Korea (Hamilton)/Introduction

To those who are not close students of military history, as well as to those who do not possess an extensive knowledge of the situation, the position in which Russia is placed equally affords the keenest interest. Certainly in the annals of military history, excluding the march of Napoleon upon Moscow, there is no war which may be said to have developed a parallel to the task which besets Russia in Manchuria and Korea. Her position at sea, moreover, is no better than that which she holds on land. Upon land, a single line of railway traversing the heart of an enemy's country terminates at Port Arthur. At sea, Vladivostock is cut off by reason of its position, while it is inaccessible on account of its climate. These points. Port Arthur and Vladivostock, define the extremities of the strategic position which Russia holds in Manchuria. Excluding Vladivostock at this moment from any especial consideration. Port Arthur is left for the opening moves of this campaign. Therefore, Port Arthur, with a single line of communications in its rear, becomes the pivot of the operations.

The aspect of Port Arthur from the sea is uninviting. Rugged hills, offshoots from the range of mountains which divides the Liao-tung peninsula, cluster round the bay, and encroaching upon the foreshore and bearing neither trees ​nor vegetation, impart to the surroundings a desolate and even wild appearance. Within the headlands of the harbour, conforming with the indentations of the coast, there are several bays shallow and unprofitable, but which in time may become an important adjunct to the small area of deep water which the harbour now possesses. Dredging operations have been undertaken, but there is so much to be done that many years must pass before Port Arthur receives any material addition to its very restricted accommodation. The mud, brought down by the streams which empty into the harbour, has already affected the deep-water area, and since the harbour was constructed these deposits have encroached very considerably upon the depth off shore. At low water steamers, which lie up within sixty feet of the wharf, rest upon mud in little more than a fathom of water, and at the same time the space is so small that it is impossible for a dozen vessels to anchor in the harbour with any comfort. Steamers, if any larger in size than the small coasting-boats which call at Port Arthur from China and Japan must anchor off the entrance, unloading and re-charging from junks or tenders. In relation to the requirements of the squadron Port Arthur is not nearly large enough. When cruisers are taking in stores battleships remain outside, an arrangement which is manifestly inconvenient in a period of emergency. It was for this reason that the authorities constructed at Dalny—a few miles from the fortress and within Ta-lien Bay—a new town, together with commercial docks and wharves, in order that Port Arthur might be devoted more particularly to the needs of the navy.

Port Arthur is happy in the possession of all those objects which, to a naval base, are component parts of its ​success. The dry dock, somewhat weak and unsubstantial, is 385 feet in length, 34 feet in depth, and 80 feet broad, while the naval basin is equal in surface space to the total available steamer anchorage in the harbour proper. When the dredging works in the harbour bays have been completed it is hoped that a mean depth of four fathoms will have been obtained. This systematic deepening of the harbour will give to the fleet a surface anchorage considerably in excess of one square mile, but until the work has been executed the value of Port Arthur as a satisfactory naval base is infinitely less than the prestige which it enjoys as an impregnable position.

Port Arthur possesses a small parade-ground, rifle-range, and artillery practice-ground, torpedo-station and training reservation, which will be enlarged when the bays are opened out. There is a flash-light station and various schools of instruction—torpedo, gunnery, telegraphy—while the arsenals and workshops which are built around the naval basin and within the navy yards are very thoroughly equipped. These effects, however, were mainly taken over by Russia when she seized Port Arthur; their existence at the present moment tends to show how impossible it is to under-estimate the advantages which Russia derives from the possession of this port, and how far-reaching are the consequences of the monstrous blunder which Lord Salisbury committed when he acquiesced in its usurpation.

Apart from the defences Russia, hitherto, has not added much to Port Arthur; for the main part the troops have been quartered in the old Chinese houses or in the former barracks of the Chinese troops, affairs having been somewhat neglected in view of the prior claim which the ​defences held. Now, however, fine barracks are in course of construction, and, if there is no war, it is anticipated that ample accommodation will be ready soon upon the shores of some of the bays and on the hills. The defences are indeed magnificent. Very few of the forts, which were in existence during the time of the Chinese, remain. Since the Russian Government entered upon possession the work of extending the perimeter of the defences, as well as strengthening the fortifications, has been a continuous labour. It is quite clear that the authorities are determined upon no half-measures. They have gained Port Arthur, and they propose to keep it. Upon the cliffs, rising immediately from the right of the harbour entrance, there is a most powerful position, formed, I believe, of a battery of six 21-inch Krupp guns, which was further supported by a fort placed a few feet above the harbour, and sweeping its immediate front, containing eight 10-inch Krupps. At the corresponding elevations upon the opposite headland there were two similar forts with identical batteries, while the mine fields within the harbour are controlled from these two lower positions. Following the hills to the south and north there are other forts; one in particular, of great size, is placed upon the extreme crest of the range, and, towering above all else, sweeps the sea and approaches to the harbour for great distances. It is impossible to detect the character of these guns, but from their position, and the extent of the fort and the nature of the part which they are intended to fill, it is improbable that they can be less than 27-ton guns, discharging shells of about 500 lb. The interior line of forts is no less formidable, and it must seem that Port Arthur can never be reduced by bombardment alone, while any ​force attacking by land would be severely handled by the positions from which the Russians propose to defend their flanks and the neck. At the present, however, there is a paucity of field-guns among the troops in garrison, in addition to which many of the more recently constructed forts lack artillery; while the opinion may be hazarded that the entire position has been so over-fortified as to become a source of eventual weakness in the ultimate disposition of the Russian force.

Of course a fight for the command of the sea will precede any land operations. Japan is within fifteen hours steam of Fusan, already a Japanese garrison-town, and of Ma-san-po, the port to which Russia and Japan make equal claim. The strait separating Japan from Korea is 200 miles broad, while Russia's nearest base at Port Arthur is 900 miles away on one hand and Vladivostock is 1200 miles away on the other. It follows therefore, that in Korea, and not in Manchuria, the troops of the Japanese army would be landed. Once established in Korea, Japan would be able to dispute the supremacy of the sea on equal terms. In this respect the possession by the Japanese of numerous torpedo craft confers a distinct advantage upon them, since it will be within their power to utilise their services if the Russian fleet were to attempt to check the movement. The absence of any facilities for repairing damages makes it certain that so far as possible the Russian fleet will evade any serious engagement. It would be difficult to improve upon the position of Japan in this respect. At Yokosuka, from which place a large number of cruisers have been launched, there is a very extensive building-yard, and Japan also possesses suitable docks for large ships at Kure and Nagasaki. In all she has at her immediate disposal some half a dozen docks, ​400 ft. in length or more, and a very skilful army of working mechanics and workmen in general. Port Arthur must be regarded for practical purposes the naval base of Russia in the Far East in the event of a cold-weather campaign.

Vladivostock is too far removed from the range of probable utility. At this port, however, Russia has constructed one large dry dock, one floating dock 301 ft. long, and a second dry dock has been laid down. Against these two solitary and isolated centres, Japan possesses naval bases, arsenals and docks at the following points on her coast.

The squadrons which Japan and Russia will be able to employ in this war are very formidable, and during the past few months each Power has made strenuous efforts to increase the strength of its fleet.

In January 1903 the aggregate tonnage of the Russian Pacific Squadron stood at some 87,000 tons, the fleet including the battleships Peresviet, Petropavlovsk, Poltava, Sevastopol, and the cruisers Rossia, Gromoboi, and Rurik, with other smaller vessels.

In March the tonnage went up to 93,000 tons, thanks to the arrival of the cruiser Askold from the Baltic.

In May the cruisers Diana, Pallada, Novik, and the battleship Retvizan joined. ​In June the cruisers Bogatyr and Boyarin reached the scene.

In July the battleship Probleda arrived.

In November the battleship Tzarevitch and the cruiser Bayan further added to Russia's strength.

In December the battleship Oslyabya, the armoured cruiser Dimitri Donskoi, the protected cruisers Aurora and Almaz, and eleven torpedo-boat destroyers.

In January 1904 the battleship Imperator Alexander III. left the Baltic for the Far East.

Russia has laboured under great disadvantages to secure her position in this region. In consequence of restricted shipbuilding resources and owing to an unfortunate geographical position, she has not enjoyed those opportunities of adding to her Pacific fleet which have presented themselves to Japan. In effect, if not in fact, Russia is compelled to maintain four navies. Unhappily, each is isolated from the other, many hundreds of miles separating them. Naval squadrons are concentrated in the Baltic, in the Black Sea, in the Caspian Sea and in the Pacific. The Pacific squadron is of recent establishment and of most modern construction. It dates back to 1898, from which time her policy of naval expansion began. Orders were placed with France, Germany and America for cruisers and battleships, coal was bought at Cardiff, and in a short space the nucleus of a powerful fleet had sprung into existence. At the present time these new ships are deficient in the various ratings, and hundreds of mechanics, gunners and engineers have been withdrawn from the Black Sea Squadron to do service with the Pacific Fleet, moving to the Pacific Ocean from the Black Sea by means of the Trans-Siberian Railway. ​The subjoined, detailed list presents the principal vessels in the Russian Pacific Squadron. The officers commanding are:

BATTLESHIPS
	Built	Tonnage	Speed knots	Chief armament
Tzarevitch (flagship)	1901	13,000	18	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 12 in.
					12 06 in.
Probleda	1900	12,000	19	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 10 in.
					11 06 in.
Poltava	1894	11,000	17	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 12 in.
					12 06 in.
Sevastopol	1895	11,000	17	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 12 in.
					12 06 in.
Petropavlovsk	1894	11,000	17	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 12 in.
					12 06 in.
Peresviet	1898	12,000	19	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 10 in.
					10 06 in.
Retvizan	1900	12,700	18	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 12 in.
					12 06 in.

​

CRUISERS
	Built	Tonnage	Speed, knots	Chief armament
Askold	1900	7,000	23		12 06 in.
Bayan	1900	8,000	21	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	02 08 in.
					08 06 in.
Gromoboi	1899	12,000	20	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 08 in.
					16 06 in.
Rossia	1896	12,000	20	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 08 in.
					16 06 in.
Rurik	1892	11,000	18	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 08 in.
					16 06 in.
Bogatyr	1901	6,000	23		12 06 in.
Varyag	1899	6,000	23		12 06 in.
Diana	1899	7,000	20		08 06 in.
Pallada	1899	7,000	20		08 06 in.
Boyarin	1900	3,000	22		06 04.7 in.
Novik	1900	3,000	25		06 04.7 in.
Zabiuca	1878	1,300	14		Field guns
Djildjit	1878	1,300	13		03 06 in.
Rasboinik	1879	1,300	13		03 06 in.

The gunboats on this station number nine, the destroyers eighteen, and the transports six. Thirteen destroyers are to join.

This fleet, with reinforcements, compares numerically with the eventual strength of Japan as follows:

A proportion of Japanese cruisers would be needed for coast defence, so that Russia may prove numerically stronger for sea work. In addition, Russia also has a powerful auxiliary fleet, consisting of ten steamers of the Black ​Sea Steam Navigation Company, most of which were built on the Tyne, and average fourteen knots. The Russian Volunteer Fleet Association numbers twelve Tyne and Clyde built ships. They are also at the disposal of the authorities.

Against this fighting array the Japanese are able to place vessels of equal size and displacement; in the actual weight of metal the Japanese are at a disadvantage, but in the thickness of the armoured protection there is little to choose. Against this comparative equality of the opposing fleets there must be borne in mind the great advantage which Japan derives from her ability to use her own fortified ports as naval bases. Indeed, this is of such importance that the knowledge of this fact might induce her to risk her whole strength in a single engagement. Again, in the mercantile marine, which has increased enormously of recent years, Japan will find all she may require for the purposes of transport and auxiliaries to the war fleet. The principal vessels in the Japanese navy are here indicated:

BATTLESHIPS
Name		Displacement	I.H.P.	Nominal Speed	Gun Protection	Weight of Broadside Fire
		Tons		Knots	In.	Lbs.
Hatsuse	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$	15,000	15,000	18.0	14.6	4240
Asahi
Shikishima
Mikasa		15,200	16,000	18.0	14.6	4225
Yashima	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$	12,300	13,000	18.0	14.6	4000
Fuji

​

ARMOURED CRUISERS
Name		Displacement	I.H.P.	Nominal Speed	Gun Protection	Weight of Broadside Fire
		Tons		Knots	In.	Lbs.
Tokiwa	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$	9750	18,000	21.5	6.6	3568
Asama
Yaqumo		9850	16,000	20.0	6.6	3368
Azuma		9436	17,000	21.0	6.6	3368
Idzuma	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$	9800	15,000	24.7	6.6	3568
Iwate

In addition to these there are the two cruisers which Japan purchased in Italy from the Argentine Government.

PROTECTED CRUISERS
Name		Displacement	I.H.P.	Nominal Speed	Gun Protection	Weight of Broadside Fire
		Tons		Knots	In.	Lbs.
Takasago		4300	15,500	24.0	4½.2	800
Kasage	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$	4784	15,500	22.5	4½.0	800
Chitose
Itsukushima	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\\\ \\\ \ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$	4277	5400	16.7	11.4	1260
Hashidate
Matsushima
Yoshino		4180	15,750	23.0	—	780
Naniwa	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$	3727	7120	17.8	—	1196
Takachiho
Akitsushima		3150	8400	19.0	—	780
Nitaka	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$	3420	9500	20.0	—	920
Tsushima
Suma	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$	2700	8500	20.0	—	335
Akashi

In connection with the First Division of the Japanese Fleet an interesting fact has transpired which, from reason of its association with this country, will prove of more than ordinary interest. In case of war it appears that with one ​exception the ships comprising this division are all British built. Designs, armour-plating and armament follow the type and standard of our own Navy, and it is therefore obvious that we cannot fail to be stirred deeply by the results of any collision which may occur. Each nation possesses in Far Eastern waters ships supplied with the latest appliances which science and ingenuity have devised. To the people of this Empire, whose security rests primarily upon the Fleet, our interest in the engagements is naturally the higher, by reason of the similarity between the ships which will be engaged upon one side and those of our own Navy. These vessels, all of which have received their war-paint, and whose place of concentration is Nagasaki, some 585 nautical miles from Port Arthur, are as follows:

Name	Where built	Tonnage	Chief armament
Hatsune (B)	Elswick	15,000	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 12 in.
				14 06 in.
Shikishima (B)	Thames	15,000	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 12 in.
				14 06 in.
Asahi (B)	Clyde	15,000	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 12 in.
				14 06 in.
Fuji (B)	Blackwall	12.500	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 12 in.
				10 06 in.
Yashima (B)	Elswick	12,500	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 12 in.
				10 06 in.
Iwate (C)	Elswick	10,000	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 08 in.
				10 06 in.
Asama (C)	Elswick	10,000	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 08 in.
				10 06 in.
Idzuma (C)	Elswick	10,000	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 08 in.
				14 06 in.
Tokiwa (C)	Elswick	10,000	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 08 in.
				10 06 in.
Takasago (C)	Elswick	4,300	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	02 08 in.
				10 04.7 in.
Kasagi (C)	Cramp	5,000	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	04 08 in.
	(Philadelphia)			10 06 in.

​A torpedo flotilla, numbering thirty-five vessels, forms part of this division. The other divisions of the fleet for war comprise the following:

In addition to these the auxiliary fleet numbers some forty steamers, for the most part vessels belonging to the Nippon Yusen Kaisha.

The present constitution of the Japanese Army dates from 1873, and the Military Forces consist of—(1) the permanent or Regular Army, with its Reserves and Recruiting Reserves; (2) the Territorial Army; (3) the National Militia; and (4) the Militia of the various island centres off the coast, &c Military service is obligatory in the case of every able-bodied male from the age of seventeen to forty years of age. Of this period, three years are passed in the permanent or Regular Army, four years and four months in the Regular Reserves, five years in the Territorial Army, and the remaining liability in the National Militia. The permanent Army, with its Reserves, conducts operations abroad, and the Territorial Army and the Militia are for home defence. These latter are equipped with Peabody and Remington single-loading rifles. The up-to-date strength of the permanent Army, on a war footing, which does not include the Reserves, is as follows:

​

				Officers	Rank and File	Horses
Infantry, 52 regiments of 3 battalions, 156 battalions			=	4,160	143,000	52
Cavalry, 17 regiments of 3 squadrons, 51 squadrons			=	400	9,300	9000
Field and Mountain Artillery, 19 regiments of 6 batteries, total 114 batteries of 6 guns = 684 guns			=	800	12,500	8,800
Fortress Artillery, 20 battalions			=	530	10,300	70
Engineers	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left\{{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right.}}$	13 Sapper battalions	=	270	7,000	215
		01 Railway battalion	=	20	550	15
Cavalry, 17 regiments of 3 squadrons, 51 squadrons			=	400	9,300	9000

The Reserves comprise 52 battalions of Infantry, 17 squadrons, 26 Engineer and Transport companies, and 19 batteries with 114 guns, yielding a total of 1000 officers, 34,600 rank and file, and 9000 horses. Therefore, on mobilisation, the grand effective strength of the Army available for service beyond the seas would amount to 7,400 officers, 224,990 rank and file, 798 guns, and 67,152 horses. Behind this, there is the Territorial Army, comprising 386 Infantry battalions, 99 squadrons, 26 Engineer and Transport companies, and about 70 batteries, or 11,735 officers, 348,100 men, 11 16 guns, and 86,460 horses.

The Infantry and Engineers of the Regular Army have been recently re-armed with the Meidji magazine rifle. The following particulars show that the Japanese small arm is a superior weapon to the Russian, which dates from 1891:

​

The Regular Cavalry have the Meidji carbine. The Reserves are armed with the Murata magazine rifle, model 1894, calibre .312 in., muzzle velocity 2000 feet-seconds, sighted up to 2187 yds., and weight with bayonet, 9 lb. 1 oz. The equipment carried by the Infantry soldier in the field weighs 43½ lbs.

The Regular Field and Mountain Artillery is armed with 2.95 in. quick-firing equipment, with hydraulic compressor, throwing a 10 lb. projectile. This is known as the Arisaka equipment. The Fortress and Siege Artillery have the latest models of Krupp and Schneider-Canet in siege guns, guns of position, and mortars. The Reserve Field Artillery are armed with a 2.95 rifled cannon of bronze on the old Italian model. The Japanese have no Horse Artillery, and the only difference between the field and mountain equipments is that the latter is the shorter and lighter gun, and has not as long a range. The Cavalry is the least efficient army of the service. It carries sword and carbine, but no lance. The horses are badly trained; the men are very indifferent riders.

The strength of the Russian forces in Manchuria embraces 88 battalions, 60 squadrons and 50 batteries, which, together with the garrison forces and fortress armament, numbers 200,000 men and 300 guns. These troops in Manchuria are formed into two army corps ​of the first line and two of the second. Two new Rifle Brigades have just been added to the existing strength. They are composed as follows:

7th Brigade Port Arthur		8th Brigade Vladivostock
General Kondratenko		General Artamanoff
25th Regiment		29th Regiment
26th Regiment„		30th Regiment„
27th Regiment„ 28th Regiment„	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$ (new)	31st Regiment„ 32nd Regiment„	${\displaystyle \scriptstyle {\left.{\begin{matrix}\ \\\ \end{matrix}}\right\}\,}}$(new)

The Russian is a phenomenal marcher; the actual weight of his equipment is 58 lbs. 2 oz. One tent is carried in section between six men. Each soldier carries in his haversack two and a half days' biscuits. The ration in daily use for war consists of

In the exigencies of active service it happens that the Russian soldier must forage for himself. Under any circumstances, however, he sustains himself on very little nourishment, and relies in a great measure upon what he can find. The Russian cavalry is armed with sword, rifle and bayonet. The latter is invariably carried "fixed," even when the weapon itself is slung. A few regiments only carry the lance. The field guns are steel breech-loaders manufactured at the Obukhov works. They are akin to the Krupp pattern; many, however, have the interrupted screw breech piece and the de Bange obturation. At present there are many varieties of artillery with the Russian troops, ​particularly in their fortified positions, to which places the Russian transported the seizures which they made from the Chinese during the Boxer crisis. These embraced French, German and British examples of artillery.

On land, the immense superiority of the reserve numbers of the Russians reduces the advantages which would accrue to the Japanese if the fighting were confined to the sea. At the same time, however, it should be remembered that the Russian troops are slow movers, and although they may exhibit magnificent endurance, and although they may be relied upon to fight well, the lack of individual initiative upon the part of the Russian officers robs the operations of that dash and address which is embodied in the spirit of the Japanese army. Curiously enough, each side favours the Continental school of infantry and cavalry tactics, the underlying principles in the training of the Japanese revealing a close adherence to Teutonic methods. Neither side will profit, therefore, by any degree of indivisibility to which they may have attained. The winter great-coat of either army is very nearly identical in colour, and for warm weather Japanese and Russians alike favour a white blouse. There has been talk of the Japanese adopting a khaki tint; upon the other hand, the blouse of the Russian soldier is by courtesy equally white or khaki. In the more important direction of land transport, it might appear that the Manchurian railway would be a crowning triumph for the Russian authorities. Unfortunately, this immense length of rail, badly laid and indifferently equipped, will impose a perpetual strain upon the military resources. If the country population could be relied upon to maintain a benevolent neutrality towards telegraph poles and lines, railway sleepers and rails, the stone pillars ​and balks of the bridges, the possibility of any serious interruption of traffic would be materially lessened. Unhappily for the Russians, the attitude and acts of the native population, who, in a general way, will lose no opportunity to harass their enemy, must impede the effective cooperation of the Russian forces.

Against this instinctive feeling of animosity there may be set the racial sympathy with the Japanese which governs every Chinaman. In Manchuria particularly, the Japanese enjoy a high reputation in the minds of the populace, while there is remembered, above aught else, that prompt redemption of all obligations during the Chino-Japanese War which distinguished the policy of the invaders towards local interests. This policy of benevolence was exhibited for the second time during the Boxer crisis, and, of course, the striking example offered by the Japanese, in comparison with the Russians, was not lost upon the Chinese. These things are recalled to-day in Manchuria, and they may be calculated to offset any reactionary sentiment which may take place in Korea. Between the hospital arrangements of each belligerent there is little to choose. The more efficient system of the Japanese service is equalised by the greater facilities which the possession of railway communication by the Russians will present to the transportation of the wounded. It should be pointed out, however, that the principal medical service—the Russian Red Cross Society—is wholly patriotic, and that it is not, in any degree, a military organisation. It is liable to be withdrawn from the field at any moment after the conclusion of the major operations.

Beyond these few observations it is difficult—if not impossible—to trespass with any certainty, although, as a ​closing remark, it may perhaps be added that, provided the investment of Port Arthur be satisfactorily accomplished by sea and that Vladivostock were enclosed by ice, the estuaries of the Yalu and Liao Rivers enable an admirable line to be taken up, from which the Russian position throughout Manchuria may be very readily threatened. Speculations as to the development of the campaign upon land are, however, quite absurd until something is known of the results of the naval engagements with which the war must open. Meanwhile the painful familiarity with the costs of war which distinguishes the British taxpayer has directed no little attention to the financial position of either country. An eminent German financier, interested in the public debt of Russia, lately explained to me that a very large proportion of the moneys, which have been raised for the construction of the Russian inter-railway communications in addition to the Trans-Siberian and Manchurian Railways, has been set aside from time to time to supplement her war chest. These sums, added to those collected by Count Mouravieff with the assent of M. de Witte, and including the large balances which have accrued to the State by departmental economies during the past year, represent approximately a capital of one hundred millions sterling. Against this accumulation it is said that the financial position of Japan is most favourable. There is, I believe, a specie reserve in the Central Bank which amounts to 113,000,000 yen, plus some 40,000,000 yen in London. Moreover, the bank's note-issuing margin is 35,000,000 yen, which will be larger after the New Year. The Treasury has three capital funds, amounting together to 50,000,000 yen, besides some millions in London remaining from the bond sale of 1902. Finally, ​there are large sums lying idle in all the banks throughout the country, while an Ordinance has been issued which provides the Government with unlimited credit.

The more recent action of the Russians in Manchuria tends, of course, to support the view that war may be imminent. Nevertheless, bluff is a component part of Russian diplomacy, and there is ground for believing that the intentions of Russia in the Far East are by no means so warlike as the preparations now proceeding and the acts of the Russian administrative officials in Manchuria itself would imply. Russian diplomacy always covers the development of its plans by preparing to demonstrate in a contrary direction; and at the present time her occupation of Korean territory is little else than the screen, behind which she proposes to secure her hold upon Manchuria. Nothing short of war will cause her to retire from her position in Manchuria; but while Korean territory is of little value to the Russian protectorate, whatever the compromise which may be effected between Japan and Russia, she may be expected to make a determined effort to dominate the lower waters of the Yalu River. In fact, curious as it may seem, the estuary of the Yalu River is the very locale of the dispute between the two Powers, since, if Russia were ever permitted to dominate the Yalu River, she would gain at once that special position upon the frontiers of Korea which it is the desire of Japan to frustrate. In this Japan can rely only upon the makeshifts of diplomacy; and although the Russian occupation of Yong-an-po may be circumvented, the development of An-tung upon the opposite shore of the river cannot be prevented. It seems, therefore, as inevitable that some commanding position upon the Yalu River must ultimately fall to her lot. An-tung lies within Manchurian ​territory; the Yalu River is the border stream between Manchuria and Korea, and at Yong-an-po the nucleus of an important Russian settlement has been established. The future contains no promise of the immediate settlement of the present difficulty. At best the outlook is confused; while at the same time there is presented in a manner singularly clear and comprehensible the fact that Russia will neither evacuate Niu-chwang nor be driven out of Manchuria, while she will certainly not abandon her position on the Yalu River. The attitude of Russia at Niu-chwang has been indicated by past events, her occupation of Manchuria is an old story, and she is now engaged in the rapid development of her interests at An-tung. The position of this port endows it with unusual advantages, and the commercial potentialities of the place are very great. It lies about fifteen miles above Yong-an-po, on the opposite bank. At present the export trade is confined to millet and silk cocoons, the overproduction of the latter commodity requiring close technical supervision. Eight miles below An-tung, situated on the right bank of the river, is the likin station San-tao-lan-tao, where junks and rafts must report and pay the stipulated excise before they proceed onward. The river then bears away to the north-east, and after another stretch of seven miles there comes An-tung, upon the same bank, at a point where the stream divides, the eastern branch being the Yalu River. An-tung is of quite recent construction, and a few years ago millet fields occupied its site. Under the care of native merchants large, solid-looking houses have been built, broad streets have been opened out, and an air of unusual prosperity distinguishes the place. The anchorage is thronged with junks, while timber is stacked in vast quantities below the limits of the town. Sea-going steamers ​of the coaster type can here discharge and load their cargoes, thus obviating transhipment at Ta-tung-kao.

Trade between Ta-tung-kao, which is situated at the mouth of the Yalu, and Chi-fu, is at present carried on by small steamers of the Mosquito flotilla and one British ship, the Hwang-ho, of the China Navigation Company (Messrs. Butterfield and Swire), while the vast volume of the exports and imports finds its way hither and thither in Chinese junks. The run from Chi-fu port is one of a hundred and eighty-five miles, and the time usually occupied in the trip north-eastward is twenty-two hours, the steamers anchoring in the fairway channel at a distance of four miles from Ta-tung-kao. Ta-tung-kao is a busy town, inasmuch as it is the place of transhipment for imports and exports, most of which go to or come from An-tung. The fact of steamers being unable to approach Ta-tung-kao makes An-tung the real business centre of the Yalu River. In respect of An-tung, two hundred Russian cavalry have been stationed there for over two and a half years. The cantonment is situated on a small hill, marking the northern limit of the town, which has no wall. As usual, through the Yalu Valley these soldiers bear an evil reputation among the natives, from whom they commandeer at pleasure. Striking away from An-tung is the Pekin "Great Road," which runs to Liao-yang. Above An-tung the river divides and shoals exist, the water being so shallow that none but native craft can ply. Wi-ju is situated about ten miles to the eastward, and at a point west of Mao-kewi-shan, four miles below An-tung, there is the terminus of the branch of the Manchurian railway, which is to strike the river. The construction of this work will begin in the spring of 1904. The first eighty miles offer little obstruction, and it ​is intended that the work shall be pushed forward until its junction with the main line of the system is accomplished. Russia, therefore, cannot well afford to ignore the consequences of her policy in the Far East, nor, at the same time, can she be expected to sacrifice, at the request of Japan, those great interests which she has been at such pains to foster. The position is, indeed, a striking example of the manner in which an imperious policy will create the taste, if not the necessity, for Imperialism.

The position of Korea in regard to the disputed questions is a hopeless one. Unfortunately, the government of Korea is powerless to prevent either the advance of Russia or the steady spread of Japanese influence. She possesses neither army nor navy which can be put to any practical use, and she is in that position in which a country is placed when unable to raise its voice upon its own behalf. The army numbers a few thousand men, who, in the last few years, have been trained to the use of European weapons. They are armed with the Gras, (obsolete pattern) Murata, Martini, and a variety of muzzle-loading smooth-bore rifles. Their shooting powers are most indifferent, and they lack besides the qualities of courage and discipline. There is no artillery, and the cavalry arm is confined to a few hundred men with no knowledge of horse-mastership, and with no idea of their weapons or their duties. At a moment of emergency the entire force of mounted and dismounted men would become utterly demoralised. There are numerous general officers, while, I believe, the navy is composed of twenty-three admirals and one iron-built coal lighter, until quite lately the property of a Japanese steamship company. Korea is the helpless, hapless sport of Japanese caprice or Russian lust; and it has been my aim to present an ​impartial study of the condition of the country in the pages of this volume. Since so many and so much abler pens have dealt elsewhere with the position of Manchuria, I have confined myself solely to a review of Korea. For this I trust that I may not be taken to task, while in order to satisfy those who think that some reference to the questions of Manchuria should have been incorporated in my book I have ventured to impart to my preface the appearance of a chapter which deals solely with this problem. And now, at the end of my work, a last, but none the less pleasant, duty awaits me. In addition to my own notes upon Korea I have gathered information from many people—writers, travellers, and students—all interested in the contemporary history of the Hermit Kingdom. These I now hasten to thank, and by naming them I would mark my grateful appreciation of the kindness which they have extended to me. To Mr. MacLeavy Brown, of the Korean Maritime Customs; Mr. Gubbins, formerly of the British Legation, Seoul; to my distinguished and learned friend, Professor Homer B. Hulbert, whose published notes upon Korea have been of exceptional value, I make hearty acknowledgments; to Mrs. Bishop, Colonel Younghusband, the Rev. Mr. Griffis, Major Gould-Adams, Mr. Henry Norman, M. P., authors of interesting and important contributions to any study of Korea, I express the sense of my obligation; to the Rev. C. Collyer, who was good enough to make my spelling of Korean names identical with the standard of Dr. Gale; to Mr. Bolton, of Messrs. Stanford, the map makers, of Long Acre, who laboured so patiently with the many shortcomings of my geographical data, I am, indeed, indebted. To Sir Douglas Straight, editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, whose paper it was my delight to represent throughout my long residence in the Far East; to Mr. ​Nicol Dunn, editor of the Morning Post; to Mr. S. J. Pryor, of the Daily Express, I have to record my acknowledgment of the courteous permission of these distinguished people to reproduce such portions of my work as have appeared in the columns of their respective organs from time to time. And last of all to my readers I offer this book in the hope that an immediate apology for its production may be permitted to atone for its numerous shortcomings.

December 25, 1903.