Japan by the Japanese/Chapter 11

The history of foreign affairs in Japan in the early part of the New Era is so intricately bound up with the political events of the period that a brief statement of the latter is indispensable for the clear understanding of the former.

The Tokugawa Government had already entered into diplomatic relations with the United States in 1854, and promised to open the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate. The same arrangement had already been made with England and Russia during the same year, with Holland in 1855, and with France in 1858. But the diplomatic documents then signed by the officers of the Shogun, and not subject to ratification, were all of a temporary nature, because he dared not enter into formal engagements so long as there existed much opposition in the Imperial Court in Kyoto, and even among the Daimyos or feudal lords directly subject to the Shogun.

The arms of England and France having been attended with success in the South of China, in 1857 Mr. Townsend Harris, United States Consul General, obtained audience of the Shogun after great difficulties, and explained to him the advisability of entering into formal treaty relations with the United States first, so that the latter might act as mediator, in case England and France should make exorbitant demands, elated by the newly obtained victory. This was listened to, and on the 29th of July, 1858, a treaty of amity and commerce, consisting of fourteen articles, was signed, promising to open the ports of Kanagawa and Nagasaki in 1859, Niigata in 1860, Hyogo in 1863, and to fix concession grounds in Yedo (1st of January, 1862) and Osaka (1st of January, 1863). The document was to be ratified by the Shogun on or before the 4th of July, 1859, but before doing so he had to obtain the permission of the Emperor in Kyoto. The permission, ​however, was not given, and the date of ratification had to be postponed.

In June, 1860, two American men-of-war entered Shimoda, followed by a Russian man-of-war, and announced that the English and French would also be on the scene before long. The Shogun Government was hard-pressed, and ratified the treaty with the United States without the Imperial permission on the 20th of June, 1860. Similar treaties with England, France, Holland, Prussia, and Russia, were also signed not long after. This exasperated the anti-foreign party, and years of bitter contest followed between it and the Shogun party. In 1861 the Shogun had to send a mission to the treaty Powers asking the postponement of the opening of the ports for five years after the 1st of January, 1863. At last some of the nobles in the Imperial Court formed an alliance with the most powerful Daimyos, like those of Mito, Satsuma, Nagato (Choshiu), Echizen, Tosa, and Hijen, and obtained a decree from the Emperor, ordering the Shogun to cancel the treaties and drive away the foreigners. As it was impossible to carry out this order, the Shogun, Keiki Tokugawa, petitioned the Emperor on the 14th of October, 1867, to hand back the governing power entrusted to his family already for 250 years. This was granted, and after much study and discussion amongst the makers of the New Era—like the Lords Sanjo and Iwakura—and the Daimyos on the Imperial side, with their prominent retainers like Saigo, Okubo, Kido, and many others, the direct government of the Emperor (Tenno) was announced on the 9th of December of the same year.

But the events that followed soon showed that the opposition against foreign intercourse was only a pretext for compelling the Shogun to resign, and that even the most inveterate of the decriers of the new treaties were persuaded of the necessity for opening up the country. Already on the 18th of December Lord Iwakura informed the members of the new Government that, though since 1853 the policy of the Imperial Court was that of seclusion and driving away of foreigners, and though the Western nations were regarded as barbarous, yet the fact is undeniable that the opening of Hyogo (and other ports) was finally granted to the late Tokugawa Government, and the policy of peaceful intercourse with foreign Powers adopted, so that the Imperial Government will henceforth place the States of Europe and America on the same footing as China. It is said that many of the Imperialist statesmen were ‘astonished’ at this proclamation, as they well might have been.

Meanwhile the formation of the new Imperial Government ​in Kyoto exclusively out of the late anti-foreign and anti-Shogun party, and their decision that the late Shogun should at once give back to the Emperor all his lands and revenues, exasperated the Shogun party; and as both parties were in full arms, Keiki Tokugawa, till then in Kyoto, had now to retire to Osaka, in order to avoid collision. This was on the 12th of December. On the 16th the representatives of the United States, France, England, Prussia, and Holland, presented themselves to the late Shogun, and read to him the following collective note:

To this, Keiki Tokugawa replied with a long note, in which he explained why he had given back the governing power to the Emperor, and why he had to retire from Kyoto, although the actual management of affairs was still entrusted to him, until the form of the new Imperial Government should have been decided upon by the assembly of all the Daimyos. The note concluded with the following words:

Immediately after this the army of the Tokugawa party marched against Kyoto with the avowed purpose of presenting a petition to the Emperor, and fighting ensued between it and the Imperial army at Fushimi. The Shogun forces being defeated, Keiki Tokugawa fled to Yedo. Here he returned to his dutiful submission, left his own castle, and retired to a Buddhist temple to wait for deserved punishment. He enjoined the Daimyos under him likewise to disarm, but they refused to obey him, and marched north in order to defend themselves in their feudal possessions.

On the 15th of January, 1868, Lord Higashikuje, Chief of the newly instituted Board of Foreign Affairs in the Imperial Government, forwarded to the representatives of the five Powers assembled in Hyogo the important document dated ​the 10th of January, 4th year of Keio, and signed by the Emperor himself, and stamped with the Great Seal of the empire, worded as follows:

On the same day an Imperial ordinance was issued announcing to the nation the foreign policy of the new Government:

The northern provinces being in open revolt now, Lord Higashikuje sent letters to the foreign Ministers on the 21st of January, and desired that their Governments should assume an impartial position during the present trouble, not allowing their subjects to aid the insurgent forces by transporting their soldiers, supplying them with ships, ammunition, etc. On the 25th the five Ministers announced the intention of their Governments to remain neutral, and called back the French officers that were fighting on the side of the Tokugawa forces.

On the 14th of February took place the first interview between the members of the new Board of Foreign Affairs and the foreign Ministers, and Lord Higashikuje, Chief of the Board, communicated to them verbally that the policy to be pursued by the new Imperial Government was to establish the intercourse between Japan and the foreign Powers on a firmer and broader basis than before. He then announced, ​to the great joy of all present, the intention of the Emperor receiving the representatives of the Powers in the palace in Kyoto.

That this sudden opening-up was decided partly by the necessity of not making the Powers incline towards the Tokugawa party is evident; but that the general feeling was still opposed to foreign intercourse is demonstrated by the murder of fourteen Frenchmen in Sakai on the 15th of February, by the Samurais under the Daimyo of Tosa. The affair, however, was soon settled by the payment of an indemnity and the prompt punishment of the culpable. The ill-advised patriots were made to commit harakiri before the eyes of the French Minister, but his endurance did not hold out to the end of the ghastly scene, for, on the eleventh man disembowelling himself, he implored that the punishment of the remaining nine men should be mitigated. They were therefore banished to distant islands.

The French and the Dutch Ministers were received in audience of the Emperor on the appointed day, but the retinue of the English Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, was attacked on the way by another party of mistaken patriots; and though the Minister himself was not hurt, yet some of the Japanese escort were wounded, among whom was the famous Nakai, afterwards Governor of Shiga-ken, and member of the House of Peers, who received a sword and pension from Queen Victoria.

In July of the same year the seat of the Imperial Government was transferred to Tokyo (formerly Yedo).

After much fighting, the northern provinces were subdued, and on the 3rd of December Lord Iwakura, Minister of the Right, received the representatives of the United States, France, England, Italy, Holland, and Prussia, in Yokohama, and expressed to them the wish that their Governments should now give up the position of neutrality. A verbal note to the same effect was sent to them the next day, and on the 28th the foreign Ministers announced the cessation of neutrality. Thus ended the eventful first year of the New Era.

In July, 1869, the form of the Imperial Government was definitely fixed, and a regular Foreign Office (Gwaimusho) instituted as one of the six departments of Daijokwan (the Great Imperial Government). The department Ministers were not the associates, but the subordinates, of the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Left and the Right, being the revival of the old Imperial Government modelled after the Chinese system. Lord Sawa was appointed the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Terashima Vice-Minister.

The new Imperial Government was hardly organized, when it found itself face to face with important international questions, which demanded early solutions. These were the question of peace or war with Corea; of confirming or abandoning the territorial right of Japan to the islands of Sakhalin and Liukiu, in view of the rival claims of Russia and China respectively; and the question of treaty revision. Let us first state these questions themselves, and then pass on to the narration of how we proceeded to solve them, and in what order.

Japan had from time immemorial a trading settlement in Corea in the port of Fusan. It can be traced in history certainly as far back as the year 1443, under the Ashikaga Shogunate. And as this port lay opposite the island of Tsushima, so, under the Tokugawa Shogunate, the protection of trade between Japan and Corea was entrusted to So, Daimyo of Tsushima. In 1868 the new Imperial Government ordered So to send a special mission to Corea, in order to inform that Government of the political change that had lately taken place in Japan, and announce the intention of continuing peaceful intercourse with her as before. But the father of the King of Corea, usually known by the title of Tai-in-kun, who had never sat on the throne himself, but was at this time acting as Regent, refused to have anything to do with the mission. His pretext was that the wording and the seal in the document produced by the mission were not the same as before. But the real fact was that he had already heard of Japan’s adopting Western things and ideas, and from his point of view the throwing away of the time-honoured national customs and institutions in exchange for Western ‘barbarism’ was in itself a sufficient proof of the disdainful character of the Japanese as a nation. As to his implacable hatred of Western nations, there were some historical examples. In 1847 the French under Louis Philippe sent two men-of-war against Corea, in order to chastise her for the murder of some Catholic missionaries several years back; but both vessels were stranded on the Corean coast, and Tai-in-kun then caused the whole Christian population to be massacred. In 1866 Napoleon III. sent three men-of-war against Corea; the vessels went up the Han River, bombarded the forts, and landed 400 men, but were repulsed, and came away effecting nothing beyond deepening the Corean hatred of foreigners. Now, these 400 soldiers had been taken out of the French garrison in ​Yokohama, so that in the eyes of the Coreans Japan was an accomplice in the attack. Again, when in 1868 Herr von Brandt, Prussian Minister in Tokyo, visited Fusan in a man-of-war, it was the Japanese living there that rendered him aid, so that the Japanese were, in the eyes of the Coreans, the ally of the much-hated foreigners.

In 1869 the new Imperial Government sent out a Commission of investigation to Corea, with special instructions to inquire into her relations with China and Russia, and the Commission returning the next year, its members eagerly explained the necessity and feasibility of warlike chastisement. The Daimyo of Tsushima, having resigned the post of the medium of communication between Japan and Corea, a direct mission was sent out in October, 1869, for the purpose of negotiating directly with the Corean Government; but they absolutely refused to receive it, and when the mission proceeded to the capital without invitation, they accused its members of having ‘intruded into forbidden precincts.’ The mission came away leaving behind a document of severe reproach. In August, 1871, Hanabusa, Chief Secretary of the Foreign Office, was sent out with two men-of-war to remonstrate with the Corean Government, but their downright refusal to have anything to do with him forced this tenacious diplomat to come away with empty hands.

In the same year Frederick F. Low, United States Minister in Peking, accompanied by Commodore John Rogers, commanding the United States squadron in Asiatic waters, proceeded to Corea with the mission of negotiation for the treaty of peace and commerce with that country, but the Coreans fired at the American vessels, and forced them to retreat after having inflicted some injuries on the forts. Tai-in-kun’s hatred of foreigners, Japanese included, became stronger than ever, and anti-foreign epitaphs were now posted up throughout the peninsula.

In Japan this was already the fourth year of the new Imperial Government, and the psychological moment was attained when the ex-Samurai politicians, tired of the long quiet after so many years of excitement and danger, and dissatisfied with the apparent gradual weakening of manly national spirit under the influence of Western intercourse, eagerly longed for some stirring events in which their belligerent patriotism could again be brought into direct display. Hence, the question of war or peace with Corea was clearly on the order of the day.

That there was ground enough to chastise Corea nobody doubted, but the peculiar condition in which Japan found itself just at this moment made this apparently simple ​question very complex. Japan was yet only a few years ahead of feudalism, and though the leading men in the Government were enlightened, the mass of the ex-Samurai class was not. The districts were still governed by the Daimyos, whose title was changed to that of Governor, appointed by the Emperor, but whose real power rested on the authority they enjoyed as hereditary lords of the counties and chiefs of the local Samurais. There was as yet no Imperial army, and the Government could only dispose of the contingents supplied by the Daimyos. This last trace of feudalism and decentralization had to be done away with before any great undertaking could be launched, but it demanded the greatest possible prudence to work out such a momentous social reorganization.

There was also the financial difficulty. The finance of the Tokugawa Government was in the most wretched condition, and so were also the finances of most of the Daimyos, some of whom issued paper money beyond all hope of redemption. Coinage was irregular, and owing to the difference of ratio between gold and silver from the ratio in Europe and America, gold had almost disappeared from the empire. The salaries of civil and military officers, hitherto paid in rice, had now to be paid in money, and the system of taxation demanded complete reorganization. All this required time, and before finance was regulated nothing could be undertaken that called for any expanded outlay.

Such being the case, it was very natural that, with regard to the question of Corea, the opinion of the men in power should have been divided.

Formerly the island of Yeso formed a feudal possession of the Daimyo of Matsumaye, and the northern limit of this possession was undefined. The Russian ships often making their appearance in the northern seas in the latter half of the eighteenth century, the Tokugawa Government directed their attention northward as early as 1780, when the two explorers Tokunai Mogami and Jinzo Kondo were sent out to explore the islands of Iturup, Urup, Kunashiri, etc. In 1785 a party of ten men was sent out to Sakhalin, and in 1799 Sakhalin and the greater portion of Yeso were laid under the direct government of Tokugawa. Already some fishermen’s villages were founded on Sakhalin.

In 1804 a Russian mission headed by Lezanoff arrived in Nagasaki, with a number of shipwrecked Japanese, and, presenting a letter and presents from the Emperor of Russia, asked for the opening of trade with Japan; but being refused, ​he turned northwards and ravaged the islands of Sakhalin and Iturup. This made the Tokugawa Government pay greater attention to the defence of the north.

In 1808 the bold explorer Rinzo Mamiya explored the whole length of the western coast of Sakhalin, and ascertained for the first time that Sakhalin was not a peninsula, but an island. He even crossed the channel, and went up the river Amur as far as the Chinese town of Delen.

After this period the Russian vessels ceased to appear for some years, and as the cultivation of the northern islands entailed great expenses, though attended with little fruit, so the Tokugawa Government gradually called back the troops, and finally gave back the northern islands to the Daimyo of Matsumaye in 1821.

But in 1849 the Russian Captain Nevilskoi explored Sakhalin under the instigation of the famous Count Muravieff, and found a Russian port at Dui, on the western coast of it. On the 17th of July, 1853—that is, a month after the first arrival of Commodore Perry in Uraga—Admiral Putiatin arrived in Nagasaki with a letter from Emperor Nicholas I., and asked two things: the fixing of the northern boundary, and the opening of trade with Japan. After a long negotiation, first in Nagasaki, and the next year at Shimoda, the first treaty of amity and commerce with Russia was signed. By the same treaty, the sea between the islands of Iturup (Japanese) and Urup (Russian) was fixed to be the boundary between the two empires on the Kurile side; but as to Sakhalin, no definite limitation was made, and the maintenance of the status quo was promised as regards the mixed habitation of Japanese and Russians there. Taking advantage of this indeterminate condition of the island, Russia busily explored the interior of Sakhalin, and discovered some coal-mines.

After the Crimean War, Russia extended its territory towards the Pacific with renewed activity, and in 1859 Count Muravieff himself entered the Bay of Yedo in a man-of-war and demanded the recognition of the whole of Sakhalin as Russian territory, making the Straits of La Perouse the boundary between Japan and Russia. His argument was that by the Treaty of Aigun, 1858, Russia had obtained from China the cession of the whole territory along the Amur and the Pacific coast, and Sakhalin formed a part of the territory ceded. When the article promising the status quo was pointed out, he replied that Putiatin had had only full power for signing a commercial treaty, and not for boundary affairs. But the diplomats of the Tokugawa Government were also determined to resist, and so the famous Count of the Amur had to go away without having accomplished his object.

​Several earnest Daimyos and Samurais now advised the Tokugawa Government to wind up the affair by ceding to Russia the part of Sakhalin lying north of 50° of latitude, and when the mission had to be sent out to Europe in 1861–62 for obtaining the agreement of the Powers to the postponement of the opening of treaty ports, it was empowered to negotiate with the Russian Government on the line of the 50° delimitation. General Ignatieff was now the negotiator on the Russian side, and after some unworthy, if not fraudulent, attempts at proving the whole island to be Russian, he proposed to make 48° as the boundary, on the ground of its being in better conformity with the geographical features of the land. This our plenipotentiary refused, and Ignatieff finally agreed to the 50° boundary in principle, on the condition of appointing a mixed Commission from the two Governments in order to determine the appropriate natural boundary by the examination of local conditions. In 1863 the Russian Commissioner came to Hakodate, but the Tokugawa Government, being already hard-pressed by the political events soon leading to its downfall, neglected to appoint the Japanese Commissioner for several months, and when it decided to make good the neglect by consenting to the 48° boundary, the Russian Commissioner had already departed.

In 1866 the Tokugawa Government sent Koide Yamatonokami to St. Petersburg with instructions to make Kushunrai the boundary line; but as the Russian Government did not agree, he signed with Stremogoff, chief of the Asiatic Section of the Russian Foreign Office, a modus vivendi placing Sakhalin under a sort of joint rule between Japan and Russia. When Koide returned to Japan, the Tokugawa Government was no more!

The new Imperial Government instituted the Board of Exploration of Yeso in 1869, and that of Sakhalin in 1870. Kiyotaka Kuroda, the most influential Satsuma man after Saigo and Okubo, was appointed Vice-Director of the two Boards. But with regard to the important question of territorial right, nothing could be effected as long as there was no Russian Minister in Tokyo or Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg during the first years of the new Imperial Government.

The Liukiu Islands are situated between Japan and Formosa, and were originally called Okinawa. In 1185 Tadahiro Shimazu, ancestor of the Daimyo of Satsuma, was made the lord of ‘the twelve islands of the South Sea,’ including Okinawa; but during the feudal wars of the fourteenth century the islands ​became divided into three rival principalities, called North, South, and Middle Mountains, and the ruler of the Middle Mountains finally unified all the islands by the aid of China. In 1373 the Chinese Emperor of the Ming Dynasty named the island Liukiu, and conferred investiture on its King, who was obliged to pay annual tribute to the suzerain.

In 1609 Iyehisa Shimazu, Daimyo of Satsuma, obtained from the Shogun permission to reconquer Liukiu in the name of his ancestor, reduced the whole of the islands to submission, established there a local government, took the census, surveyed the lands, and gathered taxes from the inhabitants. But the people of Liukiu always regarded China as one of their masters, calling China their father, and Japan their mother.

The Powers of Europe and America generally regarded Liukiu as an independent State, and entered into treaty relations with it. The treaty between Liukiu and the United States bears the date of 11th of July, 1854, and in the Liukiu text the Chinese era is employed (17th of June, 4th year of Heng-Fieng), which, according to Oriental ideas, is the symbol of China’s suzerainty. Under the new Imperial Government, when the question of Liukiu was first raised in 1872, some advocated the maintenance of the status quo for fear of coming into conflict with China and the foreign Powers; others advanced the theory of a well-defined joint protectorate, but finally a clear forward policy was decided upon. In September of that year order was sent to the new King of Liukiu to send a member of his family to Tokyo in order to announce his accession and congratulate the establishment of the new Imperial Government. When the mission arrived, the recognition of the King of Liukiu was formally issued by the Imperial Government, and under this title Sho Tai was made one of the peers of the realm. As all the peers were obliged by law to reside in Tokyo, a house was given him in the capital, and a sum of 30,000 yen was granted to him out of the Imperial treasury. Japan was, of course, to incur the liability for the national debts of Liukiu, amounting to 200,000 yen, but on the express wish of Sho Tai to pay them back in his name, the Imperial Department of Finance guaranteed the new bonds issued for cancelling the Liukiu debts.

The Imperial Government entrusted to the Foreign Office the regulation of the diplomatic relation of Liukiu with the foreign Powers, and the fact having been communicated to foreign Governments represented in Japan, the United States Minister in Tokyo sent a letter to our Minister of Foreign Affairs bearing the date of 20th of December, 1872, and asked whether by the late ‘annexation’ Japan meant to take upon herself all international responsibilities formerly incumbent on ​Liukiu by the treaty with the United States. To this the Minister replied that Liukiu had always been a dependency of Japan, and the transaction of the last month only meant the transformation of a dependency into a province, and that, as to the treaty in question, Japan would keep it intact and assume itself all the obligations arising therefrom. In March, 1873, the authorities of Liukiu handed over to our Foreign Office all the texts of the treaties concluded with foreign Powers. Shortly afterwards the Ministers of Italy and Germany in Tokyo also sent a note to our Minister of Foreign Affairs asking to share in the benefit of the treaties formerly concluded by the United States, France, and Holland, with Liukiu. This was readily assented to.

All this was very good, but was in itself a one-sided transaction, and nobody could know what would result if China once came to assert her right to Liukiu. Hence, the account had to be settled with China sooner or later, but how?

Though coming last in order of time, this was by far the most important question of all. The treaties signed by the Tokugawa Government, and accepted such as they were by the new Imperial Government, were not even framed by the Japanese officers themselves, who were naturally entirely ignorant of international affairs. It was the United States Consul-General, Mr. Townsend Harris, who did everything for the diplomatic officers of the Tokugawa Government; and judged by what he had done, and by the accounts published by himself in after-years, we cannot but deeply admire the high conscientiousness and the real friendly feeling of this diplomat towards Japan. If he had taken advantage of the rare position in which he was placed, he could have forced upon us almost any treaty that only benefited America and the Americans; and all the other nations would have followed him in the track. But as he was anxious to assist Japan to join the community of nations based upon mutual interest, he never imposed upon us any greater disadvantage than was absolutely necessary, in view of the difference of life and culture. The right of extraterritorial jurisdiction held by the Powers over their subjects in Japan was one disadvantage, and Mr. Townsend Harris taught the Japanese from the very beginning that it was an injustice, inevitable for the time being, but which the Japanese ought to avoid by reforming their laws before the time came for treaty revision. Again, the Customs tariff rates attached to the Japanese-American treaty of 1858 were entirely framed out of the American Consul-General’s own head, with ​the view of initiating the Japanese into the benefit of Customs revenue, and was therefore quite fair. He openly told the Tokugawa officers that the items might not be in accordance with the real economical interests of Japan, so that Japan should work out its own problem by the practical experience of international trading. It was therefore quite regrettable that the Tokugawa Government should have succumbed to the pressure of the Powers in 1866, and by the articles signed in Osaka by the representatives of Japan, England, United States, France, and Holland, on the 25th of June of that year, consented to lowering the Customs duties on all imports to 5 per cent., excepting the few articles respecting which prohibitive tariffs were agreed upon.

Now the treaties, together with the tariff rates, were revisable on or after the 1st of July, 1872, subject to one year’s previous notification, and the new Imperial Government had already proclaimed its intention ‘to proceed to their early revision’ by the decree issued immediately after its formation, on the 10th of January, 1868. But how was the consent of the Powers to be obtained?

The fourth year of the new Imperial Government, 1871, is memorable as one in which the last trace of feudalism was done away with. The Daimyos, to whom had been entrusted the government of their ancient domains as provinces of the empire, were now relieved of their functions, and were superseded by the regularly appointed Governors removable at the will of the central Government. A uniform system of coinage was also established, and provincial paper moneys of all kinds and values exchanged with the new Imperial currency.

Externally the establishment of regular diplomatic intercourse with China and the Western Powers was considered to be necessary in order to proceed to the solution of the questions above mentioned, and the same year saw the sending of two important missions abroad—one to China, and the other to Europe and America.

On the 27th of April, 1871, Muneki Date, ex-Daimyo and Minister of Finance, was appointed Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of Peking, and Lord Yanagiwara and Shindo Tsuda were associate envoys. The mission stayed for two months in China, and signed with Li-Hung-Chang, on the 29th of July, 1871, the treaty of peace and friendship, accompanied by the commerce regulations and a tariff table. According to this treaty, criminal jurisdiction over the Japanese in China belongs ​to the joint court of the Japanese Consul and the Chinese local officer in the treaty ports, but to the Chinese local officer alone in the interior, and, in view of the imperfect state of Chinese criminal law, this stipulation, although reciprocal, could not but be unpopular. Another very grave defect of the treaty was the fact that Japan was not placed in China on the same footing as the most favoured nations, and vice versa, so that the Japanese merchants and ships in China were placed under many unfavourable conditions compared with those of European and American nationality. For these reasons the treaty remained for some time unratified.^[2]

In October of the same year Lord Iwakura, Minister of Justice, was appointed Ambassador and chief of the mission to the United States and the principal States of Europe. Kido, Okubo, Ito, and Yamaguchi were the second plenipotentiaries. To the mission were also attached a great number of officers, chosen out of the various departments of public service, for the purpose of observing and reporting on the various branches of administration and justice. The main object of the mission maybe gathered from the following full powers given to the Ambassador and his associates:

But when the mission arrived in Washington, the Secretary of State of the United States told its members that in diplomatic affairs a mere verbal exchange of ideas would have no binding effect in the future, and that in his opinion the best thing for Japan to do would be to begin at once formal preliminary negotiations for the revision. President Grant is also said to have advised Lord Iwakura to open the negotiations there and then. For this, however, full powers were wanting. So Okubo and Ito were sent back to Japan to ask for the full powers, submitting at the same time the following items concerning treaty revision to the consideration of the Imperial Cabinet:

1. As it is too early to open the whole interior of Japan to foreign intercourse, so the foreigner should be made to live within prescribed limits, and allowed to travel freely within a fixed number of miles from the concession grounds, such distance having to be enlarged gradually.

2. Preparations should be made for the establishment of public courts and for the placing of foreigners under the same justice as Japanese subjects, in return for the abolition of extraterritoriality and the restoration of the right of jurisdiction to Japan. But for the time being temporary laws should be promulgated, subject to gradual reform until the foreigners became satisfied with the impartiality of the courts and the liberality of the laws.

3. Although the Japanese criminal code does not punish Christian converts, yet as long as there is the article prohibiting Christianity in Kosatsu (tablet of laws put up in public places), Japan would look like a barbarous country not recognising freedom of worship, and therefore unworthy of being placed on the footing of equality with other nations. Hence, the said article should be struck out.

In Tokyo the framing of the new treaty was entrusted to Ito and Soyejima, and when the draft was completed and approved full powers issued, the negotiation for revision was entered into in Washington. It was, however, interrupted in a very curious way. Herr von Brandt, German Minister in Tokyo, who had not on the whole shown himself very friendly towards Japan, obtained leave of absence just at this time, and on his way home came to Washington to inform Lord Iwakura that in his opinion the mode of ​negotiating for treaty revision by going from one State to another was a very disadvantageous one to Japan, because, on account of the most favoured nation clause which would have to be introduced into every treaty, each country would obtain without trouble all the rights granted to the countries already passed through, and would not consent to the revision unless some fresh grant be made to it specially, so that in the end Japan would have to lose much more than in the case of negotiating with all the Powers at once. This frightened our mission, and the negotiations were broken off, for Lord Iwakura communicated to the United States Government that Japan intended to assemble the representatives of the Powers in Paris, and there negotiate once for all.

From America the mission passed over to Europe, and travelled through England, France, Belgium, Holland, Prussia, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden. From the last-mentioned country it turned south, and visited the various German States, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Switzerland, and came home by way of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, spending twenty-three months on the way. There was not a city of any size or renown which they did not visit, and everywhere they received invitation from so many sides, and inspected so many public institutions, industrial establishments, historical monuments, etc., that their days and nights were entirely filled up. The exhibition of Vienna, in 1873, showed them what the world’s industry and art could produce. The diary of the mission in five illustrated volumes, carefully compiled by the scholars accompanying the mission, and published by the Imperial Government, furnishes most interesting and instructive reading even to this day. It contains the history, statistics, politics, finance, and military organization, of the countries passed through, and one can readily imagine how much the stories told by this mission contributed to open the eyes of the Japanese public to the things going on abroad. We can also imagine how the thoughts and ideas of the leading men of Japan composing the mission became differentiated from those of their colleagues remaining at home. Hence, though attended with little diplomatic result, the importance of this mission in the history of Japan’s external relations can hardly be overestimated.

About the same time Legations were established, and permanent Ministers sent to Austria, United States, England, France, and Russia.

During the absence of Lord Iwakura on his mission to Europe and America, Soyejima, Councillor, was made Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was a great Chinese scholar, but, unlike most Chinese scholars, he had a remarkably clear judgment and knowledge of European international law which was rather rare among the leading statesmen of this time. Under him Japanese diplomacy entered into an active phase. Soyejima’s name as a diplomat was at once made prominent by the following incident:

In July, 1872, a Chinese coolie escaped from the Peruvian vessel Maria Luz, in Yokohama, and, swimming up to the British man-of-war stationed near by, prayed for rescue from the cruel treatment which was meted out to the coolies on board. Mr. R. C. Watson, British Chargé d’Affaires, notified the matter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, on examination by the Governor of Kanagawa-ken, it turned out that Ricardo Herero, captain of the Maria Luz, had bought 232 Chinese coolies in Macao, and on his homeward voyage entered the port of Yokohama for repairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed to bring the case before the district court of Kanagawa-ken, and have it tried by the Japanese law, which forbade the sale and purchase of fellow-beings. Curiously enough, Eto Shimpei, Minister of Justice, opposed this, and the French and United States Ministers also sent letters to Soyejima disapproving harsh measures against the Peruvian slave-ship. But Soyejima’s argument prevailed on the Prime Minister, Lord Sanjo, who gave him full powers to treat the vessel as he thought proper. The Kanagawa district court declared the original contract for the purchase of Chinese coolies null and void, as contrary to the law of the land in whose waters she lay, and set free all of them. The Kanagawa local government supplied them with food and clothing, and protected them till aid came from China. Communication was made to the Taotai of Shanghai, and through him to the Viceroy of the Two Kiangs, who sent a special messenger to Japan to return thanks for the generous act, and receive the coolies in the name of the Chinese Government. The Chinese messenger, Chin-fuk-kin, was treated with special marks of respect in Tokyo, and when the 232 poor creatures were handed over to him they all wept with tears of gratitude. That this was a very good way in which the new Imperial Government introduced themselves to the attention of their very haughty neighbour cannot be doubted.

As to the Peruvian captain, he abandoned his vessel and ​fled, because the Japanese law punishes severely those engaged in trading with human beings, and from San Francisco he telegraphed to his Government asking for protection. The Peruvian Government sent a special mission with two men-of-war to Japan, to demand an explanation and indemnity for the release of the coolies. But when the Peruvian representative arrived in the United States he heard of the attitude of the Japanese Government, and foresaw the ridiculous situation in which he would be placed if he were to appear in Yokohama with two men-of-war. He therefore left them at San Francisco, and came to Japan in an American passenger-boat, with only a few attendants. The negotiations then entered into resulted in a reference of the case to the arbitration of the Emperor of Russia, who, on the 14th of June, 1875, pronounced the proceedings of the Japanese Government to have been entirely legal.

This diplomatic victory had important effects. Macao was up to this time a great centre of the Chinese coolie trade, but now the Portuguese Governor of the port notified the Japanese Government that rigorous measures of suppression would be taken for the future. The French Minister in Tokyo applied for the cancelling of the letter addressed to Soyejima, disapproving his measures, and the American Minister, Mr. Delong, became a very great friend of Japan. Also the Government of Great Britain and Ireland issued instructions to the Governors of British possessions in the East that the case of the Maria Luz should serve as precedent for like cases happening in British waters in the future.

The rapprochement made to the Court of Peking through the affair of the Maria Luz was utilized by Soyejima for solving the questions of Corea and Liukiu. The Coreans, elated by their apparent success against the Americans in the summer of 1871, now issued laws prohibiting all intercourse with the Japanese, so that military expedition now seemed more necessary than ever should China only give us freedom of action. Again, in the December of the same year a Liukiu junk was stranded on the eastern coast of Formosa, and fifty-four out of the sixty-six people of Liukiu composing the crew were killed by the Botan savages. The Liukiu Government sought for the protection of Japan, and since then the question of Liukiu was on the order of the day. The next year saw Liukiu reduced to one of the provinces of Japan, as already seen, and for this act it was necessary to obtain China’s official recognition, utilizing, perhaps, the Formosan ​incident. Hence, Soyejima decided to visit the Court of Peking himself in the capacity of an Ambassador. The apparent object of the mission was the exchange of ratification of the treaty of the 29th of July, 1871.

The Ambassador arrived in Shanghai on the 31st of March, escorted by two men-of-war, and then set out for Tientsin, where an interview took place between him and Li-Hung-Chang on the 24th of April. The Viceroy heartily thanked Soyejima for the liberation of the 232 Chinese coolies the year before. The exchange of ratification took place on the 5th of May, and though Li wished to enter the negotiation of the Formosan affair at once, Soyejima insisted on being received in audience by the Emperor first, and arrived in Peking on the 7th of May.

This was just the time when the question of audience was actively discussed in Peking between the Tsung-li-Yamen and the diplomatic circle of Peking. The Chinese ceremony of audience granted to foreign representatives dated from the flourishing days of Kanghi, founder of the present dynasty. A Russian representative then sent to the Court of Peking agreed to the proposal of following the Chinese Court ceremony on the condition of a Chinese representative in St. Petersburg following the rules of etiquette in the Russian Court. He did not take the trouble to inform himself beforehand in what the Chinese ceremony consisted, so that he was greatly taken aback when he was required to kneel down in the courtyard outside the grand hall, in the depth of which was seated the son of heaven, and to bow very respectfully first three and then nine times. What was promised must have been carried out, and since then this became the established rule of ceremony of audience in the Chinese Court. That a foreign Minister of the nineteenth century would not submit to this humiliation was evident, and so none of them had ever since applied for audience, but only presented a copy of their credentials to the Tsung-li-Yamen, until in the winter of 1872 the question was revived by some of them demanding audience on the coming New Year’s Day.

But there was another irregularity among the foreign representatives themselves in Peking, which had to be first rectified if things were to go on according to the diplomatic usages of modern Europe. Up to this time the rule of precedence established between Ambassador, Minister Plenipotentiary, Minister Resident, and Chargé d’Affaires was not followed, but all were seated promiscuously, simply in order of their arrival in China. Soyejima thought it proper to correct this irregularity first, and entered into correspondence with his colleagues, who readily agreed with him. He then opened negotiations with the Yamen Minister concerning the audience, ​and argued that it was improper to treat with dishonour representatives of foreign rulers, equally independent and dignified as the Chinese Emperor himself, and added that if the Chinese Court should go on disrespecting foreign Ministers, he, too, would make use of his knowledge of Chinese rituals, and assume a position as disdainful of the Chinese Court as that of the Court to the foreign representatives. Nay, more, he would also teach the foreign representatives the way in which they could reciprocate the Chinese lack of respect. The lucky use he made of his profound Chinese scholarship soon made him master of the situation, and the Yamen Ministers accepted in principle the Western ceremony of saluting the Emperor while standing in front of him. But they procrastinated, and put off appointing the date of audience. Just at this time the news of the burning of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo reached Peking, and Soyejima now told the Yamen Ministers that the Japanese Emperor had sent the Ambassador to the Chinese Emperor out of respect to the Sovereign of the neighbouring Power, so that the Chinese Emperor should, properly speaking, send a mission of condolence to Tokyo on account of the late disaster; that he regarded the Chinese Ministers as standing very low in the scale of Chinese morals in not even hastening to appoint the day of audience already agreed upon; and that, as his presence was urgently called for in Tokyo, he would no longer wait, but would depart, leaving the rest to the Russian Minister in Peking.

Thus threatening to break off negotiations, he tried to take the Yamen Ministers by improviso regarding the question of Corea and Liukiu, for he knew that if he were to carry on formal negotiation on these subjects it would take months and years, and finally no definite results would be obtained. So he announced the 24th of June to be the day of departure, and on the 21st he sent Lord Yanagiwara, Japanese Minister to Peking, to the Yamen as his representative, and made him discuss with the Ministers on the following points:

Japanese Minister. Was Macao ceded for ever and without condition to Portugal?

Yamen Ministers. It is Chinese territory, but was ceded to Portugal on perpetual lease.

Japanese Minister. Some years ago, when France and the United States had to carry on military operations against Corea, they questioned the Chinese Government as to whether China regarded Corea as her tributary or not, and your Government answered that, though the King of Corea receives investiture from the Emperor of China, yet the internal administration and the question of war and peace were left to the ​Corean authority, and China had no concern with them. A copy of this answer was given to the Japanese Government by the United States Minister in Tokyo, and is here now. Does the situation remain the same now as then?

Yamen Ministers. Yes.

Japanese Minister. Formosa had formerly been occupied by the Japanese and the Dutch, and afterwards Teiseiko established his independence there. Under his descendants, however, the island became Chinese territory, but China subdued only a portion of the island, leaving the eastern portion to the aboriginal savage tribes, which your Government never attempted to reduce to obedience. Now, in the winter of 1871 these barbarians attacked and murdered the Japanese subjects shipwrecked on the coast, and the Japanese Government intends to send an expeditionary force to chastise them. But as the region lies adjacent to the territory under the local government of China, the Ambassador thought it better to inform you of the fact, in order to avoid a collision endangering amity between the two empires.

Yamen Ministers. We have only heard of the Formosan savages plundering and killing the people of Liukiu, but never heard of their attacking Japanese. Liukiu is a Chinese territory, and Chinese officers rescued and sent home to Liukiu such of them as could escape from the savages.

Japanese Minister. Liukiu has always belonged to Japan. During the feudal ages it was a dependency of the Prince of Satsuma, and is now under the direct rule of the Imperial Government. Hence, there is not a person of Liukiu who is not a Japanese subject, entitled to the protection of the Japanese Government. You say you have rescued the Liukiu people, but what have you done towards chastising the Formosan savages that have plundered and killed the rest?

Yamen Ministers. There are two sorts of aborigines in Formosa—those that have come under the Chinese rule, and are governed by the Chinese local officers, called ‘the ripe barbarians,’ and those that remain beyond the influence of China, called ‘the raw barbarians.’

Japanese Minister. The Formosan savages have molested foreign subjects more than once, and your Government never chastised them. This might lead to a very serious consequence—namely, the occupation of Formosa by other Powers, as in the case of Cambodia, Tonquin, and Amur districts, which is inconvenient, and a source of danger both to Japan and China. Hence, the Japanese Government has decided to undertake the work of chastisement itself. But in order to avoid complications our Ambassador, in his capacity of ​Minister of Foreign Affairs, caused the expedition to be postponed until he had opportunity to assure the Chinese Government that what Japan is going to do in Formosa concerns only the barbarians outside the limit of Chinese administration, and that it is no intention of hers to interfere with the internal affairs of China. It is also to be taken into consideration that, if the Japanese Government does not act now, the Japanese public, much enraged as they are at the murder of the Liukiu people, might invade the island of their own accord, and thereby give rise to a state of things incompatible with the existing treaty. The Japanese Government was originally against the idea of informing the Chinese Government of their intention, and it is therefore on his own responsibility that the Ambassador makes the present communication, etc.

Yamen Ministers. ‘The raw barbarians’ have not been chastised, because they are beyond the reach of our government and culture; but as we have in our hands the reports of the Governor of Fokien, who rescued the Liukiu people, we will consult those papers, and then answer your questions.

Japanese Minister. There is not a Japanese ignorant of the murder of the Liukiu people in Formosa, as the incident has appeared in the Chinese journals; and as the Ambassador is preparing with all haste for his departure, he will certainly not wait for any later response.

Thus, having ascertained verbally (1) that China renounced the right of interference with the internal and external affairs of Corea, (2) that she did not object to calling the natives of Liukiu Japanese subjects, and (3) that she had no objection to Japan’s sending an expeditionary force against the Formosan savages, the Ambassador regarded the object of his mission as accomplished. He had already made a portion of his suite start for Japan on the 23rd, when on the same day Bunsho, First Minister of Tsung-li-Yamen, sent one of his subordinates to the Ambassador, and, asking excuse for the delay in arranging for the audience, earnestly entreated him to postpone his departure. The Ambassador refused to consent, telling the messenger that what a Japanese Minister had once said would be done. The messenger then told Soyejima how much Bunsho repented of his not having treated the Japanese Ambassador as he ought to have done, and that he was now determined to arrange for the audience entirely in the way indicated by the Japanese Ambassador, etc. Soyejima reluctantly consented to receive Bunsho on the morrow.

On the 24th Bunsho came to the hotel of the Ambassador, and informed him that communication had already been made to the representatives of the Powers in Peking, to the effect ​that the Imperial audience would be granted them on the conditions desired by them, after the Japanese Ambassador had been received in special audience. The following day Soyejima sent an interpreter to the Yamen, formally accepting the audience under the condition specified by Bunsho, and the date of the ceremony was fixed on the 29th. The audience finally took place in Shiko-den (Purple Light Hall). This was the beginning of the foreign Ministers being received personally by the Chinese Emperor, after years of interruption, and was due solely to the efforts of Taneomi Soyejima.

But the story told by the venerable Privy Councillor^[3] does not end here. According to the Chinese custom, the Diplomatic Corps was invited to Court déjeuner after the ceremony, but, as it was already inconveniently warm, they all declined, except our Ambassador, who, understanding Chinese etiquette perfectly, gladly accepted it as a matter of the greatest honour. It was rumoured afterwards that the Chinese Princes and Ministers expressed deep approbation of the Japanese Ambassador understanding ‘the right way,’ and complained of the European and American Ministers dishonouring their ‘Father and Lord’—i.e., the Emperor.

The day following the audience the British Minister called on Soyejima, and thanked him in the name of his colleagues. On the Ambassador’s leaving China, the Taotai of Tientsin, representing Li-Hung-Chang, escorted him to Taku, and twenty-one guns were fired from the forts decorated with flags, this being the first occasion such honours were shown to foreign representatives under ordinary circumstances.

On arriving in Tokyo, all the foreign Ministers paid a visit to him together, and, commenting on his success in Peking, gave him the following remarkable assurance: ‘We wish we could say we have always done so, but as a fact we will from this day regard you as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of a really independent State;’ and they collectively invited him to a congratulatory dinner.

Within the walls of the Peking Court there are several halls, each allotted to separate ceremonial services. Shiko-den, in which the audience took place, was one originally devoted to the reception of tributary Mongol Princes. This fact having become known in 1889, the Ministers of the Powers in Peking demanded that the place of audience be hereafter transferred to Bunkwa-den; but the Court removed it to Sho-kwo-den, which was more important than Shiko-den, but less so than ​Bunkwa-den. It was only after the war with Japan that Bunkwa-den came to be used for the ceremony.

The policy of Soyejima’s mission was war with Corea, and his whole energy was directed to nullifying obstruction from the side of China in case of its declaration. But it was already known that the Iwakura mission would also return before long, with a wider view of the world, and presumably inclined towards the policy of peace. This made a portion of the men in power more agitated than before.

How the military circle, with the great Satsuma man, Saigo, Generalissimo of the Japanese Army, for its centre, looked upon the policy of Europeanization at this time can be judged from the exchange of views which took place between him and General Koyata Torio (now Privy Councillor Viscount Torio), who had done much for the reorganization of the Japanese army. In his ‘Souvenirs’ (Jikkwason) General Torio writes that his theory was as follows: That the real strength of a nation consists in the just balance of martial vigour and polite learning; that Japan of the new era necessitated a thorough reform of both these forms of national activity; and that, as it was impossible to carry on both reforms at the same time, and as militarism was at the root of the real strength of Japan, as well as capable of reform in a comparatively shorter period of time, so it would be more profitable for Japan to educate its people militarily at first, by restoring the old Samurai class and enlisting all its male members between twenty and forty years of age in active service. For this two-thirds of the whole revenue should be devoted to the maintenance of the army, and the utmost economy should be practised in all the other branches of the administration.

General Torio pressed on Generalissimo Saigo to consent to his theory, and endeavour to carry it out before the return of the Iwakura mission. Saigo entirely agreed with his theory, writes the General, and promised upon his life to carry it out, on condition that war with Corea be made the first step in its realization! He intimated that as the members of the Imperial Government had solemnly promised Lord Iwakura to introduce no change until his return except those absolutely indispensable, so there was no way but to argue it out openly after the return of the mission, and in the presence of the party of Europeanization.

This fact, coupled with the fact that Soyejima, on his way to China, had called at Kagoshima especially for the purpose of seeing the Generalissimo, puts it beyond doubt that they ​already had the Corean campaign fixed in their minds. Nor were there wanting reasons for it, for the Coreans not only persisted in their refusal to recognise the new Imperial Government, but they also openly compared the Europeanized Japanese to lower animals, sentenced to death those guilty of having had intercourse with the Japanese, and even threatened to attack our settlement in Fusan.

Hence, shortly after the return of Soyejima to Tokyo, in July, 1873, the Prime Minister, Lord Sanjo, agreed to the policy of war with Corea, subject to Lord Iwakura’s approval; and both Saigo and Soyejima offered their lives to be sent as ambassador to Corea to remonstrate with the Government, which would surely insult or attack the mission, and thus create for Japan an indisputable casus belli.

Lord Iwakura finally returned in September, and the Government immediately split up into two portions. Among its leading members, Soyejima, Goto, Itagaki, Eto, advocated war, while Lord Iwakura, Kido, Okubo, Ito, and the rest of his mission, unanimously opposed it. Okubo thus enumerated the reasons against war as follows: (1) The discontented elements among the Samurai and the common people, that had lost their means of living in consequence of the political and social change since the abolition of the Shogunate, might find occasion to assert themselves in ways injurious to the accomplishment of the great work of reorganization. (2) The new Imperial Government has already incurred great expenses for the many bold works of reform, so that war can only be carried on by increased taxation, foreign loans, or paper money; but if the taxes increased the people will hate the new Government. As to foreign loans, if once raised, there is no hope of redemption; and if paper money be issued, prices of things will rise. (3) The various productive enterprises already begun by the different branches of administration can only bear fruit after a certain number of years, but if war begins everything will have to be stopped midway. (4) Imports much exceed exports, and gold flows out of the country in consequence; but if war begins, the balance must become still more unfavourable on account of the purchase of foreign ammunition and the decrease of home produce. (5) Of all the foreign Powers, Russia is the one to be most feared, and her southward movement is well known; so that if Japan and Corea fight with one another, both would fall easy prey to Russia. (6) England is also a powerful nation, from whom Japan has already borrowed much money, so that if we cannot pay the interest in consequence of the war, she would make it a pretext for interfering with our internal affairs, thus making Japan another India. (7) Japan not being yet on the footing of ​equality with the foreign Powers—for stationing foreign troops in Yokohama, as England and France are still doing, is to treat us like a vassal State—to patiently bear such a gross ignominy near at hand, and impatiently move for chastising the remote Corea for much lighter offence, cannot be called reason. The days of animated discussions in the Cabinet between the 14th and the 23rd of October, 1873, form the most memorable epoch in the annals of New Japan, because it was by these earnest discussions, in which both parties contended, not for their personal influence or honour, but for the real good of the country, that the supremacy of the civil or the military party was to be decided, and with it the rapidity or tardiness of reform. The Prime Minister and the Minister of the Right, not being able to decide between themselves upon this all-important question, finally submitted the case to the personal decision of His Majesty the Emperor, who decreed that there should be no war with Corea. All the advocates of war now immediately resigned, except Lord Sanjo, who also petitioned to be relieved of his responsibility, on the ground of indifferent health, but whom the Emperor personally visited in his dwelling, and, consoling him, declared his intention not to let him go under any circumstance. The ex-Generalissimo Saigo retired to Satsuma, and all the Satsuma officers in the army followed him, so that the Imperial Guard was well-nigh disorganized, and the seed of the great civil war of 1877 was sown.

If war with Corea was a popular theme, the simultaneous resignation of the much-beloved Generalissimo and the Councillors, advocates of the war, was a more striking incident, such as had never occurred after the fall of the Shogun Government, and the public excitement, especially of the old Samurai class, was wrought up to a really dangerous pitch. In January, 1874, Lord Iwakura was attacked by a band of assassins, and miraculously escaped with as light wound. In February, Eto, one of the resigned Councillors, raised the standard of revolt in Saga, which was put down with much bloodshed. Graver dangers were also anticipated, and something had to be done in order to give vent to the once aroused feeling. Thus the Formosan expedition was decided upon as the undertaking most easily practicable, and attended with the least danger of international complications.^[4]

The Formosan expedition was decided upon in the beginning of April, 1874, and Lieutenant-General Yorimichi Saigo, nephew of the great Saigo, was appointed commander of the expeditionary force by land and sea. Major-General Tani and Rear-Admiral Akamatsu were his associates. Shigeomi Okuma was appointed chief of the newly-formed Bureau of Formosan affairs, and Nagasaki was chosen as the base of operations.

A detachment of 3,655 men was embarked in an American steamer chartered for the purpose, and an American gentleman by the name of Mr. Lysander was engaged as adviser; but the United States Minister in Tokyo having protested against the measure as conflicting with the neutrality of his Government, the ship had to be given back and the adviser dismissed.

But as soon as the fact became known to China, she began to prepare actively for the protest. It is to be remembered that the assurance obtained from the Yamen Ministers by Soyejima while on his mission in Peking, to the effect that the Formosan barbarians were outside the reach of China’s influence and culture, was only verbal, so that they could always assert with right that they had never officially admitted it. Grave complications were feared, and the Imperial Government, coming back on its own decision, sent Okubo to Nagasaki to stop the departure of the expedition. But Yorimichi Saigo would not listen.

He feared still graver complications at home, amongst others that the military tendency might be stopped through fear of diplomatic difficulties. He proposed to take all responsibility upon himself, and urged that, if the Chinese protestation came to anything serious, the Japanese Government might answer that Yorimichi Saigo was acting without authorization, and even against the will of the Imperial Government. So the expedition went off, and from the 6th to the 22nd of May, 1874, the work of chastisement was carried out under great difficulties, owing to the geographical conditions of that part of the island, when the savages took up their position amongst insurmountable rocks and mountains.

China now protested louder than ever, the Yamen Ministers addressing themselves to our Minister Yanagiwara, then staying in Shanghai, and the Governor of Fokien to our Consul in Amoy. On Yanagiwara’s arrival in Peking, the Yamen Ministers repeatedly sent him notes accusing Japan of the ‘invasion of Chinese territory,’ of ‘burning and plundering the Formosan people,’ of ‘the violation of the treaty of peace and ​friendship,’ etc., and ostensibly made warlike preparations. Hence, corresponding preparations had also to be made on our side, and for a time all looked very dark.

The Japanese Government appointed Councillor and Home Minister Okubo Minister Plenipotentiary, and sent him to Peking to negotiate on the Formosan affair. The mission arrived in Peking on the 10th of September, and the negotiations lasted from the 14th of the same month until the 30th of October. From the first Okubo assumed the offensive, and demanded of the Yamen Ministers what China had done to govern and educate the Formosan barbarians and on what they based their claim to sovereignty over the portion of the island inherited by them, and, if it were Chinese territory, why she left the depredations of these barbarians unchastised. The Yamen Minister produced as proofs of China’s sovereignty the official geography of Formosa, but even in that geography were found such phrases as ‘the mountain barbarians outside of Chinese territory,’ ‘beyond the reach of Chinese influence and education,’ etc. They also cited the paying of tribute as proof of sovereignty, but these tributes were not paid by the barbarians, being in reality only a price paid by the Chinese merchants for the monopoly of trading with the barbarians. Our mission produced as contrary proofs Chinese histories and European books of geography, and also cited the fact that the Yamen Ministers themselves had repeatedly announced to the United States Consul and to the Soyejima mission that the barbarians were not ‘included in the Chinese territory,’ that they lie ‘outside the civilizing influence of China,’ etc., and argued that, according to international law, a country cannot claim sovereignty in that portion of the territory over which it exercises no administration. To this last they replied that territorial administration was an internal affair, so that to question it was a breach of the third article of the treaty of peace and friendship, assuring mutual non-interference. They also remarked that the so-called ‘international law’ was a law amongst Western nations, which China has had no occasion to study.

In the meanwhile in Tokyo loud cries were heard among the impatient public that the Okubo mission was being played with by the Chinese Government pending the completion of its military preparations. And that once these were ready, they intended to end the negotiations abruptly and declare war. The Tokyo Government considered it necessary to draw Okubo’s attention to this rumour.

At last, on the 10th of October, Okubo sent an ultimatum to the Peking Government, demanding a response within five days as to whether China would relinquish all claim of ​sovereignty over the barbarian territory, or accept the responsibility towards Japan for having left their depredation unpunished. By the wish of the Yamen Ministers the answer was postponed for three days, and on the 18th the Yamen Ministers visited the hotel of our mission. They now agreed to regard the fact of having left the barbarians unchastised as neglect on their part, and to regard our expedition as just; but instead of paying any indemnity, they proposed to pay a certain sum of money as a gift to the families of the Liukiu people killed by the Formosan barbarians, on the condition of our evacuating the island. They were not even ready to fix the sum by mutual agreement, and refused to give any written engagement for it. Okubo, of course, did not agree to these evasive terms, and proposed the sum of 3,000,000 yen by written contract as indemnity to be paid before evacuation, so that the negotiations were again protracted till the 23rd, on which day Okubo announced the mission to be at an end, and made a declaration to the Yamen that Japan would hold the position of having chastised the barbarians, considering the territory as masterless. The 26th was fixed as the date of departure, and a part of the mission had already started for Shanghai on the 26th, when the British Minister in Peking, Mr. Wade, interceded.

Mr. Wade had already intimated to Okubo that the question of peace and war between Japan and China could not be indifferent to him in view of the 200 British merchants living in China, and that he would personally ascertain where the chief difficulty lay with the Chinese Government. It was easy to believe that what lay heavy on the Chinese mind was the idea of the Celestial Empire having to pay ‘indemnity’ to a small island empire. The name ‘indemnity’ having to be avoided, such a sum as 3,000,000 rio would look like an ‘indemnity’ in any case, and hence the amount would also have to be reduced. He notified that the Yamen was ready to pay at once 100,000 rio, to be given to the families of the molested people, and 400,000 rio to defray the various expenses incurred by the Japanese Government, this last sum having to be paid after the evacuation. The difference between 3,000,000 and 500,000 is not small, but money was not what Okubo wanted. So he proposed to consent on the following conditions: (1) That the Chinese Government engage to regard the expedition to have been a just undertaking. (2) That all the diplomatic papers exchanged between the Governments concerning the Formosan expedition should be returned, and the whole affair regarded as not having occurred. (3) That the Chinese Government should pay to the Japanese Government 100,000 rio for the succour of the molested ​Japanese subjects, and 400,000 rio for their having opened the roads and erected public buildings in Formosa. These points were accepted by the Chinese, and the Treaty of Tientsin was signed on the 31st of October, 1874.

The expedition cost 9,550,000 yen, and 400,000 rio (one Chinese rio is a little over one Japanese yen) was no adequate recompense for it; but one great advantage obtained by this treaty was that China agreed to regard the people of Liukiu as Japanese subjects. This was Okubo’s sole aim and purpose.

The Japanese Government, taking full advantage of the new position gained, now hastened to obliterate every trace of Liukiu’s dual dependence. In 1875 Matsuda, Secretary oi the Home Department, was sent to the islands to announce the coming as a garrison of a portion of the Kumamoto Division. At the same time he ordered the King to employ the Japanese calendar and stop further payment of tribute to China. But the Liukiu King and people insisted on the continuance of the dual protection, and refused to obey the orders, making interminable remonstrances and petitions.

In 1876 an Imperial Court of Justice was established in Liukiu, but the old Government would not hand over to it the pending judicial cases. On the contrary, the King sent one of his sons to Tokyo to prove to the Government the necessity ​of dual dependency for the welfare of the island people, and petitioned its recognition by Japan more than ten times. Finding all its efforts fruitless, the Liukiu mission now sent letters to the Ministers of China, United States, France, Holland, etc., asking for interference. In these letters China was called ‘the Great Tsin,’ and Japan simply Japan. Such expression as ‘a nation by itself though small’ also occurs. But none of the Powers interfered, not even China, for she then had before her the more important question of regaining Ili (Kouldja) from Russia.

In March, 1879, Matsuda was sent for a third time to Liukiu with some policemen and a detachment of the Kumamoto Division, and required the King to hand over the land and the people to the Imperial Government. The order was carried out in less than ten days. Liukiu is now one of the most docile provinces of the empire.^[5]

The year 1875 is memorable in many ways. Internally this was the year in which the first step towards a constitutional form of government was taken. We have already noticed the retirement of Saigo, Itagaki, Soyejima, Goto, etc., in consequence of the Corean question. The question of Formosa led to the retirement of another of the makers of New Japan, Kido, because in his eyes to have chastised the Formosan barbarians was a contradiction on the part of the Cabinet Ministers, who had opposed the chastisement of the far more delinquent Coreans. The Councillor and Minister of Finance, Inouye, had also retired, because his stringent economy differed from the views of his colleagues. But, with the open-heartedness characteristic of the patriotic statesmen of Japan, the Cabinet Ministers Okubo and Ito had an interview with Itagaki and Kido on the opposition side, and agreed on a plan of reforming the Government on a constitutional basis. This led to the return of Kido and Itagaki to the position of Councillors, and the famous Imperial decree of the 14th of April, 1875, was issued, by which the Supreme Court of Justice was established, and the opening of the Senate and the assembly of provincial Governors were announced as preliminaries for establishing a representative system of government.

The English and the French Governments, which had ​stationed 1,500 soldiers each in Yokohama since 1863, in barracks built and repaired at the expense of the Japanese Government, now regarded the measure as useless, and evacuated the town of their own accord on the 25th of February, 1875.

It was in the same year that the long-pending question of Sakhalin was finally solved. Previous to this, in 1871, Imperial Councillor Soyejima had been sent out to Possiet Bay to confer with the Russian Governor residing there on the boundary question, but no definite result could be attained, nor could the Iwakura mission negotiating in St. Petersburg obtain any better success. In the meanwhile the Russians took advantage of the unsettled situation of Sakhalin, and, establishing a local government in Alexandrowsk, extended the sphere of their action in various directions, and even encroached on the southern portions of the island occupied by the Japanese fishermen.

On Soyejima’s appointment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he heard of Russia’s selling Alaska to the United States, and conceived the idea of buying from Russia her claim to the portion of the island south of 50° of latitude. The Finance Minister Okuma agreed to advance 2,000,000 rio, and negotiations were entered into with the Russian Chargé d’Affaires. As the Russian Government refused the offer, Soyejima made the alternative proposal of appropriating the islands of Urup, Kunashiri and Iturup to Japan, and ceding the whole of Sakhalin to Russia on the condition that the latter agreed to permit the passage of Japanese troops through the Russian territory in case of war with a continental Power (Soyejima undoubtedly had in view the invasion of Corea from the north). In March, 1873, with the boundary question still pending, Soyejima was sent to the Court of Peking as aforesaid, and when he returned, in August of the same year, the United States Minister in Tokyo came to him one day and privately acquainted him with the decision of the Russian Government to sell to Japan all claims on Sakhalin. But almost on the same day Councillor Itagaki called on him and told him that the Japanese Cabinet had just decided to adopt the views advocated in the memoirs of Kuroda, Director of the United Board of Yeso and Sakhalin, and abandon the whole island to Russia, with or without condition as the case might be. According to Kuroda, the island was not worth the money required to bring it to a cultivable condition, for not only was the climate extremely cold, but the soil was barren and unproductive, besides there being constant fear of collision with Russia as long as Japan possessed only a portion of it. The Russian representative in Tokyo was not slow to hear of ​the decision arrived at by the Japanese Government, and he now remonstrated with Soyejima as the only person in Japan that stood in the way of Japan’s ceding the whole island to Russia.

After the retirement of Soyejima from office, Munenori Terashima, who had been Japan’s first Minister to the Court of St. James, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Vice-Admiral Enomoto was sent as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Russia, with instructions to negotiate the affair of Sakhalin. The instructions consisted in making Russia agree to some natural boundary between the Japanese and Russian territories on Sakhalin, and, in case Russia should claim the whole island to herself, in making her recognise the sovereignty of Japan over the whole of the Kurile group. In the latter case Japan was to demand from Russia compensation for roads and other works in Sakhalin, and also the protection of her fishing interests in the adjoining seas.

In negotiating with the Tokugawa Government, Russia had readily agreed to recognise the three islands of the Kurile group as Japanese territory, as well as to open Sakhalin to Japanese fishing; but now that she had established a firm footing on Sakhalin, she long refused to listen to any condition proposed by the Vice-Admiral, till finally the approaching storm in the Balkans made Prince Gortchakoff agree to sign the treaty of the 7th of May (25th of April of the Russian calendar), 1875.

The treaty consists of eight articles, by the first of which the Straits of La Perouse is fixed as the boundary between Japan and Russia. In the second article are enumerated the islands of the Kurile group, recognised as Japanese territory, and the straits between the island of Shimshu and the Cape of Rabakka is fixed as the boundary between the two empires. The third article stipulates that the transfer of sovereignty over Sakhalin, with all the rights emanating from it, should take place immediately on the exchange of ratification, both Governments appointing officers to superintend the formality of such transfer. The fourth article assures that all the public buildings and lands owned by the Japanese Government in Sakhalin, and by the Russian Government on the Kurile Islands, should pass on to each other’s possession, on the condition of the new owner paying indemnity for the buildings and movable property, to be valued by the officers mentioned in the third article. The fifth article concerns the nationality of the Japanese in Sakhalin and the Russians in Kurile, to whom the right of option is assured, with the promise to protect their property, labour, and worship, in case they prefer to remain in each other’s territory while retaining ​their former nationality. By the sixth article Russia agrees to confer the following advantages to Japan in recognition of Japan’s readiness to cede the whole of Sakhalin to Russia: (1) Japanese ships entering the port of Korsakov shall be exempt from Customs tariff and harbour duties for ten years, and the Japanese Government shall have the right of appointing Consul in the said port. (2) Japanese vessels and merchants shall enjoy all the rights and privileges enjoyed by the vessels and merchants of the most favoured nation in regard to fishing and navigation in harbours of the Okhotsk Sea and along the coast of Kamtchatka. The seventh and the eighth articles refer to the Vice-Admiral’s full powers, which were first given by telegram, and to the exchange of ratifications, which was to take place within six months of the signing.

If the loss of Sakhalin were regrettable, we have at least this consolation, that the treaty of 1875 was drawn up in a spirit of perfect equality, and in terms quite honourable to Japan, whose position then differed much from the position she now occupies.

At the time the ratifications of the Enomoto-Gortchakoff treaty of 1875 were exchanged in Tokyo, in October of the same year, the Corean question was once more agitating the Japanese public. The Corean King had attained his majority in 1874, and assumed control of the Government; but having a weak will, and falling entirely under the influence of his far more strong-willed Queen, her relatives—the members of the Bin family—rose to power. The newly-formed Bin Cabinet was opposed to the policy of the late Regent and King’s father, Tai-in-kun, of anti-foreign seclusion and animosity to Japan. In 1875, however, Tai-in-kun regained power, and anti-foreign agitation soon gained full motion.

On the 20th of September, 1875, the Japanese man-of-war Unyokwan was stationed at the mouth of the river Han, and the officers and men were engaged in surveying the coast, when the fort of Eiso, at the entrance of the port of Ninsen, opened fire on them. The next day the Japanese man-of-war bombarded the fort, landed a body of marines, and, attacking the garrison of Eiso, seized thirty-eight cannon and killed or wounded as many Coreans.

When the news reached Tokyo, the cry for war with Corea was again very loud, and Soyejima advised Lord Iwakura from his retirement that a decisive step should now be taken. But just at this time the leading Councillors were divided ​amongst themselves concerning the question of the reorganization of the Imperial Cabinet, and no definite course could be decided upon with regard to Corea until December, when Lieutenant-General Kuroda was appointed High Commissioner Extraordinary, and ex-Minister of Finance Inouye Associate High Commissioner Extraordinary, to be sent to Corea. Two men-of-war and several thousand soldiers in four transports were to convoy the mission, but its object was a peaceful one, because the High Commissioners were instructed to utilize the occasion for signing a treaty of peace and amity with Corea, and in case of her refusal to wait for the decision of the home Government once more before having recourse to arms.

The mission left Japan on the 6th of January, 1876, and at the same time Yurei Mori, who had been Minister in Washington, was sent to China as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary in order to negotiate with the Chinese Government concerning the Corean affair. Li-Hung-Chang was then already at the head of Foreign Affairs in the North of China, and though he claimed Corea to be a tributary of China, he declined any responsibility regarding her action towards Japan. Li-Hung-Chang disapproved of the idea of Japan’s going to chastise Corea for having opened fire on the Japanese man-of-war, which he held had no right to survey within the territorial water of Corea. To this Mori replied that Japan was not sending an expeditionary force against Corea, but simply intended to force Corea to open the country to foreign intercourse and enter into treaty relations with Japan. As to the surveying, its necessity was evident, according to Minister Mori, because the Corean coasts were particularly dangerous to the world’s navigation, and Corea could not make any surveys herself. It was at least certain that no objection was to be feared from the side of the Chinese as long as Japan had no intention of annexing Corea, and kept herself within the bounds of forcing Corea to throw off the policy of absolute seclusion.

The part now played by the Japanese Commissioners in Corea was exactly the same as that played by Commodore Perry when he first came to Japan in 1853. The first interview with the Corean officials at Kokwa took place on the 10th of February, 1876, and, according to the Corean chroniclers, a most unprecedented scene of division and contest reigned in the Corean Court from the very next day. Tai-in-kun was decidedly opposed to any idea of entering into treaty relations with Japan, and offered to the Cabinet to take upon himself the task of defending the country should war ensue from the refusal. Most of the Ministers and Councillors ​held the same view as Tai-in-kun, only the Minister of Right, Bokkeiziu, and the Chinese interpreter Yo-kei-yaku strongly represented the inevitable necessity of opening up the country, and the danger of attempting to avert it by force of arms. On the 12th the Coreans asked for a delay of ten days, which was granted. On the 20th the question was still unsettled, and the Japanese mission announced the intention to depart on the 22nd. At the end of the ten days the Coreans asked for the delay of several days more, but the Japanese Commissioners refused to comply, and betook themselves to the ship and remained there for some days, when on the 26th the Corean Government accepted the treaty, and signed it on the following day. It is said that the advocates of opening up the country finally prevailed on the leading members of the Queen’s party, including the Presiding Minister Li-sai-wo, who went over to the new policy for the purpose of depriving the party of Tai-in-kun of political power. Thus, in Corea the question of seclusion or opening the country was mingled with the struggle for power amongst contending factions in the Court.

The treaty of the 27th of February, 1876, called the Treaty of Kokwa, is the first diplomatic document ever signed by Corea with modern nations, and is remarkable in many ways. The first article, which is really a manifestation on the part of Japan against China’s claim to suzerainty over Corea, runs as follows:

The second article refers to the exchange of Envoys, and the third fixes the Chinese language as the medium of intercourse between the two Governments. The fourth and the fifth articles confirm Sôrio in the port of Fusan as the Japanese settlement and place of commerce between Japan and Corea, and promise to open two new ports within a stated period, Genzan and Ninsen being the ports opened in consequence of these articles in 1880 and 1883 respectively, though considerably later than the time first fixed upon. The sixth article refers to the aid to be given to the Japanese vessels entering Corean ports and the Corean vessels entering Japanese ​ports for stress of weather, repairs, want of fuel and provisions, and to the shipwrecked sailors, passengers, cargo, etc. The seventh article confirms Japan’s right of surveying the Corean coasts, because the seas around Corea are especially dangerous to navigation. By the eighth article Japan obtains the right of appointing Consuls in each of the Corean treaty ports, and the ninth article protects the liberty of commerce in the following terms:

The tenth article preserves to Japan the right of extraterritoriality in criminal matters, as follows:

The eleventh article refers to the drawing up of trade regulations by special Commissioners, and the twelfth and last article makes the treaty binding from the date of signing without ratification by the Sovereigns of Japan and Corea. In the appendix the limit to the distance of travelling allowed to Japanese subjects in Corea is fixed at ten Corean ri (about two English miles) from the open ports, but this was afterwards much extended.

It is to be remarked that there is not a single article in the whole treaty concerning the status of the Coreans in Japan, nor does Corea enjoy by it the right of appointing Consuls in Japan. By the circular of the Minister of Justice of January, 1883, the Coreans in Japan were made punishable in the Japanese courts according to the criminal law of Japan.

In May, 1876, the first Corean mission, consisting of about fifteen persons, and headed by the Associate Master of Ceremonies, arrived in Tokyo, and was received by the Emperor. Their expenses while in Japan were defrayed by the Japanese Government, and they were made to inspect the Government factories, schools, etc., but everywhere the Coreans showed ​great uneasiness whenever they had to meet with Europeans and Americans.

The treaty of 1876 is the first clear announcement of Japan’s foreign policy as regards Corea. The policy of annexation, though not impossible to carry out, was from the very first rejected in view of the possible conflict with China (and later with Russia also); but neither China nor any other nation was to be allowed to substantiate its claim of suzerainty over Corea, and thereby interfere with the liberty of the Japanese nation to trade with Corea on the ground of free competition.

Thus the first step was taken towards the solution of the Corean problem, but the solution, it must be remembered, was partial, because the independence of Corea was only proclaimed by Japan, and not yet recognised by China. With China the interest was more historical than commercial or economical. What was difficult for her was to treat as an independent Power what is enumerated in her history as one of her tributaries. Hence, such empty rites as the sending of an annual mission with presents from Corea to the Court of Peking, and of the Corean King receiving investiture from the Son of Heaven, were still scrupulously practised. But such nominal claim to suzerainty may at a given moment be made real, and as long as it could be done so the interests of Japan in Corea were not secure. Hence, the next step was the settlement of the accounts with China.

In the year following the first Corean affair occurred the greatest political event in Japan since the establishment of the new Imperial Government, namely, the civil war of Kagoshima. Saigo, chief of the old party for war with Corea, had retired into the reactionary province of Satsuma with his partisans, who were officers in the Imperial army, and, seeing the Cabinet Ministers differed more and more from his ideals, finally raised a standard of revolt in Kagoshima and prepared for a march upon Tokyo. For eight months most bloody fighting continued in the south-western provinces, from which the Imperial army came out victorious, though with great loss of life and property. The last remnant of the old régime having been done away with, things could now follow a freer course of development than before. The leading personages had also changed. Kido died of disease in the beginning of the campaign, Saigo fell in the field of battle, and Okubo was assassinated by the fanatic followers of Saigo not long after, ​and such statesmen as Ito, Inouye, Yorimichi, Okuma, and Matsukata, came into prominence. Inouye became Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs in September, 1878.

The internal political history of Japan during the years that followed the Kagoshima civil war is characterized by the great activity of public opinion, demanding the prompt establishment of a constitutional form of government. All forcible means of effecting change in the Imperial Government being now out of question, persons discontented with the current state of affairs looked upon the opening of a popular assembly as the only means of giving effect to their political ideals. This movement resulted in the great Imperial proclamation of the 12th of October, 1881, promising 1890 to be the year in which the Japanese Constitution was to be promulgated, and in the sending of Ito with a numerous suite of officials and students to Europe in order to make the necessary investigations for the future Constitution of the empire (February, 1882).

In Corea the state of things during the four or five years following the signing of the first treaty with Japan was much the same as that in Japan during the years that followed the first signing of the temporary treaty of peace and friendship with the United States. The same antagonism arose between the foreign and anti-foreign parties in Corea as in Japan, with one important difference, that while in Japan the contest was dictated by purely patriotic, unselfish motives on both sides, in Corea it was mingled with personal, selfish motives, utilizing or trying to utilize the momentous political event as means of concentrating the governing power in the hands of a particular faction in the Court. This fact, added to the weakness of character of her King, made the history of Corea between 1876 and 1882 extremely low, and even barbarous.

In 1877 Hanabusa was sent to Corea in the capacity of Chargé d’Affaires, and in 1880, the building of the Japanese Legation in Seoul having been completed, Hanabusa became Minister Resident. Though intercourse was thus established on a formal basis, yet both the Government and the people of Corea refused to have anything to do with the Japanese, whom they scorned as much as before. Once, in October, 1878, the Corean Government imposed a high prohibitive tariff on all imports, with the object of annihilating the trade with Japan in Fusan, and annulled the measure only on the remonstrances of Hanabusa and the Japanese Consul in Fusan that it was a breach of treaty engagements. Again, in April, 1879, when the Commandant, officers, and men of the Japanese man-of-war Hanabusa were taking a walk through the streets of Torai, near Fusan, a mob gathered around them and attacked them with stones, so that the crew had to defend ​themselves by firing the guns they carried with them for self-defence.

The Government was still in the hands of the Queen’s party that had signed the treaty with Japan, but, curiously enough, they were no real advocates of intercourse with Japan. Their temporarily taking the cause of Japan was only a means towards depriving Tai-in-kun of governing power. Having gained this, they were intent on falling back on China. China was more popular, and in their eyes a better protector of their interests, than Japan. What the attitude of China was with regard to Corea after her entering into new relations with Japan may be gathered from the following letter sent by Li-Hung-Chang in 1881 to one of the members of the governing party, and showed by the latter to the King of Corea:

The policy of China, then, was to draw Corea more and more towards herself by making the Coreans fear Japan’s intention to annex the peninsula, thereby turning her merely historical suzerainty into a real one. Here, then, was one great source of international complication for the future.

But Corea was already not entirely wanting in men who could foresee the great future in store for Japan, and wished to cultivate a really good relation with us for the good of their country, or at least as the means of asserting their power between the two rival parties of Tai-in-kun and the relatives of the Queen. The centre of this new party was an ambitious young man of the Kin family, by the name of Kin-giok-kin, who won over to his cause Boku-ei-ko, born of a very high family, and nominal husband^[6] of one of the royal Princesses. Jo-ko-han also belonged to this party. They sent a Buddhist priest called Li-to-jin to Japan, in order to communicate their ideas to Japanese statesmen, and afterwards they sent out two more men, Li-ken-gu and Taku-tei-shoku, to Japan with letters to the Minister of Justice, Iwakura, and the ​Councillor Inouye. These three persons returned to Corea after having seen something of Japan and formed acquaintance with the Japanese statesmen; but instead of taking orders from Kin-giok-kin and Boku-ei-ko, they went over to a section of the Bin party consisting of Bin-tai-ko, his son Bin-ei-yoku, Ko-ei-shoku, and his friends, who introduced the priest Li-to-jin to the King, and made him report on all that he had seen in Japan to the Sovereign. Hereupon the King decided to send a party of ten men to Japan on a mission of observation and study, and the Japanese Government gladly showed to the Coreans all that they had to show, from the interior of the Government offices, banks, and schools, down to post and telegraphic bureaux and astronomical and meteorological observatories. Thus, the King and a portion of the Bin family began to be Japanized, but the body of the Queen’s family being still opposed to the idea, they banished Kin-giok-kin to a distant province, and caused the priest Li-to-jin to be assassinated.

In 1881, the Government of the Queen’s family having become very unpopular on account of the exactions and oppressive measures of the officials belonging to it, Kin-giok-kin was recalled from his banishment, and, in concert with Boku-ei-ko and Jo-ko-han, tried to introduce reforms into the Government. Feeling their power too weak for the task, however, Kin-giok-kin and Jo-ko-han managed through Bin-ei-yoku to be sent on a semi-official mission to Japan, in order to confer in person with our statesmen on the means of reforming Corea under the guidance of Japan. The two Coreans arrived in Tokyo in the month of January, 1882, and from this time dates the attempt on the part of some politicians and statesmen in Japan to become the tutors of Corea, even with regard to her purely internal affairs.

Thus, in the beginning of 1882 three distinct factions were clearly visible in the Corean Court: the Tai-in-kun party, then out of power, but in touch with the soldiery and all reactionary elements in the people; the body of the Queen’s party, relying on China; and the party of Kin-giok-kin, Boku-ei-ko, Jo-ko-han, with a portion of the Bin family as their patron, trying to find new source of power in Japan.

The calm was broken by the Tai-in-kun party, who cleverly utilized the discontent of the soldiery and the people in effecting the coup d’état of July, 1882, directed against both the rival parties. One of the Queen’s party, Binken-ko, who held in his hands the finances of the Corean army, had pocketed the salaries of the soldiers for several months, and when he paid a portion of the arrears his subordinates lessened the sum by further pocketing. The angry soldiery attacked the subordinate ​paymasters, who fled into the house of their chief and accused the soldiers of false crimes. Bin-ken-ko ordered the arrest of the would-be chief malefactors, and sentenced them to death. The garrison now rose in a body and ran to Tai-in-kun, who formally appeased them, but secretly agitated them into a general rising, having for its double object the massacre of the Queen and the members of the Bin family, and the clearing Corea of the hated Japanese. The soldiers seized the arsenal, and, joined by a mob of several thousand Coreans, attacked the Japanese Legation in the evening of the 23rd of July, 1882. On the next morning they killed the then presiding Minister, Li-sai-wo, in his house, and, intruding into the royal palace, killed the army financier, Bin-ken-ko, and other hated officials. The Queen and the other members of her party concealed themselves, and so did also the members of the Japanese party. The angry soldiers surrounded the King, and forced him to say where the Queen lay concealed. As he would not do this, his life was in great danger, when Tai-in-kun made his appearance, and, appeasing the soldiery, received from the King full power to dictate the civil and military affairs of the kingdom. During the ten days that followed, the political enemies of Tai-in-kun were proscribed, and killed to the number of 300. The Queen, too, was proclaimed to be dead, and the ceremony of Court mourning was gone through, for the purpose, it is said, of facilitating the discovery of her whereabouts.

The attack on the Japanese Legation in Seoul is narrated as follows by the military attaché, Captain Midzuno. Late in the afternoon of the 23rd the following anonymous note was received by the Minister Resident, Hanabusa:

A few minutes after six o’clock several thousand Coreans surrounded the Legation, and with loud yells, threw stones at its occupants. They set the neighbouring house on fire, and the conflagration was fast consuming the building of the Legation. Out of the twenty-five persons then found in the Legation, only Captain Midzuno, an orderly attached to him, one police officer, and five policemen, were armed. The policemen guarded the front gate, which was flung open while the Minister remained inside and prepared for departure. The inmates now formed themselves into a compact mass, and, with the Minister and the national flag in the middle, made a sortie into the very thick of the mob, killing about ​twenty Coreans before they opened the way for the Japanese. Hanabusa first directed the column to the quarters of the Governor of Seoul, whose duty it was to protect the Legation, and finding the whole building empty, he now proceeded to the royal palace—for his diplomatic duty forbade him to quit the capital without leave from the Sovereign to whom he was accredited—but as all the gates of the palace were hermetically sealed against him, he now declared his mission at an end, and retired to Ninsen, where he arrived at three o’clock in the afternoon of the following day. In Ninsen the party was courteously received by the Corean local officers, who offered our Minister their own houses as lodging, and all were resting themselves quietly and drying their clothes, wet with rain, when they were suddenly attacked by the soldiers of the port, better armed than the Seoul mob, and four policemen and several other persons were killed or wounded in defending the Minister. The party, recruited by some Japanese officers and students living in Chemulpo, now betook themselves to a small junk with scanty provisions, and, passing one night on an island off Chemulpo, the next day rowed out in search of a foreign vessel, which was known to be surveying the coast some days since. On the evening of the 26th they were picked up by the English surveying ship Flying Fish, through whose extreme kindness the party reached Nagasaki in safety on the 29th of July.

From Nagasaki Hanabusa telegraphed to Tokyo and waited for instructions. Inouye was still the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a Cabinet Council was immediately held between the Prime Minister, Lord Sanjo; Minister of Right, Lord Iwakura; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Inouye; and the Councillors Kuroda, Yamagata, Terashima, Oki, Yamada, Matsukata. Kuroda, who had signed the treaty of 1876, strongly advocated the policy of war, but Lord Iwakura and Inouye proposed peaceful negotiations, and, unable to come to any decision till late at night, the Ministers and Councillors separated with a decision of reopening the Council the next morning in the presence of the Emperor, and of referring to his personal decision. Inouye then argued that the event of the 23rd of July was probably the result of anti-foreign agitations, as had been the case in Japan on the first opening of intercourse with foreign nations, when the fanatic Samurais had burnt the British Legation in Tokyo; and if that were so, it was rash to chastise the Corean Government for the movement, which they were powerless to check. He proposed sending Hanabusa to Corea once more under the escort of four or five men-of-war, in order to see first what the Corean Government could and would do towards fulfilling our demand ​for satisfaction. After closely listening to the arguments of each present, the Emperor decided on the sending of a peaceful mission to Corea, and entrusted the management of the whole affair to Inouye. The Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately called together the Ministers of the Powers represented in Tokyo, and reading to them the telegram from Hanabusa, and acquainting them with the intention of the Imperial Government, asked them whether, in their opinion, they regarded Corea to be an independent State or not. They all answered that in their views Corea was an independent State. Satisfied with this answer, Inouye immediately set out for Nagasaki, and, giving minute instructions to Hanabusa, sent him out to Corea under the escort of three men-of-war and 800 men. Major-General Takashima and Rear-Admiral Nire were to start after him with 1,150 men.

But between the coup d’état of the 23rd of July and the second arrival of Hanabusa in special mission for demanding satisfaction, a new factor had made its appearance in Seoul. The Queen’s party, suddenly deprived of their power by the party of Tai-in-kun, had applied to China for aid through their partisans, Kin-in-shoku and Gio-in-chiu, who had found themselves in China at the time of the coup d’état, and Li-Hung-Chang immediately gave orders to General Go-cho-kei, Colonel En-sei-gai, and Admiral Tei-jo-sho to proceed to Corea with land and sea forces. The very name of China inspired awe and reverence in the heart of all the Coreans, and Tai-in-kun was not only powerless to resist interference of the suzerain Power, but was even inclined to seek its aid in facing the storm that was sure to arrive from the side of Japan.

Hanabusa arrived in Ninsen on the 12th of August, 1882, and, despite the earnest demands of the Coreans to enter Seoul without escort, or to postpone his entry till proper buildings for the quartering of soldiers could be provided, proceeded to Yokwazin, within an hour’s march of the capital, on the 16th. Here he was again asked to stop for three days in a villa belonging to Tai-in-kun, and the various Corean officials came and went with all sorts of pretexts, intended to make him postpone entrance into the city, but Hanabusa disregarded them. When he marched up to the capital, he already saw superior Chinese forces posted around the four gates, and understood for the first time what the remonstrances of the Corean officers meant. They either waited for instructions from Li-Hung-Chang, or wished to give the Chinese forces time to post themselves in advantageous positions. They now freely spoke of the chief Ministers visiting the Chinese men-of-war, and not being able to receive the Japanese Minister immediately. ​Hanabusa immediately applied for audience with the King, but the Ministers would not grant it, on the pretext that the 17th and the 18th were days of important religious ceremony in the Court. The Japanese Minister consented to wait, adding, however, that on his mission hung the question of peace or war between Japan and Corea, that the unwillingness on the part of Corea to receive the mission in a proper way would be interpreted in the sense of her not wishing for peace, and that, should the audience be granted or not, he would present himself before the King on the 19th. On the 19th the King sent a messenger to Hanabusa expressing his sorrow for not being able to receive him on account of illness, and appointing the noon of the 20th as the time of audience. In the meanwhile Major-General Takashima and Rear-Admiral Nire arrived with reinforcements.

The audience took place at the appointed time. After proper exchange of courtesies, Hanabusa presented to the King the ultimatum containing the items of the demand for satisfaction, and added verbally that, in the extreme moment when the diplomatic relations between the two nations were about to break off, the Government of Japan made this demand solely out of their desire to preserve friendly relations, that on the answer of the Government of Corea depended the continuity or rupture of peace between the two nations, and that he was to wait for the said answer for three days—i.e., till the noon of the 23rd. He also asked the King to appoint a responsible Minister for the negotiation, and the King named the Presiding Minister, Ko-jun-boku, as the Corean plenipotentiary.

After the audience, the arch-author of the coup d’état, Tai-in-kun, received the mission in another portion of the palace, treated Hanabusa and his suite with every mark of cordiality and good-humour, and acted as if he had nothing to do with the late event. He was even such a consummate diplomat that, in serving tea to the mission, he purposely made use of select Japanese porcelain and trays, and gave to each person with his own hands Corean fans made of stork feathers.

As the Corean Government showed symptoms of procrastination, Hanabusa urged once more that the ultimatum was really an ultimatum, the term of three days for the answer being absolutely unalterable. Nevertheless, the Presiding Minister notified on the 22nd that he had to travel in the interior on Government service, so that the negotiations could not be opened for several days more. This decidedly showed that the Corean Government did not really intend to end the matter by direct negotiation. Hanabusa now announced his departure the next day, and sending a note to Ko-jun-boku, ​severely reproached him for his insincerity, and admonished him to consider well the situation before it was too late.

But the news that now reached Seoul made the whole situation clear. Admiral Tei-jo-sho, who had returned to China some days before, again arrived in the Corean port of Nunyo with six ironclads and two transports with six garrisons of picked soldiers under Li-Hung-Chang. On the 23rd, a few hours after the departure of the Japanese mission for Ninsen, the Chinese messenger, Baken-chiu, entered Seoul in the palanquin of the highest Corean official, with the Corean soldiers as forerunners. It was this messenger, no doubt, for which the Corean Government was waiting, or had to wait, before entering into negotiations with Japan. The situation in which the Japanese mission now found itself was an extremely vexatious one, for its retreat to Ninsen looked like a flight before the stronger Chinese. When the secretary of the Japanese Legation left Seoul on the 24th, the Coreans already threw stones at him in contempt.

There is no doubt that the Chinese preparation was meant to threaten Japan in case our demands were exorbitant, but our wise moderation seemed to have induced Baken-chiu to take a different course than he had first intended. On the 24th, while Hanabusa was still staying in Ninsen, Baken-chiu came to him and proposed to mediate between Japan and Corea, assuring him at the same time that he was interfering with the affairs of Corea, not as a dependency of China, but on purely friendly grounds. Hanabusa declined the offer, but Baken-chiu earnestly desired that the former should postpone his departure, as there was definite hope of an amicable solution of the difficulty. On the 25th Hanabusa returned the visit of Baken-chiu in Chemulpo, who returned to Ninsen immediately afterward.

Then followed the most high-handed stroke of policy on the part of the Chinese Government, reminding us of the fate of Alexander, Prince of Bulgaria, four years later. The Chinese officers, Go-cho-kei, Tei-jo-sho, and En-sei-gai, enticed Tai-in-kun into their camp, and, depriving him of his liberty, conveyed him in captivity to Tientsin, and thence to Po-tieng, where he was to be confined for several years! The Chinese now posted up placards in the chief places of Seoul, with inscriptions to the following effect:

Such was the reason given for the kidnapping of Tai-in-kun, but the real ground for it lay in the attempt of Li-Hung-Chang to utilize the contest between the rival factions in Corea for advancing China’s influence over that country. The Queen’s party regained power under protection of the Chinese army, and on the advice of the Chinese officers they showed readiness to negotiate with the Japanese mission.

Hanabusa and his suite were already embarked in the ships, when in the early dawn of the 26th a letter from the Corean presiding Minister was brought to him, which showed sincerity of purpose in wishing to end the matter by peaceful negotiation. Hanabusa agreed to postpone his departure for two days, negotiations were opened in Chemulpo late in the night of the 28th, and the treaty was signed on the 30th of August, 1882.

By this treaty Corea promised to punish within twenty days, and in the presence of Japanese officials, persons guilty of the late attack on the Japanese; and if the Corean Government failed to do so within the stated time, Japan was to have the right of arresting and punishing the guilty herself by sending out her own police to Corea. Corea was to institute a funeral ceremony for the Japanese official personages killed in the disorder. She also promised to pay Japan an indemnity of 500,000 yen in annual instalments of 100,000 yen each (afterwards reduced to 50,000 yen each). Japan obtained the right to station a detachment of soldiers in Corea for the protection of her Legation, but if nothing occurred in the course of a year, and if the Japanese Minister in Corea regarded the presence of such a force no longer necessary, it was to be withdrawn. Corea was to send to Japan a High Commissioner with the King’s letter asking pardon for the late disturbance.

By an additional contract the travelling limit of the Japanese residing in the open ports in Corea was extended to fifty Corean ri immediately, and to 100 ri on the expiration of the second year after the exchange of ratifications. In addition to the ports already opened, Yokwatin was also to be opened for trade with Japan within one year. The Japanese Ministers and Consuls with their families and suites were given the right of travelling in the interior of Corea with passports, and the Corean local Governors were called on to supply them with escorts.

In October, 1882, Corea sent Boku-ei-ko to Japan as High ​Commissioner, with Kin-ban-shoku as associate High Commissioner, and Jo-ko-han as secretary, with letter and presents from her King to the Emperor of Japan, who received them in audience in the palace in Tokyo. At the same time the Corean Minister of Finance Bin-ei-yoku, Kin-giok-kin, and Li-fuk-kwan, also came, and were received by the Emperor in private audience. The intercourse of these men with the high circles of Japan doubtless led to the strengthening of the Japanese party in Corea.

Lord Iwakura, who had been obliged to retire from active politics on account of illness, died in July, 1883. A fortnight later Ito returned from Europe after having studied the constitutional systems of England, Germany, and Austria, and he and Inouye became the centre of political life in Tokyo. The study of German law, politics, and administration now came into vogue, and Inouye began systematically the work of Europeanizing Japan, in order to place her on the same level with Western nations, and thus facilitate the last work of the new Imperial Government, namely, the revision of the treaties with foreign Powers.

On the 7th of July, 1884, were instituted the five classes of nobility, and, besides the nobles of the old Imperial Court and the ex-Daimyos already ennobled in the beginning of the New Era, many new nobles were created among the Samurais who had rendered service to the new Imperial Government. Lord Sanjo and the successor of Lord Iwakura were created Princes, and Ito, Inouye, Yamagata, Soyejima, Okuma, Matsukata, etc., were made Counts (of these Ito and Yamagata were afterwards made Marquises).

As to Corea, many Western Powers followed Japan, and entered into treaty relations with her, such as England, America, France, and Germany in 1883, and Russia in 1884.

Some Japanese politicians, like the ex-Councillor Count Goto and Fukuzawa, founder of Keiwogijiku, a private school of politics and social science, now formed the idea of reforming Corea through the aid of Japan, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Inouye, was not entirely adverse to the idea. A certain sum of money advanced by the Yokohama Specie Bank was put at their disposal for the purpose of founding political newspapers in Seoul, for training Corean soldiers, and the like; and the disciples and agents of Count Goto and Fukuzawa went out to Corea to write the papers or corroborate the schemes of reform.

The Japanese Government appointed Takezoyé, a Chinese ​scholar of some repute, Minister in Corea, to support the reformers.

But the Queen’s party was well on guard, and did not suffer the Japanese party to grow stronger than they could control. The Chief Commissioner to Japan, Boku-yei-ko, received no higher appointment than the Governorship of Seoul, and Kin-giok-kin and Jio-ko-han were only appointed Councillors to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, so that their influence was too small to effect any reform.

On the contrary, the influence of China, having the Queen’s party on their side, was very strong, and the Chinese army still garrisoned in Seoul now numbered 3,000 men, while the Japanese troops guarding the Legation only amounted to 130 men. China supplied Corea with arms, and the Chinese officers, Go-cho-kei, Go-chio-yu, and Yen-sei-gai, virtually dictated measures to the Corean Government under instructions from Li-Hung-Chang, who also advanced to Corea 200,000 rio out of the treasury of the Chinese Navigation Company, and sent the German Mollendorff, and other foreigners, as instructors and advisers to Corea. China obtained from Corea the right of allowing Chinese merchants to establish branches in Seoul, and the 2,000 subjects of the Celestial Empire, crowding into the Corean capital, far outwitted the ingenuity of the handful of Japanese editors and political adventurers. Hence the latter returned disappointed to Japan one after the other, and the cause of Japan in Corea seemed to be lost for a time.

But in 1884 France began an armed conflict with China, and the decrepit old empire seemed to be no match for the vigorous republic of the West. The Japanese party in Corea now saw a good opportunity of striking a decisive blow against the Chinese party, and it is likely that some of the politicians in Japan more or less countenanced this attempt.

The Japanese Minister Takezoyé, who had been in Tokyo for some months, returned to Seoul in October of 1884, and began active intercourse with the persons whom he supposed to belong to the Japanese party. He now freely spoke of the approaching destruction of China and of the opportunity for Corea of declaring her absolute independence. On the 2nd of November the Minister was received in audience by the King of Corea, and, after the usual ceremony was over, in the tête-à-tête conversation with the monarch, he made the formal announcement that his august master, the Emperor of Japan, had decided to present to Corea the 400,000 yen, still remaining to be paid out of the indemnity of 1882, on condition that the King should use it for military reforms. He also explained to the King the state of affairs in the East, ​of the injustice of Chinese intervention in the internal affairs of Corea, of detaining Tai-in-kun, etc., and assured him that the Japanese Government would be very glad to see Corea assert her real independence according to international law in the face of the whole world.

On the 3rd of November the birthday of the Japanese Emperor was celebrated in the Japanese Legation, and in the midst of the gala dinner, to which the Corean Minister of Foreign Affairs, the United States Minister, the British Consul-General, and the principal Coreans belonging to the Japanese party were invited, speeches were made by the Japanese guests against China and in favour of the alliance between Japan and Corea. They even ridiculed the Chinese Consul present, who did not understand the Japanese language.

On the 4th of November Takezoyé presented himself at the Corean Foreign Office, and demanded the treatment of the Japanese in Corea on the footing of the most favoured nation—namely, the Chinese—especially with regard to the opening of shops and firms in Seoul. This was readily granted, and after the official negotiations were over, the Japanese Minister again freely indulged in conversation respecting the hopeless state of China, and the disorganized state of her army and finance.

On the 8th of November a report was brought to the Japanese Legation that for several days the Chinese officer Yen-sei-gai had given orders to his soldiers to be fully armed and ready for immediate action day and night, and that Bin-ei-yoku, one of the chief figures of the Queen’s party, was guarding the Crown Prince with armed men. In the depth of night of the 11th–12th of November the Japanese troops practised firing at the foot of the Southern Hill, and terrified the poor King. On being asked for an explanation, the Japanese Minister replied that the thing was done without his knowledge, but that, according to the Japanese officer commanding the Legation guard, such measures were necessary in order to keep the soldiers alive to their duty in face of the Chinese soldiers kept ready for action day and night. The rumour now became general that Japan was going to fight with China in Corea.

Kin-giok-kin, one of the central figures of the Japanese party, writes in his diary that he was admitted into the King’s presence on the night of the 29th–30th of November, and, as there was nobody else in the room, he explained to the King the state of affairs abroad, and made him see the danger for Corea if Japan should come to fight with China on the Corean question. He told the King how the Japanese hated the ​Chinese on account of the high-handed acts of the latter in Corea, and that if Japan should defeat China in concert with France she would surely annex Corea in order to prevent her becoming the prey of her rival. The Queen, who had been listening to the conversation from behind the door, now presented herself, and earnestly inquired of Kin-giok-kin what was to be done in order to avoid this unhappy outcome. Remembering that the Queen was a member of the Bin family, Kin-giok-kin only muttered that he deserved the sentence of death for having spoken to his Master and Lord in such an unceremonious manner. The Queen, who was no ordinary woman, now said to Kin-giok-kin: ‘You doubt me, Kin-giok-kin, but when it concerns the fate of Corea, why should I, one woman, stand in the way of avoiding national calamity? You had better speak out freely what you think.’ The King also assured Kin-giok-kin that he believed in the absolute loyalty of the latter, and, swearing that he would abide by whatever advice Kin-giok-kin had to offer, earnestly entreated him to do something for the country. Hereupon Kin-giok-kin disclosed to the royal pair what seemed to him the only possible way open under the circumstances, and obtained from the King a secret order, written, signed, and sealed by the King himself, to carry out the plan. That Kin-giok-kin was not lying when he wrote this diary subsequent events will show.

The plot conceived by the Japanese party was as follows: As all the principal personages of the Chinese party were officers of the guard, and were by duty bound to assume certain posts or appear in the Court whenever a fire broke out in the capital, a detached building of the Palace was to be burnt on a certain day, in order to give the assassins easier work to do; and as there was a fear of their perceiving the plot and concealing themselves, a festive occasion was to be chosen, when all the principal personages had to present themselves.

On the 4th of December, 1884, the first post-office was opened in Seoul under the direction of a Japanese ex-postmaster, and a dinner was given by the Corean Government, to which were invited the Diplomatic Corps and all the magnates of Corea. The feast was hardly over when fire broke out in a neighbouring building, and, in the tumult which ensued, Bin-ei-yoku was severely wounded by Coreans disguised as Japanese. Boku-ei-ko, Kin-giok-kin, and the rest of the Japanese party immediately went to the royal presence, and told the King that, as the Chinese soldiers were ravaging the city and threatening the palace, the only help was to be sought from the Japanese Minister and his soldiers. ​The King understood what it meant, drew up with his own hands a hasty note, stamped it with the seal of State, and sent it to Takezoyé asking for immediate aid. When Takezoyé arrived the whole Royal Family was assembled in Keiyu Palace, and the King came out to meet him in person. The Japanese and the Corean soldiers were stationed at the principal posts, and commanded by the Japanese officer, Captain Murakami. Within a few hours the assassins did their work, and killed six or seven principal Ministers of the Chinese party. The Chinese soldiers were stationed in a village at some distance from the capital, and care was taken that nobody should communicate to them what was taking place in the city till all was over.

Early the next morning the King issued orders abolishing all the old Government offices and creating new ones. Li-tai-gen the King’s nephew, was made Presiding Minister; Boku-ei-ko, Commander of the Guards; Jo ko-han, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs; Kin-giok-kin, Vice-Minister of Finance, and so on. But as the Japanese party was from the beginning not numerous, it strengthened itself by giving offices to the near relatives of the King, Queen, or Tai-in-kun, who had something to complain of in the late Bin Government.

At ten o’clock in the morning the United States Minister, Foote, and the British Consul-General, Aston, were received by the King, who was unusually amiable, and freely conversed with them on the necessity of a coup d’état for all nations undertaking a thoroughgoing reform. Pointing to Takezoyé, who was always at his side, he told them that the Japanese Minister, for instance, had personally experienced many such events in his life, and asked if England and America had not fared the same. The United States Minister was of the same opinion as the King. In the afternoon the German Consul-General also came, and, though they all took leave after three o’clock, Takezoyé was still entreated by the King to remain with him.

Several measures of fundamental reform were now passed, such as the declaration of real as well as nominal independence from China, equality of political rights between the nobles and the common people, abolition of Court officers—whose intrigues always stood in the way of good national government—fiscal reform, and the concentration of all financial affairs in the hands of the Financial Minister, etc.

Boku-ei-ko now proposed to remove with the whole Royal Family to Kokwa Harbour, and there wait for Japanese reinforcements, since the 3,000 Chinese soldiers would not be long inactive, and the 2,000 Corean soldiers were not to be trusted. Already Kin-in-shoku, to whom the post of the Minister of ​the Royal Household had been offered, had refused the offer, and gone over to the Chinese side. But the Queen wished to return to the main palace, and Takezoyé also disapproved of Boku-ei-ko’s idea, and so the Royal Family now re-entered the usual residence in the evening of the day following the coup d’état.

The next day, the 6th of December, 1884, an apparent calm reigned over the whole of Corea, and the New Era seemed to have commenced gloriously. Takezoyé now asked for leave to retire with the Japanese soldiers, but the King entreated him to remain longer. The Cabinet Ministers were assembled in the royal presence, and discussing the Great Decree which was to be issued to mark the beginning of the Reformed Government, when, at about three o’clock in the afternoon, a sudden bursting noise was heard close at hand. The Chinese commanders, Go-chio-yu and En-sei-gai, had asked to be received by the King in person several times since the morning, but being refused as often, now fired a volley against the Corean and Japanese soldiers, and forced their way through the Senin Gate. The second and third volleys were also fired, and the bullets reached the royal presence. Captain Murakami now ordered the Japanese soldiers to return the fire, which they did with great precision, and killed eighty Chinese on the spot. The Corean soldiers either fled or went over to the Chinese ranks. The whole interior of the Palace now presented scenes of indescribable confusion, and as the poor King fled from one corner to the other for safety, Takezoyé had to hunt him out with great difficulty. Unfortunately, the King’s mother, to whom the son had always shown the utmost devotion, fell into the Chinese hands, and the King now insisted on going over to her side, happen what might. He would no longer listen to Takezoyé’s remonstrance that he should not show his person in positions so close to the Chinese and Corean soldiers; and as these latter would not cease firing so long as there were Japanese soldiers around the King, Takezoyé now resolved to retire with all his men out of sheer necessity of saving the King from the greatest of disasters. Takezoyé and his suite, and the Coreans—Boku-ei-ko, Kin-giok-kin, Jo-ko-han, etc.—now assembled the 130 Japanese soldiers around them, and made their way to the Legation, which they found well defended by the Japanese that had fled into it. But the want of food soon compelled the inmates to give it up to the fire of the Coreans, and retire to Ninsen. From here Takezoyé reported the whole incident to Japan.

In Seoul on the next day the remnants of the Chinese party came out of their concealment, restored the old form of government, and killed or gave poison to all the remaining partisans ​of the ‘Kin’ and ‘Boku’ rebels, as the Japanese party was now called, from the first characters of the names of its leaders; and, according to the Corean law, all the innocent relatives of the accused were punished with death, including many women and children. The King himself issued the orders of persecution and punishment.

The news of the trouble reached Japan on the 13th of December, 1884, and the anger of the people, especially of the military class, was great. The opinion of the Cabinet Ministers was again divided between peace and war, and offers came from the French side to act in combination, if Japan were to declare war against China. Was it, however, with China or with Corea that we had to regulate the question? It was the King of Corea who had asked for protection, and it was the Chinese soldiers who had fired on the King and the Japanese soldiers protecting him; but the King afterwards went over to the Chinese side, and allowed the Japanese Legation to be burnt, and the Japanese subjects remaining in Corea to be massacred—against his will it may be, but surely in his name. Hence we had to square our accounts with both.

Our Government decided to send Count Inouye as Special Ambassador to Corea on the 22nd of December. The Chinese Minister in Tokyo notified our Foreign Office that his Government was sending Go-dai-cho as Commissioner to Corea; and Viscount Admiral Enomoto, our Minister to the Court of Peking, was instructed to ask the Tsung-li-Yamen to give full powers to the Commissioner, in order that, once arrived in Seoul, the latter might enter into negotiations with the Japanese Mission there, together with the Corean Government. The Peking Government, however, refused to consent, on the pretext that the Commissioner was being sent out merely for the purpose of ‘punishing the rebels.’

Count Inouye arrived in Seoul on the 3rd of January, 1885, accompanied by the Minister, Takezoyé, Lieutenant-General Takashima and Rear-Admiral Kabayama, with a certain number of land and sea forces. As the Chinese Commissioner had already arrived with his soldiers, the Japanese troops had to be posted outside the city in order to avoid collision. Go-dai-cho now caused placards to be put up in the principal places in Seoul to the effect that the criminal attempts of the rebellious subjects, Kin-giok-kin, Boku-ei-ko, and his party had incurred the just anger of the Chinese Emperor, who, ‘out of anxiety for his eastern vassal State, now sends his officer with the grand army for protecting the King,’ etc.

The audience took place as usual, and on the 8th Count Inouye opened negotiations with Kin-ko-shin, the Corean Plenipotentiary and Minister of Foreign Affairs, when a strange ​scene occurred. As the Japanese demand for satisfaction was very modest, the Corean Minister was inclined to accept all, when suddenly the Chinese Commissioner, Go-dai-cho, introduced himself into the chamber of negotiations without notice or invitation, and wanted to know the substance of what was being negotiated. Count Inouye refused to do anything with him, and then Go-dai-cho, taking a piece of paper, wrote the following words and gave it to the Count:

On another piece of paper he wrote down some threatening words, and, giving it to the Corean Minister, silently walked away.

On the next day was signed the Treaty of Seoul, by which Corea accepted five things, namely: (1) To send a special Mission to Japan to express regret for the late event; (2) to pay 110,000 yen as indemnity for the Japanese killed or wounded in Corea, as well as for the properties of the Japanese subjects destroyed; (3) to punish severely those guilty of the murder of Captain Isobayashi, who had been in the interior when the disturbance occurred; (4) to offer ground and pay 20,000 yen for the rebuilding of the Japanese Legation; (5) to rebuild a barracks for the Japanese soldiers at the expense of the Corean Government. As no provision was made for obtaining amnesty for the political crimes of the Japanese party, and as the indemnity was also much less than the sum obtained in 1882, the treaty caused some dissatisfaction in Japan; but it must be remembered that the chief care of Count Inouye was fixed upon quite another point—namely, that of obtaining official recognition from the Corean Government that the Japanese Minister, Takezoyé, was not implicated in the crime committed on the 4th of December.

Corea sent Jo-so-u and Mollendorff to Japan, as stipulated in the treaty, and also decapitated the murderers of Captain Isobayashi in the presence of the members of our Legation. Thus the account with Corea was settled, but there still remained the most delicate portion of the affair, namely, the necessity of making China responsible for the conduct of her soldiers in Corea, which was tantamount to making her disavow her claim to suzerainty. This difficult task was confided to Count Ito, lately returned from Europe, and actually filling the post of the Councillor and Minister of the Imperial Household. He was appointed Ambassador on a special mission to China in February, 1885, and the Councillor Count Yorimichi Saigo accompanied him.

​On arriving in Tientsin, Count Ito was officially informed that Li-Hung-Chang was appointed Plenipotentiary to deal with the Corean affair, so that there was no need of the Ambassadors proceeding to Peking. Here, however, Count Ito had to choose between two courses, both of which found warm advocates among his suite, containing such able men as Ki Inouye and Miyoji Ito. As China was just at this moment suffering under great pressure from France, our Mission could take advantage of the situation and bring matters to a hasty close by threatening her; or, by pursuing an entirely opposite course, he could sympathize with her misfortunes, convince her of Japan’s sincerity towards China by not taking advantage of her distress, and make her concede Japan’s demands through the moral persuasion that it was for her interest not to sacrifice the friendship of such a nation as Japan, understanding the true idea of Eastern morality. For placing the relations between Japan and China as regards Corea on a firm, endurable basis, the latter course seemed much more preferable, and for the purpose of convincing the Chinese that we did not intend to take advantage of the action of France, Count Ito showed them that he was in no hurry, but willing to wait till China’s hands should be free. So he decided to go to Peking merely for the purpose of presenting credentials and attending the funeral ceremony of Sir Harry Parkes, an old friend of the Count, lately deceased in Peking. He left Tientsin on the 17th of March, and arrived in Peking on the 21st. Although there was no audience on account of the youthfulness of the Emperor, yet there was a grand reception of the Ambassador by the Yamen Ministers on the 27th, and the funeral of the English Minister took place on the 30th. The Mission returned to Tientsin on the 2nd of April, and the negotiations were opened from the following day.

On this occasion Count Ito is said to have substantiated his demands by the following argument: The claims of China over Corea were historical only—i.e., as the history of China reckons Corea among her tributaries, and as China had the greatest repugnance of changing the face of history as the worthy legacy of ancestral emperors, so she was intent on claiming Corea as her vassal state. The claims of Japan over Corea were economical—i.e., she did not claim any legal authority over Corea, but, from her geographical position and the necessity of providing for her constantly increasing population, she was intent on utilizing Corea as the best source from which the defect in the home produce of rice was to be supplied, as well as the nearest field in which the future sons of Japan might find employment. For this purpose Japan would have Corea always independent and under no foreign influence; but within ​late years China was sending military and political agents to Corea, and interfering with the Corean international affairs, as if she intended to make good her claims over Corea, long since become purely historical. This state of things had to be rectified, for Japan would never consent to Corea’s becoming in reality a part of the Chinese Empire. Why should China, he argued, with an immense territory, covet a far distant country such as Corea at the danger of disturbing the friendship between the brother empires of the Far East? He also reminded Li-Hung-Chang of the fact that while China was still an absolute monarchy, conducting its foreign affairs as its Ministers thought fit, Japan was on the eve of adopting a constitutional form of government, with due regard to the voice of the people. This, if disregarded beyond a certain degree, would surely bring on a Cabinet crisis, and result in the appointment of politicians of the more marked forward policy. Li-Hung-Chang expressed his agreement with the general line of Count Ito’s argument, and even consented to withdraw the forces from Corea, if Japan would do the same, but as regards the action of the Chinese soldiery in Seoul on the 4th of December, 1884, he held views quite different from those held by the Count. Li-Hung-Chang thought that the Japanese Minister, Takezoyé, was guilty of having instigated the Corean rebels, and that the affair was already closed by the Treaty of Seoul between Japan and Corea, signed on the 9th of January, 1885. Two days after the opening of the negotiations the conflict between China and France was brought to a happy close, which, though not glorious to China, because she had to abandon her historical claim to suzerainty over Annam, yet was, in fact, a success for China, because, after twelve months of armed conflict, France could obtain no material advantage over China. China now wished to reserve to herself the right of sending military forces to Corea whenever necessary, and Count Ito consented to this on the condition of Japan’s preserving the same right. Both Japan and China accepted the obligation of each informing the other before sending troops to Corea whenever such a necessity should present itself in the future. The question of the instruction of the Corean army was also settled, it being decided that Japan and China should conjointly advise Corea to provide for her internal safety by training her own troops and employing foreign subjects other than Japanese or Chinese as instructors. As to the action of the Chinese soldiery in Seoul, the affair was to be wound up by Li-Hung-Chang addressing the following letter to Count Ito:

Thus, after six sittings, the negotiations were brought to a close, and the so-called Treaty of Tientsin was signed on the 18th of April, 1885. By it China could not be brought to recognise the independence of Corea, but so much was gained for Japan that, with regard to Corea, China recognised Japan to be on the same footing as herself. Thus a step was gained towards the solution of the Corean problem. Subsequently China found the treaty inconvenient to herself, and made some futile attempts to annul it, but it remained in force till the war of 1894–95, of which it was really the cause.

The Treaty of Tientsin did not alter the relations between China and Corea. Go-dai-cho and the Chinese soldiers were recalled, but En-sei-gai was again sent as Chinese Resident, and interfered in all the important affairs of State. The German, Mollendorff, and after him an American named Denny, continued to act as adviser under instructions from Li-Hung-Chang. When Russia tried to open inland trade with Corea along the river Tiumen, it was Li-Hung-Chang who persuaded Corea not to consent. Corea appointed Boku-tei-yo Minister to Washington, but En-sei-gai objected to the measure on the ground that for all such matters authorization had to be obtained from China as suzerain. Li-Hung-Chang instructed En-sei-gai to propose the following conditions: (1) On arriving at his post the Corean Minister should first of all pay a visit to the Chinese Minister, and ask the latter to accompany him to the State Department. (2) On all public occasions, State ceremonies, and private dinner-parties, the Corean Minister should always sit below the Chinese Minister. (3) Whenever an international affair of any significance occurred, the Corean Minister should ask the advice of the Chinese Minister, and act in concert with the latter. Corea objected, but En-sei-gai threatened her with immediate action, and she yielded to superior force.

​The question of telegraphic connection brought Japan into direct antagonism with China in Corea. Since March, 1883, there had existed a secret treaty between Japan and Corea concerning the submarine cable between Nagasaki and Fusan, according to which the Corean Government was for twenty years bound to employ this line and no other for all telegraphic communications between Seoul and abroad, and not to sanction the establishment of direct communication by land with neighbouring countries. The cable was completed the following year by means of a special arrangement between the Japanese Government and the Shanghai branch office of the Great Northern Telegraph Company. But in July, 1885, En-sei-gai succeeded in inducing the Corean Government to sign a treaty which gave China right to extend her Shanghai-Tientsin line through Gishin (Wiju, in the North of Corea) to Seoul, and control it for twenty-five years. As there existed no telegraph line between Seoul and Fusan at that time, all telegraphic communications with the foreign countries came to be made by this new Chinese line, in violation of the secret treaty with Japan. Japan, of course, remonstrated with Corea, but her reply was that she never allowed China to connect the Chinese line with Seoul, but only agreed to her connecting it with an insignificant village on the other side of a rivulet flowing outside the limits of Seoul. What a subtlety! Japan now demanded from Corea permission to establish the Seoul-Fusan line, in order at least to bring the Fusan-Nagasaki cable into direct connection with Seoul; but Corea refused this, and, on the pretext of building the line herself, gave the right to China, who completed the line and worked it under Chinese control from 1888 (till the right was transferred to Japan during the war of 1894–1895).

In 1889 the so-called anti-corn affair embittered the feeling between Japan and Corea still more. The Governors of the two Corean provinces adjacent to China suddenly prohibited the export of rice, and caused great loss to the Japanese rice importers. As this was in distinct violation of the Ninth Article of the Treaty of Kokwa, 1876, the Japanese Government remonstrated with the Corean Minister of Foreign Affairs, but without success, for five years, during which several of the rice importers were ruined. In 1893 the Japanese Government made Oishi, one of the young politicians of the popular party, Minister in Seoul, and gave him a free hand to deal with the Corean Government as best he might. Oishi threatened them with breaking off of relations, and succeeded in obtaining an indemnity of 110,000 yen out of the 140,000 demanded. All through the years of tension China was believed to be backing Corea, for the prohibition of the export of rice is a ​well-known Chinese system, which in her own case is founded upon treaty rights.

The affair of the Corean political criminals in Japan, arising as an immediate consequence of the affair of 1884, and continuing down to the very eve of the great war, hopelessly entangled the relations between Japan on one side and China and Corea on the other. On the failure of the coup d’état of December, 1884, the chiefs of the Japan party, Kin-giok-kin, Boku-ei-ko, Jo-ko-han, etc., had fled to Japan, and from there they went to the United States, with the exception of Kin-giok-kin, who lived in Tokyo under the assumed name of Imata Shinsaku. The Corean Government sent Mollendorff and Jo-so-un to Tokyo to ask for the extradition of Kin-giok-kin, but the demand was refused on the double ground of there being no treaty of extradition between Japan and Corea, and of Kin-giok-kin being a political criminal. To the Coreans, however, furthest removed from any idea of international law, this refusal seemed to mean that Japan harboured secret plans against Corea. Several would-be assassins now offered their services to the Corean Government, chiefly for pecuniary ends. One of them, named Chi-un-ei, came to Tokyo in February of 1886, and fell into the snares set by the crafty Corean students under the patronage of Kin-giok-kin. He showed to the students a letter patent from the King of Corea giving him full powers ‘to go beyond the sea and capture or deal with the rebel as convenience required.’ In his possession was also found a letter which proved that Li-Hung-Chang and En-sei-gai had also been consulted in connection with Chi-un-ei’s mission. Chi-un-ei offered 5,000 yen to any of the students who succeeded in assassinating Kin-giok-kin. In order to avoid complications, the Japanese Government ordered Kin-giok-kin to quit the soil of Japan without delay, and at the same time telegraphed to Seoul demanding of the Corean Government whether it had really given such full powers to Chi-un-ei. The Corean Government disavowed this, and asked the Japanese Government to send back Chi-un-ei under escort, which was done. Kin-giok-kin wanted to go to America, but, as he was not in possession of sufficient means to do so, was ordered to retire to Ogasawara Island, which orders he refused to obey, and was in consequence dragged out of his lodging and sent thither by force. As his health required a cooler temperature, he was afterwards removed to Hokkaido, where he remained for two years under police superintendence, till, in 1890, owing to comparative calm in Corea, he was permitted to return to Tokyo. Meanwhile, Boku-ei-ko had also returned from America, and the presence of these two so-called ​arch-conspirators in Tokyo again disquieted the Corean Government, who now sent a more discreet assassin in the person of Ri-itsu-shoku. He came to Japan in 1892, and entered by some means or other into the closest intimacy with Kin-giok-kin, who imparted to his false friend all his secrets. Ri-itsu-shoku won over as his accomplice Ko-sho-u, a young Corean lately returned from France, whose name will never be forgotten in the dark history of assassinations. Ri-itsu-shoku made Kin-giok-kin believe that Li-Hung-Chang was tired of the Bin Government in Corea, and wished to enter into personal relations with Kin-giok-kin in order to carry out in Seoul a plan suited to bring back the Japanese party to power. He presented Kin-giok-kin with a false cheque for 5,000 yen drawn by Li-Hung-Chang on a Chinese bank in Shanghai, and told the latter that Ko-sho-u and an attaché of the Chinese Legation in Tokyo would accompany him to the Chinese port, whence the party might find passage to Tientsin. Kin-giok-kin was foolish enough to believe all this, despite the warning given him by some of his Japanese friends, and was shot by Ko-sho-u while resting in a Japanese hotel in Shanghai on the 28th of April, 1894. Ko-sho-u was captured by the Chinese police, and Li-Hung-Chang ordered him to be sent to Corea under escort, together with the corpse of Kin-giok-kin, which, arriving in Corea, was cut into six pieces (head, body, and limbs), and exposed for three days in each of the eight provinces of the realm. As for Ko-sho-u, he was set free by the Corean Government, despite the representations made to the Tsung-li-Yamen by the foreign Consuls in Shanghai through their Ministers in Peking, and to the Corean Government by our Minister in Seoul.

Meanwhile, Ri-itsu-shoku remained in Tokyo in order to assassinate Boku-ei-ko, but was not so fortunate as Ko-sho-u. He was betrayed by two of his accomplices, who went over to Boku-ei-ko, invited Ri-itsu-shoku to the boarding-house of the Corean students in Tokyo, and, tying him up with ropes and threatening him with fire and sword, compelled him to disclose all the details of the secret mission. His papers were seized, and among them were found as many as two letters patent from the King of Corea. Of course, illegal arrest and torture were punishable by Japanese law, and the Corean students were sentenced by our district court to several months’ imprisonment. Ri-itsu-shoku was also tried, and acquitted for want of evidence.

Since March, 1894, several provinces of Corea had been in a disturbed condition. The so-called To-gaku-to (Tonghaks—party of Oriental learning) were driven to despair by the ​oppression of the local Governors, who had obtained their appointments by giving high bribes, and intended to pay themselves back by squeezing every penny out of the pockets of the people they governed. These discontented people were anti-foreign, because in their eyes the vices of Corean officialism were due to the corruption of good morals by contact with the foreigners—i.e., Japanese most of all. They formed themselves into bands with the following reactionary motto. ‘Reorganize society on the principle of Confucian virtue. Restore the right way by driving out the Japanese barbarians. Enter Seoul with armed force and exterminate the nobles and the officials. Re-establish moral order according to the teachings of the Chinese sage.’ Towards the end of May an army of several hundred men sent out by the Central Government suffered ignominious defeat, and the enraged populace now marched against defenceless Seoul from all directions. The terror-stricken Government of the Bin party asked China for aid, and Li-Hung-Chang despatched an army of 1,600 men under Sho-shi-sho, and two men-of-war commanded by Admiral Tei-jo-sho (Ting). In fulfilment of the Treaty of Tientsin the Chinese Government notified the matter to our Government on the 7th of June, 1894, but in the note produced by the Chinese Minister in Tokyo Corea was called the ‘protectorate’ of China in one place, and her ‘dependency’ in another. The Japanese Government at once retorted that they had never recognised China’s claim to ‘protection’ or ‘suzerainty’ over Corea, and, mobilizing the 6th Division, hastily sent out a mixed brigade under General Oshima to Corea. The Japanese army entered Seoul while the Chinese army was still in the province, and the Japanese Minister Otosi forced the King of Corea to ask the aid of Japan in driving out the Chinese army threatening her independence, and thus was begun the war between Japan and China, the course of which need not be retold here.

By the Peace of Shimonoseki, China formally recognised the independence of Corea, and thus the question of Corea was at last solved.

After the war, Russia, France, and Germany objected to Japan’s annexing the Liao-tong peninsula on the ground that such annexation was dangerous to the peace of the Extreme Orient. The Emperor of Japan listened to the seemingly well-intentioned advice of the three Powers, and retroceded the Peninsula sans condition. But why, it may be asked, did not the Japanese diplomats obtain from the intervening Powers assurance that they, too, would never attempt to annex the peninsula under any form or pretext whatever? The case was as follows: The intervention of the three Powers began ​in Tokyo with diplomatic notes sent by their Ministers to the Foreign Office on the 23rd of April, 1895—i.e., a week after the signing of the Peace of Shimonoseki. Russia had already been sending out powerful battleships to the Far Eastern waters since the end of March, 1895, and France and Germany joined her in the demonstration. The Japanese Government now considered it necessary to ascertain two things before taking a decisive step: first, whether Russia really meant to fight with Japan, and secondly, to what extent was aid from the side of England to be relied upon. Hence, in order to gain time, Count Mutsu instructed the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg to see the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and make representation to the effect that the Japanese Government wished the Russian Government to reconsider the question. This was a fatal step, for Russia refused to change her views, and went on increasing her armaments and that of her allies in the East to the point that it was now too late to bring up the fresh demand for assurance that the Powers, too, would not annex Liao-tong in the future. At the same time it became clear that nothing could be expected from England beyond benevolent neutrality. Thus an important chance was let slip.

We now arrive at the last of the great diplomatic problems of the New Imperial Government which baffled the attempts of many a statesman. The extraterritorial jurisdiction which the foreigners in Japan had enjoyed had to be done away with, the disadvantageous tariff rates annexed to the treaties had to be revised, and the application of the most favoured nation clause had to be made reciprocal and not one-sided, as under the old treaties. The 4th of July, 1872, being the date after which Japan could demand the revision of the treaties signed by the Tokugawa Government, the Imperial Government had revised the penal code, and abolished the system of torture in 1871, and sent out the Iwakura Mission for the sake of exchanging ideas with foreign Governments regarding treaty revision. In the project of the revision then adopted by the Japanese Government, the abolition of extra-territorial jurisdiction was made the principal point. The circumstances under which the negotiations were opened in the United States, and the way in which they came to an end, have been already told above. This was the first attempt at revision.

In the absence of Lord Iwakura, Count Soyejima, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was also working for the revision by conferring with the foreign Ministers in Tokyo. His idea was to allow the foreigners to live in the interior of Japan instead of ​shutting them up within the concession grounds (settlements), for the double purpose of disseminating the civilizing influence among our people, and of making the Western Powers agree to the treaty revision. To the question why he regarded the present treaties as unfair, he replied that in order to make them fair England ought to give to Japan the same rights and privileges she had already given or would give to France; France the same rights and privileges she had already given or would give to Germany, etc. That is, he laid the greatest stress on the unfairness of Japan’s being obliged to treat the Western nations on the basis of the most favoured nation clause, while Japan received no corresponding treatment from the Western Powers. The foreign Ministers in Tokyo agreed to the necessity of revision on principle, and the Italian Minister even went so far as to agree to submitting the Italians in Japan to the Japanese laws on the condition of their being allowed to reside in the interior. But the Ministers of the other Powers objected to the advances of their Italian colleague, and the mission of Count Soyejima in China, and the fall of the Cabinet soon after his return, prevented him from accomplishing his object.

The second systematic attempt at treaty revision was made by Count Terajima, Minister of Foreign Affairs, immediately after the civil war of 1877. As it was then clear taht until the laws and the system of administration of justice in Japan had been reformed on the European model nothing could be effected by way of the recovery of judicial rights, so Count Terajima made the establishment of tariff autonomy the principal point of his revision. He developed his ideas as follows:

The United States readily agreed to Count Terajima’s proposal, and the new treaty, signed in Washington, was published here on the 25th of July, 1878, but it was not to come into force until Japan had concluded similar treaties with the other Powers, or greatly modified the existing ones. As tariff reform affected England the most, so the British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, strongly opposed the revision, and the efforts of Count Terajima seemed doomed to failure, when an unlucky incident put an abrupt end to this affair. In 1878 an Englishman named Hartley secretly imported opium in violation of the treaty, but Japan had no jurisdiction over foreigners, so the case was brought before the British Consul, who acquitted the prisoner on some ground or other. This greatly enraged the Japanese public, who now deemed the measures of Count Terajima as insufficient, and cried for tariff and judicial reforms at the same time. Count Terajima tendered his resignation, which was accepted.

The next Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Inouye, also ardently worked for the revision in concert with the Councillor Count Okuma. The new penal code and the law of criminal procedure compiled by the French jurist, M. de Boissonade, and voted by the Senate, the only existing legislative body at the time, was promulgated in July 1880, and seemed to pave the way for their success. The plan of Counts Inouye and Okuma was to recover both tariff autonomy and judicial independence, not at once, but by degrees, by negotiating with the Powers, not separately as did Count Terajima, but conjointly in the form of a diplomatic conference to be held at the Foreign Office in Tokyo. The main treaty was drawn up on the basis of perfect equality, but to it were attached a memorandum restricting jurisdiction over foreigners for a certain number of years, and separate articles on commerce and navigation by which the tariff rates were greatly revised to our advantage, but autonomy was far from being realized. The negotiations were conducted under great secrecy, but the drafts were published by the Yokohama Herald, through the indiscretion of the Dutch Minister, and the discontent of the public opinion at such a partial measure soon became very loud. The Dutch Minister was recalled, and the negotiations were dropped. Thus ended the third attempt at treaty revision in 1880.

Count Okuma, having become the leader of the first political ​party in Japan in 1881, Count Inouye became the sole exponent of the revision movement in the Government. His principle was to reform not only the laws and institutions of Japan, but also to Europeanize entirely the manners and customs of the Japanese, in order to make the foreign Powers see the anachronism of the existing treaties. Already in 1882 he invited the foreign Ministers in Tokyo to a preliminary conference for treaty revision, and discussed with them the projects of laws on the privileges of Consuls in Japan, the administration of justice, the lease of land, the reforms of administrative organs, the treatment of the Christian religion in Japan, trade regulations, harbour regulations, and regulations for cabotage, lighthouses, ships, shipwrecks, and even neutrality. But the Corean affairs of 1882 and 1884 and the consequent trouble with China prevented him from resuming the work of the revision itself, until, in 1885, his great friend and fellow-clansman, the present Marquis Ito, became the Minister President of the reorganized Imperial Cabinet.^[7]

A more united action being now possible, the plan of Europeanization was carried out on a grand scale. Rokumeikwan was built at the Government expense for social gatherings in European style, the adoption of foreign dresses and coiffure by the ladies was officially encouraged, and, amidst a whirl of soirées, garden-parties, balls, and even fancy balls, the formal conference for the revision of treaties was opened on the 1st of May, 1886. The Ministers of twelve Powers took part in it. After seven sittings it was adjourned, in order to give time to the foreign Ministers to obtain instructions from their Governments, and was resumed on the 20th of October. In the meanwhile a board for the codification of civil and commercial laws, and the law of civil precedence, was established, not in the judicial department, as it ought to have been, but in the Foreign Office, under the presidency of Count Inouye himself. The present Marquis General Yamagata (now Marshal), was entrusted with the reorganization of the system of local government, for which he travelled to Europe, and became the founder of the present system of communal self-government, based on the Prussian model.

In April, 1887, the substance of the revised treaty was agreed upon as follows:

The revision itself was perhaps the best obtainable at the time, but the conditions under which it was obtained, namely, the Europeanization of Japan, disgusted a certain class of men both in and out of the Government. When the draft of the revised treaty was submitted to a Cabinet Council in May, a unanimous consent could not be obtained. The late Count Katsu, who had formerly been a member of the Tokugawa Government, and to whose rare statesmanship and personal influence was due the peaceful transition of power from the Shogun to the New Imperial Government, presented memoranda to the Cabinet enumerating ‘twenty-one faults of the time’ emanating from an attempt to imitate the externals of Western civilization. Later it was a member of the Cabinet itself, General Tani, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, lately returned from Europe, who pointed out seven defects in the draft of the revised treaty, and resigned his office. M. de Boissonade, the French jurist who was engaged in compiling our ​codes, himself objected to the system of employing foreign judges in Japanese courts. The writings of these last two personages were secretly printed by a set of patriotic students and became freely circulated amongst the amateur politicians of Tokyo. Hence the creation of many new associations for opposing treaty revision in its present form, and the almost daily demonstrations in the city and the provinces.

A minor incident also added to the unpopularity of Count Inouye’s foreign policy. In October, 1886, an English steamer, the Normanton, was wrecked off the coast of Kisnin, and all on board were saved, except over forty Japanese cabin-passengers, every one of whom went down with the ship. Seeing that even a Chinese servant could be saved, the unfairness of the captain was apparent, and as public opinion loudly called for retribution, our Government indicted the captain before the British Consular Court, but after a protracted trial he did not receive the just punishment he deserved in the eyes of the Japanese people.

After twenty-nine sittings, on the 29th of July, 1887, Count Inouye was obliged to announce the adjournment of the conference sine die, on the ground that the codification of the civil and commercial laws had to be completed before proceeding to treaty revision. Count Inouye himself resigned his office, which he had held for eight years, and the fourth attempt at revision came to an end.

The Minister President, Marquis Ito, gave the portfolio of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Count Okuma on the 1st of February, 1888, and the latter at once devoted his whole energy to the work of treaty revision, leaving the routine of his department to the care of the Vice-Minister, Viscount Aoki. His policy was diametrically opposed to that of his predecessor, for he caused the existing treaties to be interpreted with great strictness and withdrew all such favours and benefits hitherto bestowed on foreigners in Japan as were not expressly stipulated therein, in order to make the foreign Governments themselves feel the necessity of revision. Among other things, he caused the most favoured nation clause to be interpreted conditionally, with the object of liberating Japan from the necessity of revising the treaties with all the Powers simultaneously.

First of all a treaty of amity and friendship was signed between Japan and Mexico on the 30th of November, 1888, and was the first treaty on the footing of perfect equality ever signed by the Japanese Government. The Japanese in Mexico and the Mexicans in Japan were allowed to travel, sojourn, or dwell in any part of the interior of the respective countries, with the sole incapacity that they were not allowed to own ​immovable property. The tariff was autonomous, but not to exceed or to be different from those levied on the imports of other nations. The extraterritorial jurisdiction found no trace in it. The most favoured nation treatment was, of course, reciprocal, and at the same time conditional—i.e., the right or benefit granted to A was to be granted to B, C, D, etc., without recompense if the original grant was made without recompense, but with the same or equivalent recompense if the original grant was made in exchange for some other right or benefit.

At the same time negotiations were carried on with the United States, whose Minister in Tokyo asked instructions of the home Government by telegram towards the close of the year 1888, and obtained an answer within forty-eight hours that he was to accept the treaty as proposed by Japan. England, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Austro-Hungary were also invited to consider revision.

In the meanwhile an event of the greatest moment occurred in Japan, which gave to the affair of treaty revision quite a new aspect. Previous to this, on the 30th of April, 1888, Marquis Ito resigned his premiership in favour of Count Kuroda, and himself becoming the President of the newly-created Privy Council, submitted the draft of the constitutional laws compiled under his direction to the deliberation of that august body, consisting of all the male members of the Imperial Family, the acting Ministers of State, and special Councillors, among whom figured all the greatest personages of the new epoch, like Prince Sanjo, Counts Higashikujé, Soyejima, Terajima, Ōki, Sano, Katsu, Torio, Toshu, Viscounts Enomoto, Nomura, Hijikata. The Emperor attended in person almost all the sittings of the Council, and the Imperial Constitution and its accompanying laws and ordinances being now complete, they were promulgated on the 11th of February, 1889. Japan was henceforth to be a constitutional State, and as becomes a constitutional State, she was to enjoy the unrestricted right of independence in her foreign relations, so that the treaty revision now acquired a new meaning and a new urgency.

In Germany negotiations were carried on between our Minister, Marquis Saionji, and Count Herbert Bismarck, and the telegram received by our Government on the 11th of June, 1889, announced that the treaty was signed. This was considered a great success on the part of Count Okuma. Russia also consented to the revision. The Ministers of Spain, Portugal, Holland, and other minor Powers were now invited to obtain full powers from their Governments concerning treaty revision.

​But again an unexpected hindrance occurred. A correspondent of the London Times reported from here on the 11th of March, 1889, the substance of the new treaty, which appeared in the number of the 19th of April, and was distributed amongst its Japanese readers about this time. It was as follows:^[8]

As soon as the secret was thus divulged, great opposition again rose against the new form of revision, both in and out of the Government.^[9] The majority of the Genro-in (old Senate) and of the Privy Council were opposed to it, and especially weighty was the opposition of Marquis Ito and Count Inouye, the former because he thought the employment of foreign judges in the Supreme Court not in conformity with the spirit of the new Constitution, and the latter because the very same arrangement was the cause by which his own project of revision had been frustrated two years ago. In the Cabinet Council held ​on the 2nd of August, it was decided that the ‘foreign judges’ in the project of the revised treaty should be interpreted ‘foreign jurists naturalized in Japan,’ and a law of naturalization was projected with great haste. But the measure was considered to be still objectionable on two grounds: first, because the limitation of the Imperial right of nomination by treaties was contrary to the idea of independence; and secondly, because the fact that seven out of the twelve judgeships of the Supreme Court were open only to naturalized subjects was in distinct violation of the article of the Constitution by which all public offices are open to all the Japanese subjects alike.

Never was political controversy so loud and so heated in Japan as at this time. The members of Count Okuma’s party energetically defended the revision in speeches and in the papers, but all the other parties denounced it as national dishonour. New associations, clubs, and newspapers sprang up in all districts and among all classes of the people especially for the purpose of opposing the new treaties, which were understood to become effective from the February of the next year. At the end of September the addresses presented by the people to the Senate^[10] concerning the revision amounted to 305 in all, of which 185, signed by 63,616 persons, were against, and 120, signed by 6,759 individuals, were for the revision.

The Minister President, Count Kuroda, decided to support Count Okuma at any cost, but Count Matsukata, Minister of Finance, proposed to set up a special Commission for the investigation of necessary preparations for treaty revision to be made in the various branches of the Administration; and Count Goto, Minister of Communication, at whose back stood a powerful group of political associations, all opposed to the revision, demanded a Cabinet Council in presence of His Majesty, for deciding the question of revision or not revision at once. At last the great Cabinet Council was held on the 15th of October, 1889, under the personal presidency of the Emperor. It continued from three o’clock in the afternoon till dark, Count Okuma strenuously advocating his measure, Count Goto opposing it with convincing arguments, and Marquis General Yamagata, as Minister of Home Affairs, lately returned from Europe, proposing several weighty questions to Count Okuma. No conclusion was arrived at before the Minister President asked His Majesty to adjourn. On the 18th of October another Cabinet Council was held, without the presidency of the Emperor, and it was almost decided that the revision should be postponed, when Count Okuma, driving back to the Foreign Office at four o’clock in the afternoon, was seriously hurt by a ​dynamite shell thrown into his carriage by Tsuneki Kurushima, ex-samurai of Fukuoka, who instantly cut his own throat, with a sharp dagger, and died on the spot. Luckily, the wound of Count Okuma was not mortal, but the amputation of his left leg prevented him from taking part in the affairs of State for some months. The Kuroda Cabinet resigned on the 25th, and in the difficulty of finding a new Premier among the active statesmen of the day, the Emperor called out Prince Sanjo from his retirement, and entrusted him with the formation of the next Cabinet. Thus was brought to an end the fifth attempt at treaty revision.

In December, Marquis General Yamagata formed a new Cabinet, and Viscount Aoki was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The next year, 1890, was a busy one in the political history of Japan, for it was in this year that the Imperial Diet was to be assembled for the first time, and the new Constitution put into execution. Many new things had to be done before legislation should become hampered by the addition of new machinery, whose action and working nobody could foresee, and among other laws hastily ‘crammed,’ so as to speak, at this time were the civil and commercial codes, civil procedure, and the law on the organization of the Courts of Justice. They were all prepared by the Board of Codification, transferred to the Judicial Department immediately after the retirement of Count Inouye; the civil code was drafted by M. de Boissonade; the commercial code by the distinguished German jurist, Dr. Roesler; the civil procedure and the law on the organization of the Courts of Justice by another German jurist, Dr. Rudolf. Many were the objections against these hasty codifications, and the Senate, which was soon to give place to the Imperial Diet, rejected them, but the necessity of their completion as preliminary steps to treaty revision, and the fear that the coming Diet might never pass them, induced the Yamagata Cabinet boldly to promulgate them in the early part of 1890. The law for the organization of the Courts of Justice came into force on the 1st of November, 1891; the commercial code and the civil procedure on the 1st of January, 1892; and the civil code, which was to take effect on the 1st of January, 1893, was postponed by a law passed by the Diet in its first session till five years later. It is fair to add that the civil and the commercial codes were afterwards carefully revised with the consent of the Diet, so that they now suit Japanese life and institutions perfectly well, and no loud complaint is heard of their being foreign in origin.

As the day for the first election in 1890 approached, the political life of the people, with its parties, papers, meetings, ​and the like, acquired a new force and a new meaning. The body of the old Senate passed into the new House of Peers, in which were also present all the male members of the Imperial Family and the two highest classes of nobility, the counts, viscounts and barons being represented through class elections. Marquis Ito was nominated by the Emperor the first President of the House of Peers. In the House of Commons Count Itagaki’s party returned the greatest number of members, and that of Count Okuma was also largely represented, but neither commanded an absolute majority. The first session was sufficiently stormy, but ended well, chiefly out of respect to the Emperor, whose earnest desire to see the smooth working of the Constitution—a thing so new in the whole East—filled the hearts of all with sympathy and the spirit of moderation.

In May, 1891, Marquis General Yamagata voluntarily laid down his office, and Count Matsukata became the next Minister President. Viscount Aoki was still the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but he was forced to resign a few days after on account of the unlucky incident which befell the Crown Prince Nicholas of Russia. The latter was in Japan on his way to Vladivostok, whither he was sent by his father, in order to inaugurate the commencement of the building of the great Siberian Railway, when an infatuated policeman, perhaps seeing in him the future enemy of Japan, wounded him with a sword on the temple. Viscount Admiral Enomoto, Privy Councillor—that very same Enomoto who had fought against the Imperial forces in 1869—was appointed the next Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had some plans for the treaty revision, but the fall of the Matsukata Cabinet, in consequence of the conflict with the third Diet, did not allow him time to announce them.

In retrospect, we might say that for Japan, with her people yet unprepared to live side by side with foreigners, her system of government absolute, though by no means despotic, and her laws yet little developed, to try to revise the treaties was to try an impossibility—if only for this reason, that the civilized nations of Europe make the protection of the life and property and commerce of their subjects abroad the primary object of their foreign policy; and as long as Japan had not given the guarantee that she, too, had the same end in view, no Government could safely trust their subjects to our care. Until such guarantee had been given, the Western nations must of necessity cling to the system of ‘settlements’ and ‘consular jurisdiction.’ But now, when the same constitutional form of government, the same system of the administration of justice, and the codes of laws based on the same principles as in Europe and America, had been promulgated and begun to work smoothly in Japan, the real ​objection to the treaty revision lost its raison d’être. The Chinese War of 1894–95, which showed the real strength of Japan, and her ability to act like a civilized nation, not only in time of peace, but also in that of war, and even towards the enemy, greatly facilitated the work of revision.

After the fall of the Matsukata Cabinet in August, 1892, Marquis Ito was again the Premier and Count Mutsu Minister of Foreign Affairs.^[11] During the fourth session of the Diet, in 1893, the House of Commons presented an Address to the Emperor, humbly imploring him to cause the last work of the Restored Imperial Government—namely, treaty revision—to be accomplished, not by such halfway measures as had been tried by the successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs, but by at once concluding with the foreign Powers treaties on a footing of perfect equality. Nor was the task very difficult now, for the reason above stated. Count Mutsu followed the principle of giving full powers to the Japanese Ministers abroad, and made them negotiate with the Governments to which they were accredited upon the project of revision sent them from Tokyo. The negotiations were in some cases long and difficult, because despatches had to be received and instructions given by mail requiring weeks to arrive, but the method proved successful on the whole. Even before the war, England signed the new treaty, in July, 1894, the United States during the war, and the rest of the Powers immediately after it. All these new treaties were designed to enter into force simultaneously in May, 1899, and to remain so for twelve years, after which the contracting parties were free to renounce them at any time, subject to one year’s previous notice. In them extraterritoriality is done away, the sojourn and possession of movable property by foreigners in the interior are allowed, and the most favoured nation clause is made reciprocal and unconditional. The Custom tariff is not yet autonomous, but import duties are fixed by a separate diplomatic document accompanying the main treaty, with which it is to disappear after twelve years or more, to be replaced by autonomy pure and simple. These conventional tariff rates, of course, differ in the different States, according as their chief articles of export and import differ, but the most favoured nation clause applied to them makes them uniform throughout. In the treaties with China, Corea, and Siam, it is Japan that still retains the right of extraterritoriality over her subjects living in these countries.

Thus, the last work of the new Imperial Government was ​accomplished before the close of the nineteenth century. At the same time, the war with China gave rise to many fresh problems for Japanese diplomacy concerning China and Corea, generally known as the ‘Far Eastern Questions,’ most of which have not yet found any definite solution, so that our history must end here for the time being.

For the organization of diplomatic service in Japan a few words must suffice. By the 13th Article of the Constitution the power of deciding over peace and war, and of making treaties and conventions, rests in the Emperor. This article is so interpreted that in Japan the conduct of diplomatic affairs, like the conduct of military and naval affairs, forms a part of the Imperial prerogative, and lies entirely outside the rights of the Imperial Diet. If the execution of a diplomatic act calls for something which, according to the Constitution, can be done only by force of law, such a law will be submitted to the deliberation of the Diet as law, but the diplomatic act itself never requires the assent of the Assembly for its validity. Similarly the resolution of the Diet regarding diplomatic questions has no binding effect, and can at best only take the form of an address to the Emperor or memorandum to the Government. Interpellations regarding foreign policies are generally met by the answer that such and such a matter is beyond the power of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to answer.

Such absolute power of the Sovereign in diplomatic affairs is under ordinary circumstances exercised by his Cabinet Council, and only in rare, exceptional cases does the Emperor directly commission his Minister of Foreign Affairs to conduct a special diplomatic business without reference to the Cabinet Council, as we have seen in the case of the treaty revision. By the 5th Article of the Ordinance on the organization of the Imperial Cabinet all treaties and conventions and important international affairs have to be submitted to the Cabinet Council, and hence the real head of Japanese Diplomacy is the Minister President, and not the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who usually takes the initiative, but can decide nothing of weight by himself. This is the internal arrangement, but outwardly it is of course the Minister of Foreign Affairs who represents the Imperial Government towards foreign Governments and their representatives in Japan, and also gives instructions to the Japanese Ministers abroad. Knowing that nothing of weight can be decided without a Cabinet Council, foreign Ministers in Tokyo sometimes go to the Minister President directly for the negotiation of an affair at hand, but ​the latter usually refers them to the special machinery under him.

The Foreign Office is called in Japanese Gwai-mu-sho, and is divided into three sections, namely, the General Section, the Political Section, and the Commercial Section. The General Section is again divided into seven subsections for personnel, telegrams, comptabilité, correspondence, records, translation, and legal questions, and its chief takes the place of the former Vice-Minister, which office does not exist in the present organization. The change of the Minister of Foreign Affairs generally carries with it the change of the chief of the General Section, but not necessarily the chiefs of the other sections. All the chiefs are special High Commissioners, though sometimes Ministers Resident are nominated to the post. Secretaries and councillors, all ordinary commissioners, make up the staff of each section, together with a varying number of ‘élève-diplomats’ as attachés. Besides the three sections, and co-ordinate with them, is the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with a chief and the Minister’s confidential secretaries, who take charge of the confidential correspondence of the Minister, and such special affairs as the latter might choose to confide in them from time to time.

The appropriation for the Foreign Office has to be voted by the Diet, as also those of all the Ministerial departments; but the system of forcing the Foreign Secretary to state his policy regarding pending diplomatic questions, as in England and other countries on the occasion of Budget deliberations, has not yet begun, or cannot begin in Japan, on account of the article of the Constitution cited above. There is another article in the same Constitution which prevents either House to strike out or decrease, without the consent of the Government, fixed expenses—i.e., expenses once voted in the last Budget for the exercise of the Imperial prerogatives.

Japan has only three classes of diplomatic agents at present, namely, Ministers Plenipotentiary, Ministers Resident, and Chargés d’Affaires. No Ambassadors exist permanently, though on rare occasions Ambassadors are sent out on special missions. Likewise there are at present no foreign Ambassadors sent to Japan for permanent representation. A Chargé d’Affaires was formerly envoyed to Corea, but now the post has been raised to that of a Minister Resident. Ministers Resident are also accredited to Siam and the Republics of South America, but to all other States of Europe and America Ministers Plenipotentiary are sent. They are both special High Commissioners, and though theoretically the post is open to anybody, yet of late years the custom has grown up that only those that have gone through a regular diplomatic career either at home or in the Legations abroad, can aspire ​to the post. The nomination of all the other personnel of the Foreign Office and the Legations are strictly exclusive—i.e., only those that have gone through the course prescribed in the Ordinance on the appointment and promotion of diplomatic officials are nominated. The course begins with ‘Élève-Diplomats’ or ‘Élève-Consuls’ who are admitted upon special competitive State examination. There are at present fourteen Japanese Legations abroad, and to the more important ones are attached military attachés, or naval attachés, or both.

As regards Consular Service we have Consuls-General, Consuls of the first and the second classes, Vice-Consuls, and Élève-Consuls. Their nomination is also exclusive, though sometimes the diplomatic personnel is recruited from among the consular officers. There are now about fifty Japanese consulates abroad, of which a large portion is distributed over China, Corea, and India. For posts in Europe and Australia merchant consuls are also nominated, but their number is steadily decreasing.^[12] Once a month a commercial report is published by the Foreign Office in the form of a pamphlet, wherein all the mail reports of the Consuls are to be found. Only quite recently the Consuls in New York, Lyons, Bombay, and Shanghai have been instructed to send in their weekly reports by telegram. Japan is still in need of good Consuls versed in making useful commercial reports quickly.

As to diplomatic publications, things like Blue-Books are yet unknown in Japan. Only once after the Chinese War did the Government publish some diplomatic documents in the separate print of the Official Gazette. Usually reports of undiplomatic character alone, such as quarantines in foreign ports, changes of foreign laws affecting our commerce, etc., are published in the Official Gazette under the head of ‘Reports of Legations and Consular Reports.’

One great defect of the Japanese system of diplomacy is its unreasonable secrecy. Of course, all pending negotiations must be secret, but even then there are cases in which the nation can profit by well-managed disclosing of facts. But here all questions are kept secret while they are pending, and secret they remain till the end of time unless revealed in some fortuitous way, usually through publication in foreign Government reports or official organs. There are tens of cases every year where weighty diplomatic questions arise and find official solutions somehow or other; without that the people in general never dream of their ever having occurred. Public opinion works no constant effect on diplomatic affairs, because not properly guided, and in this respect little has changed since the establishment of the constitutional régime.