Korea (Hamilton)/Chapter 16

​

Russian industrial activity in Korea may be regarded as a cloak for political schemes. Since the time that the Emperor became the protected guest of the Russian Legation, the influence of Russia in Korea has been more definite in quality. Assisted by French capital, a Russian company has started recently a cattle ranch and sheep-run at A-ya-chin, on the coast of Kang-won Province, with a view to the establishment of a canning factory, which is now in process of construction. In addition to this, she has set up a glass factory at Seoul, a proceeding which throws no light upon her motives. She has promoted the Pacific Whale Fishing Company, which, plying its trade off the coast of Korea, collects very valuable information of unsurveyed bays and unsounded anchorages, water-holes, coal-deposits, and currents—and occasionally catches a whale. It possesses twelve vessels. Russia controls no railway line in Korea, although she is interested in the line which the French are building; no gold mine, but a geographical exploration party of naval officers has been topographically examining the region of the Yalu River for some years. She has been accorded certain rights in Ma-san-po; she is endeavouring ​to secure the concession of a site suitable for a naval station, and through virtue of a lumber felling concession on the Yalu, she has located herself at Yong-an-po. In May 1903, too, a commercial commission travelled from Seoul to Wi-ju, overland.

As rapidly as circumstances permit, Russia is connecting her Manchurian telegraphic system with the trunk lines of Korea, and telegraphic communication is in course of construction between Mukden and Wi-ju, Vladivostock and Won-san. The action of Russia in this respect has encountered very great opposition from Korea. When the Korean Cabinet declined to grant permission for the erection of the poles, for which the Russian engineers had not waited, M. Pavloff, the Russian Minister, delicately hinted that the removal of the poles would be regarded as an unfriendly act, and one liable to create unpleasantness between the two Governments. The Korean Government, however, were not frightened into drawing back, and for some months past the local officials have been occupied in cutting down whatever poles the Russians might erect. Russia, also, proposes to rebuild the telegraph line from Pekin to Seoul viâ Wi-ju, while further, it is her avowed intention to construct from Mukden a branch of her railway to An-tung on the Yalu River.

Russia has been associated, also, with the Korean army, the Russian military authorities having lent a number of drill-instructors to the Korean service. They have now been withdrawn. The management of the residence, in which apartments are found for the guests of the Imperial Court, has been entrusted to a Russian lady, Miss Sontag. There are very few Russian residents in Seoul. Those who live there comprise the immediate personnel of the Legation, the ​Legation guards, priests of the Greek Church, and some sprinkling of the shop-keeping element. The colony is small, but contrives, with the aid of a port guardship at Chemulpo and constant visits from the Pacific Squadron, when performances are given by the band from the guard-ship for the delectation of the Imperial Court, to support the majesty and dignity of the Russian Government with much impressive display. Proposals have been recently made to establish consulates in the open ports of the Empire—the Consulate from the capital is now established at Chemulpo; to increase the services of the steamers of the Manchurian Railway between the open ports of Korea and Manchuria, and to found a branch of the Russo-Chinese Bank at Chemulpo. It is intended, too, that the Russian Pacific Squadron shall use the Korean harbours more frequently as ports of call.

For some years Russia has been gradually feeling her way in Korea. Prior to 1885 there were over twenty thousand Koreans settled in her Far Eastern possessions, while in 1888 Russia concluded a Commercial Convention with Korea, which opened the Korean land frontier to Russian traders. In 1893 telegraphic communication between Russia and Korea was arranged, when, just as the Russian policy towards Korea perhaps was beginning to shape itself, war between China and Japan was declared. Whatever conclusions may have been anticipated as the results of such a war, there can be no doubt that its effect upon the actual destinies of Russia and Japan in the Far East was far-reaching. The policy of Russia towards China underwent a change, while the ultimate possession of Korea became equally the objective of Japan as of the greater Power. Russia, however, could not afford to profit at the moment by the downfall of China, and ​Japan was not strong enough to hold the Liao-tung Peninsula nor bold enough to seize Korea. Nevertheless, driven out of the Liao-tung by the action of Russia, France and Germany, Japan might still have secured for herself complete material and political ascendency over Korea. In time, if such had been her policy, she could have made manifest, too, her occupation of the kingdom and equipped herself with an argument, the parallel of that possessed by Great Britain in Egypt, and by Russia in Manchuria. Unhappily, while Russia with masterly deliberation was moving steadily forward in her subjugation of Manchuria, Japan, whole-hearted but ignorant of the pitfalls of colonial expansion, was creating endless difficulties for herself in Korea, besides serious complications with the Powers outside the scenes of her activities. Before she had realised the potentialities of her position, she had committed herself to a design by which she hoped to secure the King and Queen and to direct herself the reins of government. But her coup d'état was to recoil disastrously, and at once, upon her own head. The Queen fell a victim to the plot, and although the King was imprisoned, he, together with the Crown Prince, contrived in a little time to find refuge in the Russian Legation. The escape of the King only emphasised the failure of Japan, and despite her subsequent treaties with Russia, in respect of Korea, the balance of power in the Far East as between Russia and Japan has never quite recovered from the blow which Japan administered herself to her own prestige upon this occasion.

Japan still wields material influence of a high order in Korea. But, within the paramount position which she fills, there is the rift caused by the spread of the antagonistic and insidious influence of her great opponent. Curiously ​enough, the position which Russia holds to-day is not nearly as assertive as that which she occupied in 1896, yet there is little doubt that her influence is more commanding, if less conspicuously aggressive. Japan has turned aside upon occasion from the political issues to develop her commercial interests. Russia, again, has pursued unswerving the policy which revealed with the fall of China the fact that Manchuria was within her grasp and that Korea was its entail.

The action of Russia upon the Yalu River at the present time, her action in respect of Won-san in the past, are each animated by this motiv. Russia regards Korea as the completion of her dominions in the Far East, while Japan looks upon the little kingdom as the corollary to that expansion which is essential to the existence of the Island Empire. Russia in Manchuria and Korea, with her shadow projected over China, would mean a sentence of perpetual restriction and shrinkage for Japan. But, similarly, Russia from her position at Vladivostock and Port Arthur must regard the occupation of Korea by Japan as a wedge with its point projected towards the centre of her Manchurian communications. Just as, therefore, the fear of a Russian descent upon Korea has excited Japan, the necessity for such action has brought the crisis in the relations between Japan and Russia so perceptibly nearer. Private agreements and secret overtures have paved the way for the denouement which long since was disclosed. When Russia endeavoured to requisition the harbour of Ma-san-po for the requirements of her Pacific Squadron, an indication was afforded that Russian activity in Korea would be concealed no longer. Ma-san-po has since become an open port, the Government of Japan at once formulating ingenious objections to the ​

​Russian scheme at the same time that they threatened the Government of Korea with threats of immediate reprisals. But prior to the conditions laid down by Russia in the Ma-san-po Convention of 1900 with the Korean Government, this magnificent harbour had already attracted the attention of the Japanese and Chinese settlers. By force of circumstances, therefore, the place became an open port, the local authorities being powerless to check the influx of foreigners and the creation of a foreign zone around the harbour. That M. Pavloff, the clever Russian diplomatic representative in Seoul, succeeded in bringing about any agreement at all is remarkable, taking into account the panic-stricken state to which the Imperial Government was reduced by Japanese intimidation. The secret convention between the Russian and Korean Governments, entered into during 1900, preserved the independence of the harbour, and, failing to confirm Russia in the definite occupation of Ma-san-po, provided that none of the land about Ma-san-po harbour or its approaches should be permanently ceded or sold to any foreign Power. The same conditions applied to the island of Keu-chai, situated in the mouth of the harbour. This curtailment of the ambitions of Russian policy, in this particular direction, due, of course, to the energetic action of Japan, did not make the position of Russia in Ma-san-po in any sense secure. Japan, even then upon the eve of her declaration, would have gone to war with Russia, if that Power had attempted to maintain an isolated and complete domination of this harbour and its approaches against her wishes.

There is nothing in the present condition of Ma-san-po which suggests that it may become a centre of Russian influence in Southern Korea. The Japanese demanded, even before the incident had quite blown over, a large tract ​of land at Ma-san-po for the purposes of making a settlement there. In addition to this, the quarter, marked off for foreign settlements, has been almost wholly appropriated by the Japanese, who have erected shops and houses of some importance to the extent of several hundred, upon the more suitable sites. Japanese postal and telegraphic offices have been opened in Ma-san-po, and an uncomfortable hostelry disturbs the rest of the weary. A large permanent staff of Japanese police has been detached for duty in Ma-san-po, and the next feature in the development of affairs will be the detailing of a port guardship and the usual infantry garrison to protect the Japanese settlement. These acts imply a permanent lease and constitute the methods by which the Japanese propose to invalidate the Russo-Korean Convention. The aim of Japanese policy in Ma-san-po is to discount as far as possible the rights of the Russians, and to deprive their existence in the harbour of any special significance. The Russians accept the position with extreme philosophy and indifference. If they wished to do so, they might raise protest after protest against the intrusive character of Japanese action in the areas affected by the clauses of the Agreement of 1900.

Twelve months ago the foreign population of Ma-san-po consisted of two hundred and thirty Japanese, forty-one Chinese, eighteen Russians, and two Germans. These figures include male and female heads of population, but no children. The actual strength of the Russian colony in this harbour was eight men, ten women, three children; of the Japanese only seventy-eight were females. There is little import and export traffic. The nearness of Fusan, which is only six hours distant, makes it unnecessary to trade direct with the settlement. Japanese steamers from ​Fusan call daily, local produce being brought round by native junks. There is a large fishing industry off the harbour; it is, however, quite controlled by Japanese fishermen from Fusan. The principal industry on shore is the construction of the settlement, some little agriculture, and no little gossip.

Since the failure of her efforts to secure Ma-san-po, Russia has endeavoured to obtain the lease of Ching-kai-wan, sometimes called Chin-hai or Shin-hai, a bay situated in the extreme south of the Korean peninsula, as a naval station. The position of this harbour is exactly midway between Vladivostock and Port Arthur. Owing to its geographical situation, the presence of Russia in sole possession of Ching-kai-wan would be certain to give rise to even greater demonstrations of hostility from the people and Government of Japan than did the Ma-san-po incident. Nam-pu, which it was then Russia's object to secure, is about twenty miles outside the limits of the treaty port of Ma-san-po. While the Japanese Government could not prevent Russia from obtaining a coaling-station for the Russian Steamship Company within the boundaries of the foreign settlement of Ma-san-po, she most strenuously protested against a grant of land for Russian naval purposes twenty miles away. Japan likewise resists the establishment of a Russian naval depot at Ching-kai-wan, where there is no treaty port, and to which, were the "lease" confirmed, only Russia would have a right of access.

Ching-kai-wan is within a few hours' steam of that Port Hamilton which Great Britain was induced to relinquish, upon the understanding between Russia and China that Russia would not seek to acquire territory in Korea. The excuse, since put forward by Russia for the flagrant violation ​of this compact, is that it was a bargain made with China, and not with us. There is another, and still more extraordinary feature in connection with this affair, which Li Hung Chang confided to a diplomatic representative of a foreign Power, at Pekin, some years ago. The Chinese statesman admitted that the contract between China and Russia contained a private stipulation that it should be good for ten years only. In other words, Great Britain was led to withdraw from Port Hamilton on the pretence that Russia would never trespass on Korean soil, although there was a secret understanding between China and Russia at the time, that this arrangement should only be in force for one decade.

Although the position of affairs in regard to the action of Russia at Yong-an-po is of recent prominence, the question goes back in reality to the autumn of 1896, when a Russian merchant in Vladivostock, M. Brünner by name, obtained from the Korean Government the right of felling lumber and planting trees on the banks of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, as well as on the island of Ul-lyang, for twenty years. The concession was to be forfeited unless work was begun in five years. As the close of the period drew near, the Russian agent in Seoul applied for an extension of three years. At the moment it was reported in Seoul that this request of M. Pavloff had been refused, but it transpired subsequently that an agreement had been drawn up to the following effect between the superintendent, appointed by the Korean Government to oversee the matters, and the inspector in charge of the interests of of the company in Yong-an-po:

1. The said district in Yong-an-po shall be rented to the Russian company.

​2. The boundaries of the said district shall be defined by the Russian Minister and the Minister in charge of the Foreign Office of the Korean Government.

3. The Russian company shall pay a land-tax to the Korean Government.

4. If the owners of tombs within this district wish to remove them, the expense of removal shall be borne by the Russian company.

5. If the company wish to utilise wood which Koreans have cut and are bringing down the river, it must reimburse the owners with a fair and proper price.

6. The Russian company shall not raise any stock within this district except what is to be used therein.

7. Korean offenders within this district shall be dealt with by the Korean courts. Russian offenders shall be dealt with by Russian civil officers.

These contracts were signed on July 20th, 1903, by the Korean official Cho Sung-hyup and the Russian Inspector Bojisco.

Meanwhile, however, in May 1903, prior to the decision of the Korean Government in the matter, the prefect of Wi-ju reported the concentration of Russian troops at An-tung for the purpose of crossing the Yalu. A few days later, a detached party of forty of these men crossed the stream, halting on a small island in mid-river to discard their uniforms, so that they might enter Yong-an-po in private clothes. From Yong-an-po they moved to Yong-chyön, near Wi-ju, where, accompanied by one hundred Chinese and eighty Koreans, they founded a lumber settlement, buying seventeen houses, with twelve acres of land attached, in the name of two of their Korean employés. The presence of the colony was at once objected to by the ​

​Korean Government, who threatened M. Pavloff with the rupture of relations if the settlement were not at once withdrawn. M. Pavloff, however, defended the existence of the lumber camp under powers obtained from the Forest Concession of 1896, which, in actuality, had not been re-affirmed at the moment. Early in the next month, June, the magistrate at Yong-chyön reported that another party of Russians had arrived at Yong-an-po, including in all three Russian women, thirty-six men, two hundred Chinese, and many horses. These were reinforced in July by three women and sixty men, for the most part carrying rifles and swords, and who, also, at once bought houses and land.

The action of these people has assumed a specific direction. A few, as though anxious to give colour to their existence as a lumber settlement and in defiance of orders from the Korean local officials, while quite exceeding the clauses of the concession proper, persisted in felling trees on the areas of a prohibited reserve. Meantime the remainder of the party, by no means idle, began the construction of a bund on the Yalu extending over a distance of twenty-one miles, a light railway being laid down for the purpose. In addition to this work developments of a more permanent character were taken in hand; stone buildings appeared, a factory was constructed, and extensive defensive measures adopted. To confirm these indications of Russian occupation of the Yalu reaches, a body of seventy soldiers crossed the river at Cho-san, a second party of eighty men coming over at Pyök-tong. The Russians then proceeded to bring these various scattered "lumber" settlements into communication, for this purpose erecting a telegraph line between Wi-ju and Yong-an-po. This line, however, the Koreans at once cut down, whereupon the Russians began to lay a submarine cable from Yong-an-po round the coast ​and up the Yalu River to An-tung in place of the line across country from Yong-an-po to Manchuria. Since the cable projects were important and, together with the settlement at Yong-an-po, much in need of protection, Russia proposed to draft a force of three hundred soldiers into the place. At this date, towards the end of August, the settlement at Yong-an-po had grown into sixty houses with a civil Russian population of seventy citizens. By this time, however, the Japanese Minister at Seoul, Mr. Hayashi, had received the text of the proposed contract between the Korean Government and the Russian Lumber Company. Thereupon, on August 25th, he delivered an ultimatum to the Korean Government. On the same day the Russian Minister went to the Foreign Office and urged that the lease of Yong-an-po be granted. In spite of his urgent appeal, the Minister declared it to be impossible. On the 27th the Russian Minister went again to the Foreign Office at noon, and remained till seven in the evening, but the Minister was ill and did not put in an appearance. The Russian Minister then stated that he would have nothing more to do with the Foreign Minister, but would appeal directly to the Emperor. In his despatch Mr. Hayashi wrote that if the Korean Government were to sign such a lease with the Russian Government, Japan would consider such an act as a direct violation of the treaty between herself and Korea. In this event Japan would consider that diplomatic relations between the two countries were suspended, and she would regard herself free to act for herself in her own interests on the assumption that the whole of the Korean territories had been opened to the world.

The spirited action of the Japanese Minister was not lost upon the Korean Government, who at once issued orders to the prefect of Yong-an-po to restrain the Russians from ​further encroachment. The efforts of the local officials were, however, of little avail, and by the middle of September, in addition to the colony at Yong-an-po, the settlement at Yong-chyön had increased to one hundred and twenty-eight Chinese huts, with thirteen hundred Chinese, seventy Russians, and twenty tents. Complaints of the high-handed action of the Russians in appropriating the property of the Koreans to their own needs began to arrive in Seoul, and on September 13th came the information that a telegraph line had again been laid between Yong-an-po and the lumber concession on the Yalu. Coupled with the intelligence of this renewed activity was additional, and much more disquieting, information. The Russians had constructed on the elevated ground about the Tu-ryu Harbour a high watch-tower, and were preparing emplacements for three batteries of field artillery. Meanwhile, however, as a counter demonstration to the movement of a company of five hundred Russians under two officers, on October 23rd, who had crossed the Tumen River into Korean territory by night, a Japanese warship dropped anchor in the estuary of the Yalu, in close proximity to Yong-an-po.

I make no apology to my readers for giving in this detailed fashion the history of this little Russian concession. As a chapter of contemporary history I cannot think that my words are of any value, but there are doubtless many who, like myself, prefer to begin in the beginning, and so slowly trace through the developments of any question. In respect of Russian action on the Yalu, therefore, I have endeavoured to do this.