A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive

​

A SYSTEM OF LOGIC,

RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE:

BEING A

CONNECTED VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE

AND THE

METHODS OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION.

BY

JOHN STUART MILL.

EIGHTH EDITION.

NEW YORK:

HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,

FRANKLIN SQUARE.

1881.

Contents (not listed in original)

​

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.
PAGE
§ 1. A definition at the commencement of a subject must be provisional 17
2. Is logic the art and science of reasoning? 17
3. Or the art and science of the pursuit of truth? 18
4. Logic is concerned with inferences, not with intuitive truths 19
5. Relation of logic to the other sciences 21
6. Its utility, how shown 22
7. Definition of logic stated and illustrated 23
BOOK I.
OF NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS.
Chapter I. Of the Necessity of commencing with an Analysis of Language.
§ 1. Theory of names, why a necessary part of logic 26
2. First step in the analysis of Propositions 27
3. Names must be studied before Things 28
Chapter II. Of Names.
§ 1. Names are names of things, not of our ideas 29
2. Words which are not names, but parts of names 30
3. General and Singular names 32
4. Concrete and Abstract 33
5. Connotative and Non-connotative 34
6. Positive and Negative 41
7. Relative and Absolute 42
8. Univocal and Æquivocal 44
Chapter III. Of the Things denoted by Names.
§ 1. Necessity of an enumeration of Namable Things. The Categories of Aristotle 45
2. Ambiguity of the most general names 46
3. Feelings, or states of consciousness 48
4. Feelings must be distinguished from their physical antecedents. Perceptions, what. 49
5. Volitions, and Actions, what 51
6. Substance and Attribute 51
7. Body 62
8. Mind 56
9. Qualities 67
10. Relations 69
11. Resemblance 60
12. Quantity 62
13. All attributes of bodies are grounded on states of consciousness 63
14. So also all attributes of mind 64
15. Recapitulation 64
Chapter IV. Of Propositions.
§ 1. Nature and office of the copula 60
2. Affirmative and Negative propositions 67
3. Simple and Complex 69
4. Universal, Particular, and Singular 71
Chapter V. Of the Import of Propositions.
§ 1. Doctrine that a proposition is the expression of a relation between two ideas 73
2. —that it is the expression of a relation between the meanings of two names 75
3. —that it consists in referring something to, or excluding something from, a class 77
4. What it really is 80
5. It asserts (or denies) a sequence, a co-existence, a simple existence, a causation 81
6. —or a resemblance 83
7. Propositions of which the terms are abstract 86
Chapter VI. Of Propositions merely Verbal.
§ 1. Essential and Accidental propositions 88
2. All essential propositions are identical propositions 89
3. Individuals have no essences 91
4. Real propositions, how distinguished from verbal 92
5. Two modes of representing the impart of a Real proposition 93
Chapter VII. Of the Nature of Classification, and the Five Predicables.
§1. Classification, how connected with Naming 94
2. The Predicables, what 95
3. Genus and Species 95
4. Kinds have a real existence in nature 97
5. Differentiæ 100
6. Differentiæ for general purposes, and differentiæ for special or technical purposes 101
7. Proprium 103
8. Accidens 104
Chapter VIII. Of Definition.
§ 1. A definition, what 105
2. Every name can be defined, whose meaning is susceptible of analysis 106
3. Complete, how distinguished from incomplete definitions 107
4. —and from descriptions 108
5. What are called definitions of Things, are definitions of Names with an implied assumption of the existence of Things corresponding to them 111
6. —even when such things do not in reality exist 116 ​
§ 7. Definition, though of names only, must be grounded on knowledge of the corresponding things 117
BOOK II.
OF REASONING.
Chapter I. Of Inference, or Reasoning, in general.
§ 1. Retrospect of the preceding book 121
2. Inferences improperly so called 122
3. Inferences proper, distinguished into inductions and ratiocinations 125
Chapter II. Of Ratiocination, or Syllogism.
§ 1. Analysis of the Syllogism 126
2. The dictum de omni not the foundation of reasoning, but a mere identical proposition 132
3. What is the really fundamental axiom of Ratiocination 135
4. The other form of the axiom 137
Chapter III. Of the Functions, and Logical Value of the Syllogism.
§ 1. Is the Syllogism a petitio principii? 139
2. Insufficiency of the common theory 139
3. All inference is from particulars to particulars 141
4. General propositions are a record of such inferences, and the rules of the syllogism are rules for the interpretation of the record 146
5. The syllogism not the type of reasoning, but a test of it 148
6. The true type, what 151
7. Relation between Induction and Deduction 153
8. Objections answered 154
9. Of Formal Logic, and its relation to the Logic of Truth 156
Chapter IV. Of Trains of Reasoning, and Deductive Sciences.
§ 1. For what purpose trains of reasoning exist 153
2. A train of reasoning is a series of inductive inferences 158
3. — from particulars to particulars through marks of marks 160
4. Why there are deductive sciences 161
5. Why other sciences still remain experimental 164
6. Experimental sciences may become deductive by the progress of experiment 165
7. In what manner this usually takes place 166
Chapter V. Of Demonstration, and Necessary Truths.
§ 1. The Theorems of geometry are necessary truths only in the sense of necessarily following from hypotheses 168
2. Those hypotheses are real facts with some of their circumstances exaggerated or omitted 170
3. Some of the first principles of geometry are axioms, and these are not hypothetical 171
4. — but are experimental truths 172
§ 5. An objection answered 174
6. Dr. Whewell's opinions on axioms examined 176
Chapter VI. The same Subject continued.
§ 1. All deductive sciences are inductive 187
2. The propositions of the science of number are not verbal, but generalizations from experience 188
3. In what sense hypothetical 191
4. The characteristic property of demonstrative science is to be hypothetical 192
5. Definition of demonstrative evidence 193
Chapter VII. Examination of some Opinions opposed to the preceding doctrines.
§ 1. Doctrine of the Universal Postulate 193
2. The test of inconceivability does not represent the aggregate of past experience 195
3. — nor is implied in every process of thought 197
4. Objections answered 201
5. Sir W. Hamilton's opinion on the Principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle 204
BOOK III.
OF INDUCTION.
Chapter I. Preliminary Observations on Induction in general.
§ 1. Importance of an Inductive Logic 207
2. The logic of science is also that of business and life 208
Chapter II. Of Inductions improperly so called.
§ 1. Inductions distinguished from verbal transformations 210
2. — from inductions, falsely so called, in mathematics 212
3. — and from descriptions 213
4. Examination of Dr. Whewell's theory of Induction 214
6. Further illustration of the preceding remarks 221
Chapter III. Of the Ground of Induction.
§ 1. Axiom of the uniformity of the course of nature 223
2. Not true in every sense. Induction per enumerationem simplicem 226
3. The question of Inductive Logic stated 227
Chapter IV. Of Laws of Nature.
§ 1. The general regularity in nature is a tissue of partial regularities, called laws 229
2. Scientific induction must be grounded on previous spontaneous inductions 231
3. Are there any inductions fitted to be a test of all others? 232
Chapter V. Of the Law of Universal Causation.
§ 1. The universal law of successive phenomena is the Law of Causation 234
2. — i. e., the law that every consequent has an invariable antecedent 236 ​
§ 3. The cause of a phenomenon is the assemblage of its conditions 237
4. The distinction of agent and patient illusory 241
5. Case in which the effect consists in giving a property to an object 243
6. The cause is not the invariable antecedent, but the unconditional invariable antecedent 244
7. Can a cause be simultaneous with its effect? 247
8. Idea of a Permanent Cause, or original natural agent 248
9. Uniformities of co-existence between effects of different permanent causes, are not laws 251
10. Theory of the Conservation of Force 251
11. Doctrine that volition Is an efficient cause, examined 255
Chapter VI. Of the Composition of Causes.
§ 1. Two modes of the conjunct action of causes, the mechanical and the chemical 266
2. The composition of causes the general rule; the other case exceptional 268
3. Are effects proportional to their causes? 270
Chapter VII. Of Observation and Experiment.
§ 1. The first step of inductive inquiry is a mental analysis of complex phenomena into their elements 272
2. The next is an actual separation of those elements 273
3. Advantages of experiment over observation 274
4. Advantages of observation over experiment 276
Chapter VIII. Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry.
§ 1. Method of Agreement 278
2. Method of Difference 280
3. Mutual relation of these two methods 281
4. Joint Method of Agreement and Difference 283
5. Method of Residues 284
6. Method of Concomitant Variations 285
7. Limitations of this last method 289
Chapter IX. Miscellaneous Examples of the Four Methods.
§ 1. Liebig's theory of metallic poisons 292
2. Theory of induced electricity 294
3. Dr.Wells's theory of dew 290
4. Dr. Brown-Seqnard's theory of cadaveric rigidity 301
5. Examples of the Method of Residues 305
6. Dr. Whewell's objections to the Four Methods 307
Chapter X. Of Plurality of Causes; and of the Intermixture of Effects.
§ 1. One effect may have several causes 311
2. —which is the source of a characteristic imperfection of the Method of Agreement 311
3. Plurality of Causes, how ascertained 314
4. Concurrence of Causes which do not compound their effects 315
5. Difficulties of the investigation, when causes compound their effects. 317
§ 6. Three modes of investigating the laws of complex effects 320
7. The method of simple observation inapplicable 321
8. The purely experimental method inapplicable 322
Chapter XI. Of the Deductive Method.
§ 1. First stage; ascertainment of the laws of the separate causes by direct induction 325
2. Second stage; ratiocination from the simple laws of the complex cases 328
3. Third stage; verification by specific experience 329
Chapter XII. Of the Explanation of Laws of Nature.
§ 1. Explanation defined 332
2. First mode of explanation, by resolving the law of a complex effect into the laws of the concurrent causes and the fact of their co-existence 332
3. Second mode; by the detection of an intermediate link in the sequence 332
4. Laws are always resolved into laws more general than themselves 333
5. Third mode; the subsumption of less general laws under a more general one 335
6. What the explanation of a law of nature amounts to 337
Chapter XIII. Miscellaneous Examples of the Explanation of Laws of Nature.
§ 1. The general theories of the sciences 338
2. Examples from chemical speculations 339
3. Example from Dr. Brown-Sequard's researches on the nervous system 310
4. Examples of following newly -discovered laws into their complex manifestations 341
5. Examples of empirical generalizations, afterward confirmed and explained deductively 342
6. Example from mental science 343
7. Tendency of all the sciences to become deductive 344
Chapter XIV. Of the Limits to the Explanation of Laws of Nature; and of Hypotheses.
§ 1. Can all the sequences in nature be resolvable into one law? 345
2. Ultimate laws can not be less numerous than the distinguishable feelings of our nature 346
3. In what sense ultimate facts can be explained 349
4. The proper use of scientific hypotheses 349
5. Their indispensableness 353
6. The two degrees of legitimacy in hypotheses 355
7. Some inquiries apparently hypothetical are really inductive 359
Chapter XV. Of Progressive Effects; and of the Continued Action of Causes.
§ 1. How a progressive effect results from the simple continuance of the cause 361
2. —and from the progressiveness of the cause 363
3. Derivative laws generated from a single ultimate law 365 ​
Chapter XVI. Of Empirical Laws..
§ 1. Definition of an empirical law 366
2. Derivative laws commonly depend on collocations 367
3. The collocations of the permanent causes are not reducible to any law 367
4. Hence empirical laws can not be relied on beyond the limits of actual experience 368
5. Generalizations which rest only on the Method of Agreement can only be received as empirical laws 369
6. Signs from which an observed uniformity of sequence may be presumed to be resolvable 369
7. Two kinds of empirical laws 371
Chapter XVII. Of Chance, and its Elimination.
§ 1. The proof of empirical laws depends on the theory of chance 372
2. Chance defined and characterized 373
3. The elimination of chance 376
4. Discovery of residual phenomena by eliminating chance 377
6. The doctrine of chances 378
Chapter XVIII. Of the Calculation of Chances.
§ 1. Foundation of the doctrine of chances, as taught by mathematics 379
2. The doctrine tenable 380
3. On what foundation it really rests 381
4. Its ultimate dependence on causation 383
5. Theorem of the doctrine of chances which relates to the cause of a given event 385
6. How applicable to the elimination of chance 386
Chapter XIX. Of the Extension of Derivative Laws to Adjacent Cases.
§ 1. Derivative laws, when not casual, are almost always contingent on collocations 388
2. On what grounds they can be extended to cases beyond the bounds of actual experience 389
3. Those cases must be adjacent cases 390
Chapter XX. Of Analogy.
§ 1. Various senses of the word analogy 393
2. Nature of analogical evidence 393
3. On what circumstances its value depends 396
Chapter XXI. Of the Evidence of the Law of Universal Causation.
§ 1. The law of causality does not rest on an instinct 397
2. —but on an induction by simple enumeration 400
3. In what cases such induction is allowable. 402
4. The universal prevalence of the law of causality, on what grounds admissible 403
Chapter XXII. Of Uniformities of Co-existence not dependent on Causation.
§ 1. Uniformities of co-existence which result from laws of sequence 400
2. The properties of Kinds are uniformities of co-existence 408
3. Some are derivative, others ultimate 409
4. No universal axiom of co-existence 410
5. The evidence of uniformities of co-existence, how measured 411
§ 6. When derivative, their evidence is that of empirical laws 412
7. So also when ultimate 413
8. The evidence stronger in proportion as the law is more general 413
9. Every distinct Kind must be examined 414
Chapter XXIII. Of Approximate Generalizations, and Probable Evidence.
§ 1. The inferences called probable, rest on approximate generalizations 416
2. Approximate generalizations less useful in science than in life 416
3. In what cases they may be resorted to 417
4. In what manner proved 418
5. With what precautions employed 420
6. The two modes of combining probabilities. 421
7. How approximate generalizations may be converted into accurate generalizations equivalent to them. 423
Chapter XXIV. Of the Remaining Laws of Nature.
§ 1. Propositions which assert mere existence. 425
2. Resemblance, considered as a subject of science 426
3. The axioms and theorems of mathematics comprise the principal laws of resemblance 427
4. —and those of order in place, and rest on induction by simple enumeration 428
5. The propositions of arithmetic affirm the modes of formation of some given number 429
6. Those of algebra affirm the equivalence of different modes of formation of numbers generally 432
7. The propositions of geometry are laws of outward nature 433
8. Why geometry is almost entirely deductive 436
9. Function of mathematical truths in the other sciences, and limits of that function. 436
Chapter XXV. Of the Grounds of Disbelief.
§ 1. Improbability and impossibility 438
2. Examination of Hume's doctrine of miracles 438
3. The degrees of improbability correspond to differences in the nature of the generalization with which an assertion conflicts 441
4. A fact is not incredible because the chances are against it 443
5. Are coincidences less credible than other facts? 444
6. An opinion of Laplace examined 446
BOOK IV.
OF OPERATIONS SUBSIDIARY TO INDUCTION.
Chapter I. Of Observation and Description.
§ 1. Observation, how far a subject of logic 449
2. A great part of what seems observation is really inference 450 ​
§ 3. The description of an observation affirms more than is contained, in the observation 452
4. —namely, an agreement among phenomena; and the comparison of phenomena to ascertain such agreements is a preliminary to induction 453
Chapter II. Of Abstraction, or the Formation of Conceptions.
§ 1. The comparison which is a preliminary to induction implies general conceptions 455
2. — but these need not be pre-existent 456
3. A general conception, originally the result of a comparison, becomes itself the type of comparison 458
4. What is meant by appropriate conceptions. 459
5. — and by clear conceptions 461
6. Farther illustration of the subject 462
Chapter III. Of Naming as Subsidiary to Induction.
§ 1. The fundamental property of names as an instrument of thought 464
2. Names are not indispensable to induction 465
3. In what manner subservient to it 465
4. General names not a mere contrivance to economize the use of language 466
Chapter IV. Of the Requisites of a Philosophical Language, and the Principles of Definition.
§ 1. First requisite of philosophical language, a steady and determinate meaning for every general name 467
2. Names in common use have often a loose connotation 467
3. —which the logician should fix, with as little alteration as possible 469
4. Why definition is often a question not of words but of things 470
5. How the logician should deal with the transitive applications of words 472
6. Evil consequences of casting off any portion of the customary connotation of words 476
Chapter V. On the Natural History of the Variations in the Meaning of Terms.
§ 1. How circumstances originally accidental become incorporated into the meaning of words 480
2. — and sometimes become the whole meaning 481
3. Tendency of words to become generalized. 482
4. —and to become specialized 485
Chapter VI. The Principles of Philosophical Language farther considered.
§ 1. Second requisite of philosophical language, a name for every important meaning 487
2. — viz., first, an accurate descriptive terminology 487
3. — secondly, a name for each of the more important results of scientific abstraction 490
4. —thirdly, a nomenclature, or system of the names of Kinds 491
5. Peculiar nature of the connotation of names which belong to a nomenclature 493
§ 6. In what cases language may, and may not, be used mechanically 494
Chapter VII. Of Classification, as Subsidiary to Induction.
§ 1. Classification as here treated of, wherein different from the classification implied in naming 497
2. Theory of natural groups 498
3. Are natural groups given by type, or by definition? 501
4. Kinds are natural groups 502
5. How the names of Kinds should be constructed 505
Chapter VIII. Of Classification by Series.
§ 1. Natural groups should be arranged in a natural series 507
2. The arrangement should follow the degrees of the main phenomenon 508
3. — which implies the assumption of a type species 509
4. How the divisions of the series should be determined 510
5. Zoology affords the completest type of scientific classification 511
BOOK V.
ON FALLACIES.
Chapter I. Of Fallacies in General.
§ 1. Theory of fallacies a necessary part of logic 512
2. Casual mistakes are not fallacies 513
3. The moral sources of erroneous opinion, how related to the intellectual 513
Chapter II. Classification of Fallacies.
§ 1. On what criteria a classification of fallacies should be grounded 516
2. The five classes of fallacies 516
3. The reference of a fallacy to one or another class is sometimes arbitrary 518
Chapter III. Fallacies of Simple Infection, or A Priori Fallacies.
§ 1. Character of this class of fallacies 520
2. Natural prejudice of mistaking subjective laws for objective, exemplified in popular superstitions 521
3. — that things which we think of together must exist together, and that what is inconceivable must be false 523
4. — of ascribing objective existence to ababstractions 527
5. Fallacy of the Sufficient Reason 528
6. Natural prejudice, that the differences in nature correspond to the distinctions in language 529
7. Prejudice, that a phenomenon can not have more than one cause 532
8. — that the conditions of a phenomenon must resemble the phenomenon 533
Chapter IV. Fallacies of Observation.
§ 1. Non-observation, and Mal-observation 538 ​
§ 2. Non-observation of instances, and non-observation of circumstances 538
3. Examples of the former 539
4. — and of the latter. 542
5. Mal-observation characterized and exemplified 545
Chapter V. Fallacies of Generalization.
§ 1. Character of the class 547
2. Certain kinds of generalization must always be groundless 547
3. Attempts to resolve phenomena radically different into the same 548
4. Fallacy of mistaking empirical for casual laws 549
5. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc; and the deductive fallacy corresponding to it 551
6. Fallacy of False Analogies 553
7. Function of metaphors in reasoning 557
8. How fallacies of generalization grow out of bad classification 558
Chapter VI. Fallacies of Ratiocination.
§ 1. Introductory Remarks 559
2. Fallacies in the conversion and aeqnipollency of propositions 559
3. — in the syllogistic process 560
4. Fallacy of changing the premises 561
Chapter VII. Fallacies of Confusion.
§ 1. Fallacy of Ambiguous Terms 563
2. — of Petitio Principii 570
3. — of Ignoratio Elenchi 576
BOOK VI.
ON THE LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES.
Chapter I. Introductory Remarks.
§ 1. The backward state of the Moral Sciences can only be remedied by applying to them the methods of Physical Science, duly extended and generalized 579
2. How far this can be attempted in the present work 580
Chapter II. Of Liberty and Necessity.
§ 1. Are human actions subject to the law of causality? 581
2. The doctrine commonly called Philosophical Necessity, in what sense true 581
3. In appropriateness and pernicious effect of the terra Necessity 583
4. A motive not always the anticipation of a pleasure or a pain 585
Chapter III. That there is, or may be, a Science of Human Nature.
§ 1. There may be sciences which are not exact sciences 586
2. To what scientific type the Science of Human Nature corresponds 588
Chapter IV. Of the Laws of Mind.
§ 1. What is meant by Laws of Mind 589
2. Is there a Science of Psychology? 590
§ 3. The principal investigations of Psychology characterized 591
4. Relation of mental facts to physical conditions 594
Chapter V. Of Ethology, or the Science of the Formation of Character.
§ 1. The Empirical Laws of Human Nature 596
2. — are merely approximate generalizations. The universal laws' are those of the formation of character 597
3. The laws of the formation of character can not be ascertained by observation and experiment 599
4. — but must be studied deductively 601
5. The principles of Ethology are the axiomata media of mental science 603
6. Ethology characterized 604
Chapter VI. General Considerations on the Social Science.
§ 1. Are Social Phenomena a subject of Science? 606
2. Of what nature the Social Science must be 607
Chapter VII. Of the Chemical or Experimental Method in the Social Science.
§ 1. Characters of the mode of thinking which deduces political doctrines from specific experience 608
2. In the Social Science experiments are impossible 610
3. — the Method of Difference inapplicable 610
4. — and the Methods of Agreement, and of Concomitant Variations, inconclusive 611
6. The Method of Residues also inconclusive, and presupposes Deduction 612
Chapter VIII. Of the Geometrical, or Abstract Method.
§ 1. Characters of this mode of thinking 614
2. Examples of the Geometrical Method 615
3. The interest-philosophy of the Bentham school 616
Chapter IX. Of the Physical, or Concrete Deductive Method.
§ 1. The Direct and Inverse Deductive Methods 619
2. Difficulties of the Direct Deductive Method in the Social Science 621
3. To what extent the different branches of sociological speculation can be studied apart. Political Economy characterized. 623
4. Political Ethology, or the science of national character 626
5. The Empirical Laws of the Social Science 628
6. The Verification of the Social Science 629
Chapter X. Of the Inverse Deductive, or Historical Method.
§ 1. Distinction between the general Science of Society, and special sociological inquiries. 630
2. What is meant by a State of Society? 631
3. The Progressiveness of Man and Society 631
4. The laws of the succession of states of society can only be ascertained by the Inverse Deductive Method 633 ​
§ 5. Social Statics, or the science of the Co-existences of Social Phenomena 635
6. Social Dynamics, or the science of the Successions of Social Phenomena 639
7. Outlines of the Historical Method 640
8. Future prospects of Sociological Inquiry 642
Chapter XI. Additional Elucidations of the Science of History.
§ 1. The subjection of historical facts to uniform laws is verified by statistics 644
2. — does not imply the insignificance of moral causes 646
3. — nor the inefficacy of the characters of individuals and of the acts of governments 647
4. The historical importance of eminent men and of the policy of governments illustrated 650
Chapter XII. Of the Logic of Practice, or Art; including Morality and Policy.
§ 1. Morality not a Science, but an Art 652
2. Relation between rules of art and the theorems of the corresponding science 653
3. What is the proper function of rules of art? 654
4. Art can not be deductive 655
5. Every Art consists of truths of Science, arranged in the order suitable for some practical use 655
6. Teleology, or the Doctrine of Ends 656
7. Necessity of an ultimate standard, or first principle of Teleology 657
8. Conclusion 659

Contents (not listed in original)

Chapter IV. Of Propositions.
Chapter V. Of The Import Of Propositions.
Chapter VI. Of Propositions Merely Verbal.
Chapter VII. Of The Nature Of Classification, And The Five Predicables.
Chapter VIII. Of Definition.

Book II. On Reasoning.

Chapter I. Of Inference, Or Reasoning, In General.
Chapter II. Of Ratiocination, Or Syllogism.
Chapter III. Of The Functions And Logical Value Of The Syllogism.
Chapter IV. Of Trains Of Reasoning, And Deductive Sciences.
Chapter V. Of Demonstration, And Necessary Truths.
Chapter VI. The Same Subject Continued.
Chapter VII. Examination Of Some Opinions Opposed To The Preceding Doctrines.
Chapter I. Preliminary Observations On Induction In General.
Chapter II. Of Inductions Improperly So Called.
Chapter III. Of The Ground Of Induction.
Chapter IV. Of Laws Of Nature.
Chapter V. Of The Law Of Universal Causation.
Chapter VI. On The Composition Of Causes.
Chapter VII. On Observation And Experiment.
Chapter VIII. Of The Four Methods Of Experimental Inquiry.
Chapter IX. Miscellaneous Examples Of The Four Methods.
Chapter X. Of Plurality Of Causes, And Of The Intermixture Of Effects.
Chapter XI. Of The Deductive Method.
Chapter XII. Of The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature.
Chapter XIII. Miscellaneous Examples Of The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature.
Chapter XIV. Of The Limits To The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature; And Of Hypotheses.
Chapter XV. Of Progressive Effects; And Of The Continued Action Of Causes.
Chapter XVI. Of Empirical Laws.
Chapter XVII. Of Chance And Its Elimination.
Chapter XVIII. Of The Calculation Of Chances.
Chapter XIX. Of The Extension Of Derivative Laws To Adjacent Cases.
Chapter XX. Of Analogy.
Chapter XXI. Of The Evidence Of The Law Of Universal Causation.
Chapter XXII. Of Uniformities Of Co-Existence Not Dependent On Causation.
Chapter XXIV. Of The Remaining Laws Of Nature.
Chapter XXV. Of The Grounds Of Disbelief.
Chapter I. Of Observation And Description.
Chapter II. Of Abstraction, Or The Formation Of Conceptions.
Chapter III. Of Naming, As Subsidiary To Induction.
Chapter IV. Of The Requisites Of A Philosophical Language, And The Principles Of Definition.
Chapter V. On The Natural History Of The Variations In The Meaning Of Terms.
Chapter VI. The Principles Of A Philosophical Language Further Considered.
Chapter VII. Of Classification, As Subsidiary To Induction.
Chapter VIII. Of Classification By Series.
Chapter I. Of Fallacies In General.
Chapter II. Classification Of Fallacies.
Chapter III. Fallacies Of Simple Inspection; Or A Priori Fallacies.
Chapter IV. Fallacies Of Observation.
Chapter V. Fallacies Of Generalization.
Chapter VI. Fallacies Of Ratiocination.
Chapter VII. Fallacies Of Confusion.
Chapter I. Introductory Remarks.
Chapter II. Of Liberty And Necessity.
Chapter III. That There Is, Or May Be, A Science Of Human Nature.
Chapter IV. Of The Laws Of Mind.
Chapter V. Of Ethology, Or The Science Of The Formation Of Character.
Chapter VI. General Considerations On The Social Science.
Chapter VII. Of The Chemical, Or Experimental, Method In The Social Science.
Chapter VIII. Of The Geometrical, Or Abstract, Method.
Chapter IX. Of The Physical, Or Concrete Deductive, Method.
Chapter X. Of The Inverse Deductive, Or Historical, Method.
Chapter XI. Additional Elucidations Of The Science Of History.
Chapter XII. Of The Logic Of Practice, Or Art; Including Morality And Policy.

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