Korea (Hamilton)/Chapter 7

It is perhaps curious that the man who has held the Korean State together, during the past few years, should be British—one of those sons of the Empire, upon whose work the present generation looks with satisfaction. It is nearly thirty years ago since Mr. McLeavy Brown made his appearance in China. To-day, among Englishmen whose reputations are associated with the problems and politics of the Far East, his name stands out almost as prominently as that of his colleague, Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector-General of the Imperial Maritime Customs of China. Seconded from the Chinese Customs for special duty, Mr. McLeavy Brown has devoted many years of his life to the financial difficulties which beset Korea, holding at first the dual position of Treasurer-General and Chief Commissioner of Customs. Within the last few years, Mr. McLeavy Brown's activity has been confined to the administration of the Customs Service, where, though deprived of the unique and influential position filled by him as financial adviser to the Emperor, he has succeeded in accomplishing invaluable work for the country.

A man may be judged by the character of those who ​gather round him, and when, weary of the carping and pettiness that prevail in Seoul, one turns to the service which Mr. McLeavy Brown represents, it is to find his colleagues animated by a quiet enthusiasm, and a spirit of generous devotion, and loyalty to his principles and policy. Unfortunately, his supporters are not in the capital, and he can derive no encouragement from their sympathy. Their sphere of work lies in the treaty ports, but he is content to remain in Seoul always fighting, in grim and stoical silence, against the absurd extravagances of the Court, and the infamous corruption of the officials. So long as he perseveres in this duty, just so long will he be hampered and thwarted in all quarters. The very opposition which he encounters, however, is no unemphatic testimony to the exceeding and exceptional value of the work which he has already achieved, in the face of every obstacle to systematic progress and reform, that the craft and cunning of officialdom can devise.
Mr. J. McLeavy Brown, C.M.G., LL.D.

The animus which prevails against Mr. McLeavy Brown occasions, to those who are new to Seoul, sentiments of profound astonishment and dismay, but after the first feeling ​of strangeness has worn off, and it becomes possible to grasp the peculiar and complex variety of people who have gathered in the capital of the Hermit Kingdom, the causes responsible for the existence of such an opinion are very plainly revealed. Apart from the Legations, there are few foreigners, not even excepting the representatives of the very miscellaneous collection of American missionaries, who have not come to Seoul from motives of self-interest, which bring them into collision, directly or indirectly, with the Chief Commissioner of the Customs in his official capacity. If no longer the financial adviser of the Government, his counsel is sought as occasion arises; although his advice is not necessarily followed, it frequently happens that the influence of the Chief Commissioner of the Customs becomes the controlling factor in the negotiations between a bewildered and impecunious Court and an importunate concession-hunter. Moreover, cases may occur when an upright regard for the interests of the kingdom makes it incumbent upon Mr. McLeavy Brown to urge the rejection of proposals, which have not come through the channels of his own office. Such a variation of the orthodox method of application may happen any day in Seoul. While this attempted exercise of a power of veto does not endear him to the seeker after Ministerial "considerations," the impersonal spirit, in which he discharges the functions of his office, atones for any exceptional interference he may deem necessary. Much of the feeling which actuates foreigners and officials against Mr. McLeavy Brown, therefore, is based upon a thoughtless disregard for the elementary facts in his very delicate position. There is, of course, no suggestion against his honour. In a community, accustomed to the financial backsliding which appears to be an inevitable preliminary to any concession, ​the exponent of a policy of economy and straight dealing always provokes the strongest animosity in those about him.

A more emotional man than the Chief Commissioner would have tired of the thankless part which he is compelled to play. Years of laborious work, and the habit, which he has acquired in the isolated state in which he lives, of concentrating his energies upon the subject before him, enable him to school himself against the trials of his situation. He treats every one with unfailing frankness and directness, but the kindly instincts which illuminate his private life are submerged in the cares and worry of his official position. During business hours he becomes the cold, irresponsive machine of State; his whole imagination and ingenuity focused upon the necessity of checking those who would incite their Sovereign to acts subversive of the principles of financial rectitude, which Mr. McLeavy Brown would fain see encouraged.

Only those who have had experience of Korea can thoroughly appreciate the fertility of the Korean official in inventing new schemes by which public money may be appropriated to his private uses. If the condition of the finances had not already made the practice of economy imperative, this tendency would justify the determination to deny the means of peculation to officials. Mr. McLeavy Brown has therefore brought into accord the necessity of economy, which underlies the existence of the Customs, with the principles of the system upon which he administers the service. It is, in the matter of the foreign staff of the Korean Customs, impossible for Korean officials to take exception to the standard of payment by which the services of these foreigners are compensated. If this all​pervading retrenchment makes employment in the Korean Customs exceptionally unsatisfactory to its minor foreign officials, a very clear reason for the low payment is nevertheless found in the narrow margin which divides the total revenue from the total expenditure. Moreover, the Chief Commissioner is himself the chief sufferer.

Mr. McLeavy Brown has long been an enigma in Seoul. Although the variety of his gifts and the hospitable quality of his nature make him an important element in the life of the capital, there are few who care to study the man and his movements intelligently. Mr. McLeavy Brown possesses many moods; and the isolation in which he is placed, by the absence of any sympathy between himself and the people among whom he lives, renders the circumstances of his position almost pathetic. When, in 1896, he refused to accept any salary for the hopeless and onerous post of Financial Comptroller of the Imperial Treasury, the foreign community of Seoul were astounded. This refusal to burden still further the resources of an exhausted country is, however, an index to the guiding principles of his life. There is no dissembling in his transactions. Although he may temper an ill wind with promises, the continuity of his decision is maintained, and he attempts to carry out independently and honestly anything to which he may have pledged himself. He is indefatigable in his work; indomitable in his perseverance, cool and determined. A barrister by profession, he devotes himself to the minutiæ of his service with an attention which discloses his legal training. In his estimate of a person, no less than a situation, he seldom errs.

In his official life he represents a type of Englishman that is rapidly disappearing from our public services. His ​private life reflects the culture and the grace of an attractive personality. They say, in Seoul, that Mr. McLeavy Brown is more skilful as a diplomatist than as an administrator; and his brilliant conversational powers give some colour to the assertion. Upon arrival in Seoul, newcomers are apt to hear that "Brown is a walking encyclopædia." He speaks, reads and writes with equal facility French, German, Italian and Chinese. It will be remembered that he is in the service of the Korean Government, a sphere of utility and activity which demands fluency in yet another language. His library attests the breadth of his culture; it numbers some 7000 volumes, and fills the walls of the rooms and corridors of his house at Seoul from floor to ceiling. Boxes of new books arrive by every mail. When he reads them it is difficult to conjecture. At night, as one strolls from the British Legation to the Station Hotel, the lights in his study window may be seen burning brightly. He is believed to sit up with his books very often until dawn. It would be typical of this silent self-contained man if he found in the pleasures of his library the antidote to much which takes place in Seoul.

When his Imperial Majesty was pleased to demand the private residence and official premises of his Chief Commissioner of Customs, there was much perturbation in Seoul about the disturbances, which were expected to take place upon the expiration of the Emperor's ultimatum. Preparations were made for such a contingency, and four British men-of-war under Admiral Bruce appeared at Chemulpo. The eventful day passed quietly, however, and excitement gave place to no small amount of disappointment among the European community. Mr. McLeavy Brown remained in possession of his usual quarters, the ​whole question of a change in the location of the Customs having been reserved by the officials of the Court. Unfortunately, the demands of the Court could only be contested in so far as they continued to be peremptory in their nature. When, later, due warning was given to the Chief Commissioner and a fresh domicile appointed, as a servant of the Crown Mr. McLeavy Brown was unable to ignore the mandate. Prior to this notice, the Emperor had insisted, very foolishly, upon the immediate evacuation of the Customs buildings, a demand compliance with which was impossible, and in resistance to which Mr. McLeavy Brown was very properly supported by Mr. J. G. Gubbins, C.M.G., then acting Consul-General to Korea.

After the murder of the Queen in 1895, the Korean Court fled from the old Palace, in the least healthy part of the city, (o the vicinity of the British and American Legations, and built there a new Palace in a safer and more pleasant locality. But the new Palace is overlooked by the British Legation and by the residence of Mr. McLeavy Brown. The Emperor, spurred on by his eunuchs, had cast envious glances on the dwellings of these foreigners, and not unnaturally decided that these properties would make a very pleasing addition to the Palace which he is now constructing. Unhappily, there was reason to suspect that, in turning the Chief Commissioner out of his house, the Emperor, or rather Lady Om, who desired the house, and Yi Yong-ik, who coveted the Customs, hoped at the same time to expel him from the country. That the attempt to oust Mr. McLeavy Brown from his home really aimed at removing him from office can hardly be doubted. When the house question rose, Mr. McLeavy Brown was given exactly two days' notice—from the 19th to the 21st March—to ​move out. When he refused to accept such an intimation, force was threatened, but averted by the intervention of the British chargé d'affaires. In the end, Mr. McLeavy Brown's compound was entered by a few hangers-on of the palace,

who were easily ejected by the orders of the Chief Commissioner of the Customs. These creatures then tore their clothes and ran crying to the Palace that they had been beaten and otherwise shamefully ill-used. As a result, the dismissal of the Chief Commissioner was demanded. Mr. Gubbins took the matter up with great promptness, and agreed that, upon certain conditions, which included a proper notice to quit and the choice of new sites, the Emperor might acquire both the British Legation and the Customs buildings, which were apparently necessary to the completion of the new Palace. As it happens, the British Legation, which directly overlooks the half-finished Palace, is far more necessary to the Emperor's peace of mind than the Customs buildings, which are upon a lower level. It is ​obvious, therefore, that the attack was directed more against Mr. McLeavy Brown, by a posse of Court officials, than against his house. Nevertheless, it has always been apparent, since the Emperor came over to the shelter of the Legations, that there could be no sufficient accommodation for him in the Foreign quarter without encroaching on the grounds of the Legations. The Legations have a delightful situation on the only real eminence in the central part of Seoul, and the Emperor, now that he has come, must either be content with a malarial situation, at the feet, as it were, of the foreigners, or absorb the Legation grounds and send their tenants elsewhere. Already he has displaced the German Minister. Sooner or later the British, and perhaps the American, will go too; and the Palace will then cover the whole hill, save the site of the Russian Legation, whose flag will still wave a little above the Imperial standard of Korea.

No sooner had a settlement been attained upon the question at issue between the Court and the Chief Commissioner of the Customs, than there came the announcement that a loan of five million yen had been arranged between the Government and the Yunnan Syndicate, upon the security of the revenue of the Customs. This at once compromised the authority of the Chief Commissioner, who, by virtue of his office, exercises absolute control over the revenues. It should be understood that the loan had nothing whatever to do with the question of Mr. McLeavy Brown's house. The original proposals were first mooted a year before the more recent trouble. The Yunnan Syndicate, a French company registered in London, is supported almost wholly by French capital. It is generally understood that the main object of the loan was to obtain a ​weapon by which unlimited concessions might be extorted. The manœuvre was not altogether successful. The Yunnan Syndicate, by the terms of the agreement, bound itself to lend the Korean Government five million yen in gold and silver bullion at 5½ per cent., the loan to be subject to a charge of 10 per cent. for commission, and to be repaid in instalments stretching over twenty-five years. In case the Korean Government were unable to repay the money out of the ordinary sources of revenue, the Customs revenue had been pledged as security. The agreement was signed by Pak, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Yi Yong-ik, the Minister of Finance, on the one hand, and by M. Cazalis, agent of the company, and M. Colin de Plancy, French Minister at Seoul, on the other. The document left many points open. It was particularly vague in that no date was fixed for the delivery of the gold and silver bullion at Chemulpo. It was therefore argued, with obvious reason, that the Syndicate might turn this oversight to account by simply refusing to deliver the money until certain concessions had been granted.

M. Cazalis, the agent of the Yunnan Syndicate, Limited, was indignant that he should find himself opposed both by Mr. Gubbins and Mr. McLeavy Brown, who, according to his view, followed the Japanese lead in suspecting Russian intrigue. There is no reason, however, to believe that the British chargé d'affaires based his objections upon any such grounds. The scheme of the Yunnan Syndicate was quite iniquitous enough to meet with opposition for primâ facie reasons. Here are the facts of the case as stated by the representative of the company. The Yunnan Syndicate, without consulting the Chief Commissioner of the Customs, the Japanese Minister, or the British Minister, secretly ​persuaded the Korean Government to borrow five million yen in gold and silver bullion at 5½ per cent., giving the Customs revenue as security. M. Cazalis argued that it was necessary to carry the matter through with secresy, because it would have been impossible to procure any signatures to the document, if the affair had been conducted publicly, with the full knowledge of the Chief Commissioner of the Customs. In other words, he admitted that the scheme was such as would never have commended itself to Mr. McLeavy Brown, who was absolutely impartial and without interest in the matter.

In the meantime, it is as well to note that the loan aimed at creating a position for French interests in Korea. In view of the attempt of Russia to acquire an open and ice-free port for her own purposes, and the distinct understanding existing between the French and Russian Governments with regard to Russia's Asiatic policy, Great Britain could not disregard any possible development. At that moment French activity in Korea may not have involved any direct menace to our own interests. Nevertheless, any combination of circumstances which gave to French and Russian influence a predominance in the administration of the country, could scarcely fail to develop incidents, against which it is our manifest duty to guard. And it is perhaps curious, moreover, that the man who was the prime mover in the intrigue to dispossess Mr. McLeavy Brown of his house should have been the very one to arrange the loan from the Yunnan Syndicate with M. Cazalis.

If the wisdom and necessity of a loan of five millions had been assured, there are many directions in Korea in which such a sum could be most profitably spent. With the revenue of the Customs as the guarantee, there would ​have been no difficulty in securing more advantageous conditions than those of the contract. The terms were preposterous. Subsidiary proposals, as to which no conclusion was then reached, further demanded the lease of the Pyöngyang coal-mines, the control of forty-four additional mines, the purchase of French mining plant, the engagement of Fench mining experts, and involved minor stipulations, which were in themselves objectionable to the Court, while giving to French interests in Korea an unwarranted and undesirable preponderance. The uses to which it was alleged that the loan would be put were precisely those which are actually most necessary. Unanimous support for the loan would have been won if there had been the slightest reason to hope for the faithful observance by the Court of its pledges. Unhappily, there is no prospect that any very appreciable proportion of the loan will be expended upon the objects on which such stress was laid, objects which are potent and vital factors in the economic development of the kingdom. The loan was handed over in bullion; in the ratio of one-third silver and two-thirds gold, ostensibly that a National bank may be inaugurated and the present nickel coinage replaced by gold and silver tokens. This is eminently laudable. If the small dimensions of the loan rendered such a thing feasible, the conversion of the national money would be of incalculable benefit to the financial credit of the Government and the country in general. But it must be remembered that one of the reasons for contracting the last Japanese loan was to provide a nickel coinage exchangeable at par with the Japanese and Mexican silver tokens. Unhappily, this same coinage is now at a discount of 120 per cent. for one bundled Japanese cents gold. Examination has proved ​that the intrinsic value of one dollar nickel of Korean five cent pieces—at that time the only unit struck—is only one-eighteenth of its face value as against the Japanese gold standards of currency. The balance was "squeezed." It is likewise impossible to make provision for the legitimate and honourable expenditure of this new loan. Quite recently there has been a large issue of one-cent copper pieces. These coins sustain a better ratio to the yen than the nickel currency; as a matter of fact the intrinsic value of the copper coinage is so much greater than the nickel money that there is a standard of exchange between them. At present the nickel, compared with the copper, token is quoted at 12 per cent. discount.