio.

From May 1918 the Allies began official discussions with the Japanese Government concerning the supply of vessels for the transport of our troops from Vladivostok to France, and also on the subject of equipment, supplies, medical services, etc. The Ministry of War at Paris kept me systematically informed about the progress of our affairs in Tokio, so that I was able to hold parallel negotiations on these subjects with Count Matsui.

When I was certain that England definitely intended to recognize the National Council, I visited Viscount Chinda, the Japanese Ambassador in London. I informed him how far the negotiations between Great Britain and ourselves had proceeded, and I mentioned that I proposed to ask the Japanese Government to follow the example of Great Britain in this respect. At Viscount Chinda’s request I gave him a written statement on this subject, and promised that before my departure from London I would let him know the results of my negotiations with Mr. Balfour. This took place verbally at a fresh visit on August 10th, and on the following day I supplied him with a written account of the proceedings.

Viscount Chinda promised me that he would intervene in Tokio, and assured me that the Japanese Government would ​certainly grant us the same concessions as we received from London. I again visited Viscount Chinda on September 1st, when I returned to London for the signature of the British-Czechoslovak Agreement. He informed me that Tokio consented to the recognition of the National Council. Japan definitely regarded us as a military and political ally, and her dealings with our army in Siberia would be in accordance with this principle. The exact wording of the declaration had not yet arrived, as Tokio required beforehand not only the text of the British declaration of August 9th, but also a copy of the agreement which London had just prepared for signature.

The Japanese agreement was actually handed to me by the Japanese Embassy in Paris on September 11, 1918. It is not so definite as the British declaration. This can be accounted for by the guarded attitude which Japan adopted to European questions in general.