Japan by the Japanese/Chapter 9.1

In 1871 the system of conscription may be said to have first been introduced into Japan. Anterior to that date the organization of the Imperial army had been for many centuries based upon the principles of the feudal system. Some thousand years ago, however, feudalism was unknown in the history of the empire, which was divided into ken (prefecture) and gun (counties), and there was no class distinction of shi (feudal vassals) and no (farmers). They were all equally liable to military service. By recalling this old system of administration, and at the same time introducing the advanced principles of conscription as adopted in Europe, a new army system closely resembling conscription was organized. In the feudal times the Imperial army consisted of 400,000 families of shizoku, or the followers of the feudal lords (daimyos), who each kept as many retainers as his finances would permit. A large number of non-combatants, such as surgeons and treasurers, were included. Such was the standing army of those times. If, however, we allow for two or three male members—such, perhaps, as brothers—in the families, feudal Japan would possibly have 800,000 to 1,200,000 shi.

The new system—that of quasi-conscription—was first experimentally put into force in the five provinces of Tamashiro, Yamato, Kawachu, Izumi, and Settsu; and it was only in 1873 that the law of conscription, in its proper sense, was promulgated and had its full force throughout the empire.

The Imperial scheme was at first to organize a standing army of 400,000 men, which would constitute twelve shidan (divisions) or six army corps; but in practice it was only found possible to create a small army of 40,000 on a peace footing and 75,000 on a war footing. In this year (1873) the military academy was established, and several French officers were invited and entrusted with the care of the military education.

​A plan for manufacturing arms and ammunition was also laid down. In this work it was, of course, necessary to specially instruct workmen. The art of medicine could not be neglected, as it had been under the feudal system, and a school for surgeons was established. Thus, regular courses in the branches of infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering, transport, and surgery were carefully initiated and received with enthusiasm. For the instruction of under-officers, educational institutions were founded in the various corps.

In 1883 the army was reconstructed and increased to 200,000 men, which were to make six shidan of national forces and one shidan of the Imperial bodyguard. Even after this reorganization the strength of the standing army was still far short of what was first intended in 1873—400,000 men. This was owing to the fact that the national funds had to be distributed among various urgent requirements. The construction of forts for coast defence, the extension of military education, the establishment of arsenals—one in Tokyo and another in Osaka—and also of powder factories, claimed considerable sums of the money available.

In 1896 the Imperial army again underwent a change after the Chino-Japanese War. At last, by this reorganization, the military strength, as at first projected in 1871, was realized, after a long and patience-trying period. The standing army now numbers 500,000 men, who are formed into twelve shidan (divisions) of mixed command and one division of the Imperial Bodyguard.

Returning to the time when the system of conscription was first introduced, it must be remembered that it was one of the vital portions of the works undertaken after the Restoration. It meant that the 400,000 families of the shizoku had to abandon their hereditary rights and duties as soldiers, together with their hereditary fees, given in rice. Certain sums were allotted to them from the national finances in proportion to the amount of fees which they used to receive. All the daimyos, or feudal lords, had also to give up their dominions; their castles and fortifications were placed under the care of the War Department. It was the abolition of the long-existing feudalism in Japan—a great revolution. The most influential class of the people under this system were the shizoku, and the people who suffered most in honour and in interest under the new régime were the shizoku.

As a consequence of this, in 1874 the shizoku of Hizen broke forth in rebellion—known as the Saga affair—and in 1876 Maibara, an ex-retainer of the daimyo Mori, revolted against the Government with many followers. In the same year many of the shizoku of Chikuzen also rose in insurrection. ​Fortunately, however, all these rebellions were suppressed before they assumed important dimensions. In 1877, however, there broke forth a war of rebellion in Satsuma. It was the last of its kind and the greatest in magnitude. It was of a most serious nature. Many of the rebels were the veteran soldiers of the Restoration. Nevertheless, the Imperial army proved victorious after many severe engagements.

All these rebellions were vindications of the efficacy of the conscript army, and the Chino-Japanese War of 1894–95 was a crowning triumph for the system. After the war the army of 200,000 was at once increased to some 500,000, although such a sudden augmentation was generally considered to be impossible. Possible or impossible, however, it had to be accomplished. The international relations in the Far East were not ominous, but presented gloomy prospects. The apprehension over some unforeseen events happening was growing more intense. Japan has ever to contribute to the cause of peace in the Far East, and to accomplish this object it was an absolute necessity for her to maintain an efficient army and navy. These it has been her task to obtain, in spite of every difficulty, amongst which must be mentioned the finding of a sufficient supply of highly-trained commissioned as well as non-commissioned officers. Gradually, however, the empire is growing out of all these difficulties.

I must also call to mind the difficulty of keeping pace with the rapid developments in modern weapons. No sooner do the troops learn to use a new and complicated weapon than a still newer and more difficult one has to be adopted.

Before the war with China I had closely examined the military organization of that country, and had discovered that there were some 50,000 men under Li-Hung Chang who were reported to be very well equipped and trained by German officers. Besides this organized army there were supposed to be between 900,000 and 1,000,000 troops in China. Of these, however, only those in the northern provinces were available for action against our armies, about 300,000 men. I therefore ever contemplated that, in case of any emergency leading to war with China, it should be so arranged that 50,000 men of the Japanese army should be devoted to meet the army of Li-Hung Chang, while the other 150,000 could deal with the 300,000 untrained troops available in Pe-Chili and the other northern provinces.

I discovered also a great weakness in the army of Li-Hung Chang, and one which I could appreciate from its resemblance to a weakness which had been encountered at the time of the Restoration in the Imperial army of Japan, which consisted of the feudal retainers under different feudal lords. This ​weakness was that Li-Hung Chang, besides drawing a considerable portion of his soldiers from his own native place, also obtained his officers there. Thus, when anything happened to an officer in his army, he could not be replaced from amongst the troops under the command of the other generals. Thus it was necessary to send to Li-Hung Chang’s native province for all new officers.

I also learnt of another Chinese custom which was universal throughout the whole army, and which made a great difference between the reported strength and the actual strength in the field. The Chinese army was divided into yees, or battalions, which were supposed to consist of 500 men. In reality, however, they rarely ever consisted of more than 300 or 350 men. The commander of the yee, or camp, was in this way enabled to pocket the pay of 200 or 150 of his soldiers from the Government grants. Even as late as the Boxer disturbances, when the Allied Forces were in North China, this state of corruption in the Chinese army did not seem to be known clearly to the world, although it was vital as creating an important difference between the paper and actual strength of the Chinese forces. It was owing to the accurate knowledge which I had obtained as to the condition of affairs in North China that it was possible so to lay the plans of the campaign as to surely and safely bring about the complete victory of our forces.

The future of China may well have an importance to Japan, and I think that what is necessary for the regeneration of China is the coming to power of a strong Emperor, who will take the reins of government into his own hands. In the history of China there were two such rulers of the present dynasty who ruled their people directly with a firm and capable hand. One of the first steps that such an Emperor must take would be to do away with the idea that he is a celestial being, and high above all other monarchs, and enter the commonwealth of nations on an equality. The Emperor alone, I should think, is capable of such a deviation from the constitutional custom in China. Until recently I may say that it was the practice of the Chinese Emperor to abstain from signing the credentials of his envoys to foreign countries, because he considered himself too high to condescend thus much to other monarchs.

Granted a strong Emperor, it would be more easy to change China than it was to change Japan. In Japan the great changes were in establishing the uniformity of the laws, the currency, the army, and the taxation, which were different in the dominions of the different daimyos. In China the system of laws is similar all over the country, and both the civil and criminal laws were codified in Peking. The Emperor is ​supreme, and has direct authority over everything in his empire theoretically, although in practice the various viceroys represent him largely. The currency is also centralized to a greater or less degree; the military system lends itself to conscription, and is centralized, as are also the taxes. Thus, theoretically, everything is rather along the line of the described changes, and a strong Emperor could take advantage of the state of things and lead China upwards. I think that under such circumstances the Chinese could be trained to become excellent soldiers, and with China’s almost infinite resources of men and treasure, a strong Emperor could have at his command a most powerful army. If this were to be accomplished China might become a very serious menace to all the neighbouring nations; but there seems little danger of these ideas being realized in the immediate future. A strong Emperor is essential for their fulfilment, and there is no sign that such a one is to be expected to arise.